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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Community groups in the United States occasionally enter into negotiated agreements
with local communities to alleviate negative environmental and public health impacts
associated with polluting industries. These so-called Good Neighbor Agreements (GNAs)
take a variety of forms, but typically commit the company to mitigate the offending
practices in exchange for the community group’s commitment to stop legal and public
relations challenges to business operations. Many community activists believe that
GNAs are a promising tool for community empowerment. This premise is explored in
the following review of 11 GNA case studies.
The overall conclusion and recommendation emerging from this study is that GNAs are,
in fact, a process worth pursuing in the right circumstances. Those circumstances are
varied, but at a minimum, require a company with the potential to address community
concerns while maintaining economic viability, and a community group with sufficient
leverage, resources and skill to move through the often long process. Five specific
findings are offered:
(1) Environmental GNAs are Rare. Although the “GNA approach” has been in existence
for several years, it is still a fairly rare strategy used by community organizations to
address environmental, public health, and nuisance concerns.
(2) The GNAs Studied are Generally Quite Effective. The case studies strongly suggest
that when used in appropriate circumstances, the GNA approach can be (and often is)
an effective and appropriate approach for a community group to address
environmentally-oriented company/community conflicts.
(3) The Northern Plains GNA is Atypical. The arrangement between Northern Plains and
its partners with the Stillwater Mine is unusually sophisticated in terms of the scope
and complexity of the agreement, and the community group resources committed to
the GNAs successful implementation.
(4) Formal—i.e., Written and Legally Binding—GNAs are Highly Desirable, but May
Not Be Essential to Achieving Implementation Success. Although there is not a direct
correlation between the formality of the agreements and their degree of
implementation success, having a written and binding agreement offers additional
opportunities to ensure compliance should the signatory company become
uncooperative.
(5) GNAs Are Best Viewed as a (Long and Difficult) Process. Successfully utilizing the
“GNA approach” requires navigating three very different stages typically spanning
several years: (Stage # 1) getting the company to the negotiation table, (Stage # 2)
GNA negotiation/design, and (Stage # 3) implementation.
GNAs are not needed everywhere. But where the safety net of environmental law and
regulation is inadequate, GNAs can be a valuable tool for community activists.
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INTRODUCTION
The body of this Good Neighbor Agreement (GNA) evaluation report is relatively brief,
with most details and supporting material presented in a long series of appendices. The
report begins with this introductory section explaining what a GNA is and why and how
we conducted the evaluation. This is followed by an overview of the cases investigated
for this report, and an assessment of their success. Knowledge gained from these case
studies is then summarized as key findings, followed by concluding remarks. The
appendices that follow the main report contain a wealth of information, primarily
focusing on further describing the case studies (particularly the Northern Plains
arrangement with Stillwater Mine) and the research methodology.

WHAT ARE GOOD NEIGHBOR AGREEMENTS?
In many locations throughout the United States, communities suffer negative
environmental and social impacts from neighboring industries. Conflicts are particularly
common in areas dominated by industries such as petrochemicals, manufacturing, and
mining. A variety of federal, state, and local laws, and their associated permitting
programs, provide some protections for local communities. However, these protections
are frequently viewed by communities as inadequate, often failing to recognize and
address the full range of local concerns, and enforced by agencies with a limited set of
remedies and, frequently, declining budgets and staffs. Additionally, these protections
can create regulatory costs and uncertainties detrimental to the companies and, in many
cases, the communities as well. Communities, companies, and governments often see a
need for better solutions.
Increasingly, community organizations—sometimes in conjunction with local
governments—are choosing to address these conflicts through the use of agreements
negotiated directly with the local companies. These so-called Good Neighbor
Agreements (GNAs) take a variety of forms, but typically are documents promising
company concessions and behavioral changes designed to reduce (and more fully
disclose) negative community impacts. Despite the positive sentiments evoked by the
“Good Neighbor” terminology, these concessions are typically the product of hard-fought
negotiations, and then, are only offered in exchange for a community commitment to stop
litigation, a permit challenge, or some other form of activism against the company.

WHY EVALUATE GNAS?
In the summer of 2001, the Northern Plains Resource Council (hereafter “Northern
Plains” or NPRC) contracted with the Natural Resources Law Center and Anne
Fitzgerald Associates to conduct a three-year study of environmental GNAs. There were
several motivations for this study. First and foremost, Northern Plains is already a
signatory and active participant in a GNA with the Stillwater Mine (Montana), one of the
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world’s largest producers of platinum and palladium.1 While this is enough to make
Northern Plains an expert on the design and implementation of GNAs, the organization’s
experience with GNAs is nonetheless limited to this one example. In order to potentially
improve the functioning of this arrangement and to guide ongoing discussions about
potential new GNAs in other substantive areas (e.g., coalbed methane development),
Northern Plains felt that the organization could benefit from an outside perspective and
from a comparison of the Northern Plains GNA experience with others nationally. This
evaluation and review was to have at least two additional benefits. First, it would allow
the organization to better respond to the dozens of inquiries flooding in from other
community organizations considering the adoption of environmental GNAs, and
similarly, to better share knowledge among other groups that, like Northern Plains, had
some first-hand experience with GNAs. And secondly, such a review would be helpful in
guiding funders anxious to assist communities in the resolution of environmental
problems. Much like the community groups and companies that sign GNAs, the funding
community is interesting in generating maximizing return on its investments. An
evaluation of GNA performance could greatly inform these decisions.
These various motivations came together when the William and Flora Hewlett
Foundation, a long-time supporter of Northern Plains and their GNA arrangement,
offered to fund a three-year evaluation of GNAs, with the intention of generating
information that could be of use to Northern Plains, other community organizations with
or considering GNAs, and the funding community.

RESEARCH METHODS
This study is primarily based on a review of 11 case studies, with the majority of data
collection being accomplished through a written survey, the review of written documents
where available (including the GNA itself), oral interviews, and three workshops held in
Montana (at the end of year 1, 2 and 3 of research). This work was done collaboratively
among the research team, with most survey work and the literature review being
coordinated by the Natural Resources Law Center, most phone communications
conducted by Anne Fitzgerald Associates, and the hosting of workshops by Northern
Plains. The case study approach was seen as essential since there is not a rich GNA
literature, and since our goal is to identify lessons and trends that relate to the use of
GNAs in practice.
In all of this work, our communications were with the community groups—and not the
companies—involved in the GNAs. This focus on community groups persists in the
analysis of data and the formulation of conclusions. A companion study from the
perspective of the companies would undoubtedly be a worthwhile effort, but was
considered beyond the scope and intended audience of this investigation.

1

Palladium is a primary component in catalytic converters used to reduce automobile emissions. Only 3
mines worldwide produce palladium.
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The GNA Network
A key source of information and insight in this study was the community leaders and
their consultants directly involved in the negotiation and implementation of the GNAs
studied. This so-called “GNA network” was consulted frequently during the study,
including in three workshops held in Montana. Some of the key contributors are listed
below in Table 1:
































Table 1. Participants in the GNA Network
Richard Abraham, Texans United Education Fund
Rachael Belz, Ohio Citizen Action
Darlene Bos, Northern Plains Resource Council (Montana)
Arleen Boyd, Stillwater Protective Association (Montana)
Ruth Breech, Ohio Citizen Action
Aaron Browning, Northern Plains Resource Council (Montana)
Dawn Caldarelli, Seneca-Babcock Environmental Sub-Committee (New York)
Janet Callaghan, Shoreline Environmental Alliance (Rodeo/Crockett, California)
Iris Carter, Concerned Citizens of Norco (Louisiana)
Joan Chadez, Citizens of Owyhee County Organized Association (Idaho)
Henry Clark, West County Toxics Coalition (Richmond, California)
Ilene Dobbin, Citizens of Owyhee County Organized Association (Idaho)
Sarah Eeles, West County Toxics Coalition (Richmond, California)
Teresa Erickson, Northern Plains Resource Council (Montana)
Jack Heyneman, Stillwater Protective Association (Montana)
Jerry Iverson, Cottonwood Resource Council (Montana)
Kasha Kessler, Shoreline Environmental Alliance (Rodeo/Crockett, California)
Robyn Morrison, Western Slope Environmental Resource Council (Paonia,
Colorado)
Denny Larson, Refinery Reform Campaign (San Francisco)
Bill Nowak, Buffalo Common Council (New York)
Jeremy Puckett, Western Slope Environmental Resource Council (Paonia,
Colorado)
Michael Reisner, Northern Plains Resource Council (Montana)
Anne Rolfes, Louisiana Bucket Brigade
Jane Shellenberger, Boulder Residents for the Elimination of Air Toxics and
Hazardous Emissions (Colorado)
Amy Singer, Northern Plains Resource Council (Montana)
Garland Smith, Citizens of Owyhee County Organized Association (Idaho)
Wilma Subra, Louisiana Bucket Brigade
Tara Thomas, Western Slope Environmental Resource Council (Paonia,
Colorado)
Ed von Bleichert, Boulder Residents for the Elimination of Air Toxics and
Hazardous Emissions (Colorado)
Bob Wendelgass, Clean Water Action (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)
And others …
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EVALUATION METRICS
Very little documentation exists regarding our relatively small set of case studies, a
reality that has influenced our selection of research methods. Given our small sample
size and our reliance on subjective opinions, we sought to provide some structure to our
qualitative conclusions by subjecting each case to the same set of evaluation metrics.
The selection of these metrics was not only driven by our data limitations and related
methodological constraints, but was also influenced by the broad goals of this study. Our
desire is to accomplish more than a simple determination of success or failure, but to also
develop a better understanding of why efforts succeed or fail, and what transferable
lessons can be pulled from this collective experience. Based on this set of reasons, we
ultimately selected a research approach that relies primarily on 3 evaluation metrics,
listed below in order of importance (most important listed first):
1. Actual program activities versus promised activities. To the extent that the GNA
requires specific actions (or inactions) at predetermined times (or under specific
circumstances), these standards provide a useful way to evaluate activities, outputs,
and potentially, outcomes.
2. Participant satisfaction and self-assessment. Presumably, participants have a good
idea of the suite of problem-solving options available to them, and of the costs and
benefits of pursuing the GNA strategy. Thus, their degree of satisfaction with the
GNA is a useful metric of the strategy.
3. GNA success versus other problem-solving opportunities. Communities can use a
variety of approaches to modify and/or control the activities of neighboring
companies. Ultimately, the efficacy of the GNA approach must be considered with
respect to what is potentially achievable using other tools—including those of a
regulatory, judicial, economic, and/or political nature.
Two additional metrics were also utilized to complement and further refine the analysis
of case study information:
4. Self-assessment of keys to success and failure. Success or failure can often hinge on
the availability of a key resource or circumstance that is best understood by
participants active in the negotiation and implementation of the GNA. By
understanding the keys to success and failure, informed judgments can be made about
the potential merits, application and transferability of the GNA approach.
5. Internal logic of the problem-solving strategy used in the GNA. One way to explain
the success or failure of a problem-solving strategy in a given situation is through an
institutional analysis approach that evaluates how the GNA effort has changed rules
influencing relationships, behaviors, and activities of key participants, and whether or
not this happened as intended.
A detailed discussion of the evaluation methodology is provided in Appendix F.
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CASE STUDIES
SELECTION OF CASES
The research approach used in this study is based on the analysis of case studies.
Locating GNA case studies was a difficult process for many reasons. For starters, the
term “Good Neighbor Agreement” is poorly defined and is used inconsistently in a
variety of contexts; thus, it is difficult to decide what types of arrangements should be
included. In this investigation, we’ve decided to primarily focus on arrangements with
the following characteristics:
1. Feature a written agreement (i.e., an actual GNA document)2;
2. Located in the United States3;
3. Concerned primarily with environmental pollution or natural resource impacts
and/or the associated impacts on human populations4; and
4. Prominently involve one or more non-profit community groups.
These criteria reflect our need for cases offering parallels to the Northern Plains GNA
with the Stillwater Mine.
No central or comprehensive listing of GNAs currently exist. Based on our review of the
relevant—but exceedingly sparse and dispersed—literature (see Appendix A), and our
investigation of numerous Internet-based leads, we identified about 15 cases that
potentially fit our criteria. These cases were narrowed from a body of roughly 50 selfdefined GNAs in the United States.
Once this set of potential case studies was identified, we contacted key members of the
relevant community organizations and, where appropriate, followed through with a
general survey (see Appendix B). The decision to use a survey was based on our need to
develop a working knowledge of each case, to collect information in a standardized
manner (to facilitate comparisons), and to cultivate relationships with community leaders
that can contribute to, and ultimately use, this research. The survey was also useful in
fine-tuning our selection of case studies, since it is fruitless to pursue cases where we
2

Our thinking was two-fold: (1) that a written agreement would be necessary to locate and compile a case
study, and (2) that only a formal agreement would offer the promise of solving the issue of concern. This
guideline was violated by our inclusion of the Rohm and Haas agreement with Ohio Citizen Action. As
discussed later (particularly in finding # 4), the inclusion of this case study provided to be very worthwhile,
as the case illustrates a highly informal GNA model that can be very successful.
3
We do not have a full picture of GNA activity overseas, with the exception of the effort being led by
Friends of the Earth Scotland (see http://www.foe-scotland.org.uk/nation/gna_report.pdf).
4
Note that the phrase “environmental GNAs” is defined herein to include agreements focused on human
health impacts associated with air, land or water pollution. This clarification is needed to distinguish these
GNAs from those focused on topics such as collective bargaining and banking, areas where some GNA
activity is believed to exist.
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could not find an appropriate contact person, and thus, could not acquire a minimum level
of documentation. Based on this mix of technical and practical criteria, we ultimately
chose to include 11 case studies. 5

OVERVIEW OF CASES
The case studies featured in this study are briefly summarized below (listed here by name
of participating company & primary community group(s)). More detailed reviews can be
found in Appendix D and, for the Stillwater/Northern Plains case, Appendix C. The case
studies (Appendix D) were primarily compiled from surveys (Appendix B) and from the
limited documentation available, particularly the GNAs themselves. In drafting the
Stillwater/Northern Plains case study, Anne Fitzgerald Associates supplemented this
information with a series of personal interviews.


Bowie Resources & Western Slope Environmental Resource Council (WSERC).
(Paonia, Colorado.) The GNA is primarily designed to limit truck and rail traffic and
noise associated with increased production at a coal mine. The GNA, adopted in
2000, was an outgrowth of a federal coal permit challenge which threatened to delay
mine expansion for several years. The GNA provided the community with a
mechanism for addressing the traffic issues—which was not covered in the EIS—and
allowed the company to move forward quickly with expansion.



Chevron Refinery & West County Toxics Coalition (WCTC), Communities for a
Better Environment (CBE), and People Do!. (Richmond, California.) The GNA was
inspired by a variety of public health and nuisance concerns associated with pollution
discharges and Clean Air Act violations from the Chevron refinery. When the
refinery sought a state air quality permit to (ironically) start manufacturing new
“clean fuels,” a permit challenge was initiated, prompting GNA negotiations leading
to adoption of an agreement in 1992 calling for reduced pollution, increased
monitoring, and investments in the local economy.



Rhone-Poulenc & Texans United Education Fund (TUEF). (Manchester-Houston,
Texas.) The GNA addresses the community’s public health and nuisance (odors,
noise, traffic) concerns associated with emissions from a chemical plant. A major
chemical spill and a pending permit mobilized the community to seek the GNA,
which was adopted in 1992 as part of the permit issued by the Texas Water
Commission.



Rohm and Haas & Ohio Citizen Action (OCA) and Environmental Community
Organization. (Cincinnati, Ohio.) The agreement addresses air quality and noise
issues associated with a chemical plant. In response to public pressures resulting
from an aggressive canvassing and media strategy, the company agreed in 1991 to an

5

The 11 cases actually cover 13 GNAs (since the 3 Seneca-Babcock industries are treated as one case).
Additionally, some of our advisors and members of our GNA network have experience with multiple cases,
which undoubtedly increases the value of their opinions and insights.
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informal and non-binding agreement that addresses the public health and nuisance
concerns through a Community Advisory Council.


Seneca-Babcock industries (PVS Chemicals, BOC Gases, and Natural
Environmental, Inc.) & Buffalo Common Council and Seneca Babcock
Environmental Subcommittee (SBESC). (Buffalo, New York.) The GNA is actually
a series of three agreements addressing a variety of environmental, public health, and
nuisance concerns associated with three chemical companies. Bad publicity (in part
due to spills) and governmental pressure prompted negotiations leading to agreements
signed in 1995-1997 focusing on pollution prevention, community notification and
involvement, and public health and safety.



Shell Oil & Concerned Citizens of Norco (CCN). (Norco, Louisiana.) The GNA is
the culmination of a lengthy and bitter fight concerning public health and nuisance
impacts experienced by families living adjacent to a refinery and a chemical plant.
The agreement promises funds to relocate the most affected individuals.



Stillwater Mining Company & Northern Plains Resource Council (NPRC), Stillwater
Protective Association, and Cottonwood Resource Council. (Billings, Montana.) The
GNA addresses concerns relating to environmental protection and the community
impacts of new workers being brought in to increase production at a palladium mine.
Community groups used pending permits and threatened lawsuits together with a
negative publicity campaign to force a negotiated agreement in 2000 that addresses
key community concerns while allowing mine operations/expansion to proceed. (See
Appendix C for a detailed discussion.)



Sun Oil & Community/Labor Refinery Tracking Committee (C/LRTC) and the City
of Philadelphia. (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.) The GNA addresses public health and
quality of life issues associated with sulfur dioxide emissions from a refinery.
Negotiation and adoption of the GNA derived from a lawsuit inspired by Clean Air
Act violations. The GNA was enacted in 1997 as a consent decree to the lawsuit,
which has since expired.



Syntex Chemicals & Boulder Residents for the Elimination of Air Toxics and
Hazardous Emissions (BREATHE). (Boulder, Colorado.) The GNA mitigates the
public health and nuisance impacts of air emissions from a pharmaceutical company.
The agreement, initiated by the company and adopted in 1995, was inspired by high
emissions reported in the Toxic Release Inventory and by threats by citizens and local
government to block needed building permits for a proposed expansion.



Unocal & Shoreline Environmental Alliance (SEA), Communities for a Better
Environment, and the Crocket/Rodeo Coalition. (Crockett/Rodeo, California.) The
GNA addresses public health concerns associated with chemical releases from a
refinery. Several highly dangerous spills/releases prompted citizens to challenge the
refinery’s expansion permits, leading to negotiations that culminated in the agreement
in 1995.
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Idaho Dairies & Citizens of Owyhee County Organized Association (COCOA).
(Marsing, Idaho). The GNA addresses the impacts on water and air quality
associated with large-scale dairy operations, particularly the disposal of manure.
Negotiations were prompted by a citizen challenge of a water permit needed by the
dairy. The GNA, signed in 1998, is included in the state water permit. Originally the
GNA applied to only one dairy but was later extended to a second dairy owned by the
same operator.

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
Overall, the cases offer enough similarities to ensure that comparisons are meaningful,
while featuring sufficient variation to support useful contrasts. Appendix E provides a
statistical summary of the information gathered; the following paragraphs summarize
some key highlights.
Perhaps the strongest similarity among the cases is the history of how the GNA came into
being. With remarkably few exceptions, the following narrative appears to be an
accurate summary of each of our case studies:
A company (normally profitable) repeatedly ignores community
complaints about pollution (nuisance, public health, and environmental
concerns) and related impacts until a time at which it needs a new permit
(often as part of its expansion plans) or it violates an existing permit (e.g.,
a sulfur dioxide spill). This provides a focal point for community
opposition, and can provide an opportunity for community groups, by now
often organized into local coalitions, to threaten a lawsuit, a permit
challenge, and/or other forms of and activism. This tactic is generally
augmented by a public relations campaign. The intent of the community is
rarely to close the company, but rather to force resolution of community
concerns outside the scope of, or beyond the apparent interest or ability
of, governmental regulators. Fearing a lawsuit—where delays are as
much a concern for the company as a potential negative verdict—or the
rejection of permits, and wanting to turn bad publicity into good,
companies accept (often begrudgingly) a community’s offer to negotiate.
The resulting GNA outlines a plan for addressing community concerns,
often employing creative remedies not usually available through
regulatory or litigation mechanisms. The breadth and strength of the
resulting GNA is closely correlated to the amount of leverage held by the
community group at the time of negotiation.6
6

The experience of the Stillwater Mine GNA, for example, follows this pattern. The relationship between
the mine and the local community became strained in 1997-1998, when the company sought the permits
necessary to significantly expand production, to build a new impoundment, and to establish “man camps”
for new workers. These modifications threatened to produce a variety of environmental, public health, and
nuisance problems. Nonetheless, the permitting and EIS processes led by the U.S. Forest Service and the
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The greatest point of difference among the case studies is arguably the size of the
community groups involved. Annual budgets of these groups range from $500 to $2.1
million dollars; similarly, the number of paid staff positions range from 0 to 170. There
is also significant variation in the industries involved, ranging from dairies to mines to
refineries. However, in many respects, these industries are ultimately quite similar in that
they each produce emissions (pollution) that are mobile and, thus, problematic to
neighboring communities. Addressing these transboundary impacts—what economists
call externalities—is notoriously difficult, as polluting industries usually lack the
economic incentives to change behavior since the benefits of this changed behavior are
unlikely to show up as profits on the company’s balance sheet. For this reason,
environmental law imposes regulations on polluting industries, and tools such as citizen
lawsuits and permit challenges empower communities to help ensure that regulations are
enforced even when the relevant agencies fail to act. Public relations pressure can also
provide a source of leverage promoting changed company behavior. A “good neighbor,”
therefore, is one that has reached a point at which it becomes more profitable to cease the
offending behavior than to continue and face community opposition.7

THE IMPLEMENTATION RECORD
The implementation record of the case studies is more similar than different, and is
generally positive. The degree to which GNA commitments have been honored reflects
many factors, including not only the strength of the agreements, but also the attitudes of
the companies involved, the vigilance of the community groups, the age (and stage) of
the agreements, and the ease to which community concerns are readily resolved through
technological fixes or other readily-identifiable strategies.8
One of the most successful cases is the most informal of the GNAs investigated: the
agreement between Rohm and Haas and Ohio Citizen Action. In this case,
chloromethane emissions have been reduced dramatically (almost entirely), while idling
trucks have been removed from the neighborhood. What this GNA lacks in legal
formality it apparently compensates for in the strength of the community group (Ohio
Citizen Action) and the cooperative spirit of the plant manager.
Implementation of the two mining-related GNA cases also has gone well. The contract
between Bowie Resources and the Western Slope Environmental Resource Council
Montana Department of Environmental Quality approved the expansion plan, triggering a lawsuit by the
Stillwater Protective Association. Concerned about the costs, delays, uncertainties, negative publicity, and
incomplete solutions often typical of litigation, the mine and community activists soon agreed to negotiate
a GNA. By 2000, a legally binding agreement was in place that provides land, water and community
protections, and that gives locals access to the mine’s operations. (A brief description of this case is found
in Appendix D; a detailed discussion is found in Appendix C.)
7
Despite the near uniform (and well-justified) frustration with regulatory agencies expressed by the
community groups in this study, it is worth noting that the very fact that often small community groups
have been able to entice companies to negotiate GNAs is evidence that the US system of environmental
regulation has real strengths.
8
Implementation histories are included as part of the case studies in Appendix D.
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(WSERC), for example, has resulted in rerouting of truck traffic to a new load-out facility
and the implementation of noise mitigation measures. Some elements of the agreement
did not survive the company’s recent bankruptcy proceedings, although this has not yet
proved to be problematic. The agreement between Stillwater Mine and Northern Plains
(and others) also has been successful in many ways. The establishment of the busing
program for mine workers is among the most visible accomplishments, although for this
and many other issues addressed by the GNA, implementation has required a large
commitment of staff time and ongoing pressure on the mine—which has recently
changed ownership. If not for the GNA provision requiring the mine to fund some of
Northern Plains’ oversight expenses, the level of progress achieved would likely be
noticeably lessened.
Two cases involving chemical companies also appear successful and largely complete,
although in both cases a lack of data regarding implementation and the difficulty in
identifying individuals still involved in the cases makes detailed assessments difficult.
The oldest of the two agreements is the GNA between Rhone-Poulenc and Texans United
Education Fund, which appears to have achieved the goal of involving the Citizens
Advisory Committee (CAC) in many aspects of company planning and decision making
regarding health and nuisance (odors, noise, traffic) concerns. In the GNA between
BREATHE and Syntex Chemicals (Boulder), the emissions reduction program is also
believed to have been relatively successful, however, BREATHE has dissolved and very
little monitoring data exists to track compliance with the terms negotiated.
Another of the mature agreements is the GNA between the Community/Labor Refinery
Tracking Committee and Sun Oil (Philadelphia) which expired with the federal consent
decree in which it was enacted. Most items, including installation of the sulfur recovery
units, were implemented, but implementation required constant pressure from the
community, and the local air quality has not noticeably improved.
Somewhat similar implementation histories are associated with two refineries in
California. The GNA between Chevron and the West County Toxics Coalition (WCTC)
(Richmond) has featured partial implementation success, as leakless valves were installed
and a community health center was established. Fenceline monitoring and long-term
funding of the health center have not been achieved, however, as community attention
has shifted to other issues. The GNA between Unocal and Shoreline Environmental
Alliance (SEA) (Crockett/Rodeo) has also produced some successes, but overall the
implementation history has been disappointing as both the company and the community
groups have gone through transitions. Since the GNA was signed, SEA and CBE are no
longer strong and vibrant organizations; similarly, the Unocal facility has been sold twice
(and is now Conoco/Phillips). Some health studies were completed, mitigation funds
were awarded, and emergency warning equipment is now in place, but many other
provisions are likely to remain unaddressed. These cases illustrate the long-term
challenge of GNA implementation.
The most recent of our refinery cases involves Shell Oil and Concerned Citizens of
Norco. The deal negotiated is clearly a mixed bag, as most citizens covered by the
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agreement have now been able to relocate (a few families have chosen to stay), but
compensation for property and moving expenses has been low and difficult to obtain, and
long-term health care issues remain unaddressed. The GNA was clearly beneficial, but it
was nonetheless a very partial and ultimately inadequate solution to the most horrific of
the cases in this study.
A mixed track record also characterizes the GNAs negotiated between the three Buffalo,
New York companies (PVS Chemicals, BOC Gases, and Natural Environmental, Inc.)
with the Seneca Babcock Environmental Subcommittee (SBESC) and Buffalo Common
Council (BCC). The most successful of the three has been the agreement with National
Environmental Inc., which has now addressed most community concerns relating to truck
traffic and noise. The implementation record with BOC Gases and PVS Chemicals has
been spotty at best. The problems with BOC Gases stem from the facility “going remote”
(i.e., becoming largely computerized and mechanized). The most notable success from
the PVS Chemicals GNA has been the establishment of the CAN system, a computerized
telephone system used to alert community residents of spills or other emergencies.
The remaining case study is the GNA between Idaho Dairies and Citizens of Owyhee
County Organized Association (COCOA). Initial progress under this GNA is
encouraging, particularly the voluntary extension of the GNA to a second dairy and the
establishment of water monitoring programs. However, the financial and staff demands
on COCOA remain high, and the impact of the dairies on local water resources has not
been addressed; thus, much work remains to be accomplished.

EVALUATING SUCCESS
As stated earlier, three primary “metrics” are being employed to measure the degree to
which the GNAs studied are considered successful: (1) actual program activities versus
promised activities; (2) participant satisfaction and self-assessment; and (3) GNA success
versus other problem-solving opportunities. Each metric is difficult to apply in practice,
and each tells only part of the story of how useful and appropriate the GNA approach has
been. Presumably, the first and, perhaps, the third metric can be applied by an
independent observer with adequate data, whereas the second metric comes directly from
the opinions of the community group participants. However, as a practical matter, it is
difficult to limit community group member opinions to just the second metric, as the
study was highly reliant on basic data from community group participants. Also
problematic is the fact that the cases are in different stages of completion. For these and
other reasons, the evaluations offered by both the study authors and the community group
participants are both highly subjective and inherently qualitative. Fortunately, there are
only a few areas of disagreement, and these are relatively minor.
The opinions on GNA success provided by community group members (in survey data)
are summarized below in Table 2:
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Table 2. Overall Success of GNAs (as reported by community group members)
Commitments Honored a
Would you do
Name of
Overall Success b
it (the GNA)
Community
Rating: 1 to 10 (10 is best)
Rating: 1 to 10
again?
Group
(10 is best)
TUEF
9.5
9.5
Yes
WSERC
10
9
Yes
WCTC
9, 10 [9.5]
8, 10 [9.0]
Yes, Yes
NPRC
9
9
Unsure
OCA
9.5
9
Yes
BREATHE
7-8, 8 [7.8]
8, 9 [8.5]
Unsure,
Most Likely
C/LRTC
8
8
Unsure
COCOA
8
8
Yes
LABB
10
7
Unsure
SBESC/BCC
5-6, 7 [6.3]
5, 6
Yes, Yes
SEA
4
5
No
AVERAGES
8.3
8.0







a = evaluation metric # 1; b = evaluation metric # 2.
WSERC = Western Slope Environmental Resource Council; WCTC = West County Toxics Coalition;
TUEF = Texans United Education Fund; OCA = Ohio Citizen Action; SBESC = Seneca-Babcock
Environmental Subcommittee; NPRC = Northern Plains Resource Council; C/LRTC =
Community/Labor Refinery Tracking Committee; BREATHE = Boulder Residents for the Elimination
of Air Toxics and Hazardous Emissions; SEA = Shoreline Environmental Alliance; LABB = Louisiana
Bucket Brigade; COCOA = Citizens of Owyhee County Organized Association.
Multiple responses mean more than one individual completed a survey. Multiple responses from a
single group are averaged [shown in brackets] for purposes of calculating the overall averages.
The SBESC ratings are for all 3 GNAs combined (of which one was generally successful and two were
not).

Based on the information available, these “self assessments” offered by the community
group participants seem reasonable with very few exceptions.9 Specifically, the GNA
ranking by the WCTC representatives now seem generous given the recent “backsliding”
of the company (e.g., declining support of the health center), while the GNA ranking by
the SEA representative appears somewhat pessimistic given that the initial failure to
relocate the school and the ongoing problem with the distribution of mitigation fund
money are not problems that can be described as a failure of the company to honor
commitments.10 Also somewhat questionable is the description by the LABB
representative that GNA commitments in the Norco case have been completely honored
(10 out of 10). This ranking does not reflect recent difficulties with relocation, but was
likely a reasonable response at the time the survey was completed.11 Also, it is
9

These “independent evaluations” come exclusively from the lead author, Doug Kenney.
Implementation histories are provided as part of the case studies in Appendix D, and summarized in
implementation tables. Due to data limitations, there is no implementation table for the BREATHE case.
11
At the time the surveys were conducted, we did not have the cooperation of a member of CCN
(Concerned Citizens of Norco), so we relied upon the judgment of technical consultants associated with
LABB (Louisiana Bucket Brigade). Over the course of the study, we recruited a CCN member to the GNA
network and updated our knowledge of this case significantly.
10
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worthwhile to note that the rankings offered by the SBESC/BCC respondents were an
attempt to collectively summarize the response of three different GNAs, one of which has
clearly been successful (with Natural Environmental, Inc.) while the other two have been
only marginally beneficial (with BOC Gases and PVS Chemicals).
The third of our primary evaluation metrics—a comparison of GNA success versus other
problem-solving opportunities—is particularly difficult to apply, given that it requires a
judgment regarding the outcomes potentially achievable using other problem-solving
techniques. Nonetheless, two observations are worth noting. First, in every case, the
GNA was not the first technique used to resolve the problem, nor was it used in isolation
from other techniques and tools (such as lawsuits, permit challenges, public relations, and
so on). To the contrary, the GNA approach was used as a way to harness these other
techniques and tools into a coordinated problem-solving effort finally capable of yielding
results. Secondly, this coordinated problem-solving effort (of which the GNA was the
centerpiece) undoubtedly achieved a long list of outcomes likely impossible through
other means. The high flexibility of the GNA tool is apparent from even a cursory
review of the type of concessions gained by communities: e.g. citizen/community
involvement in company operations, outside reviews of facilities, relocation of families,
worker busing programs, elimination of nuisances (e.g., idling buses), community
investments (e.g., health centers, parks), information sharing, and so on. The fact that
only one survey respondent pledged not to use a GNA in future disputes (while a
majority said they would) further illustrates the opinion that this tool can accomplish
outcomes not readily available through other means.

FINDINGS
The information and analysis featured in this report support five major themes and
conclusions regarding the current state of environmental GNAs:

(1) ENVIRONMENTAL GNAS ARE RARE. Although the “GNA approach” has been in
existence for several years, it is still a fairly rare strategy used by community
organizations to address environmental, public health, and nuisance concerns.
Of course, the manner in which GNAs are defined shapes the number of identified case
studies. The range of GNA studies is larger if the defining criteria are relaxed, and if
non-environmental GNAs are included. For example, a variety of GNAs have been
pursued (including many by Ohio Citizen Action) that we chose not to investigate
because of their informality (“handshake GNAs”); similarly, we found evidence of GNAs
in non-environmental fields such as collective bargaining and labor relations. The lack of
GNAs in the environmental field is reflective of the strong history of relying on
regulation, litigation outcomes and permitting processes, and perhaps more importantly, a
history of activists trying to eliminate “offending” industries completely.12 Authors of
12

Many of the industries featured in these case studies are frequently targeted by the so-called NIMBY
movement (Not In My BackYard).
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GNAs, in contrast, do not seek to drive industry out of the region, but rather seek to shape
industry practices to better respect and protect community values. It is this quality, more
than any other, that is at the heart of the “good neighbor” terminology.

(2) THE GNAS STUDIED ARE GENERALLY QUITE EFFECTIVE. The case studies strongly
suggest that when used in appropriate circumstances, the GNA approach can be
(and often is) an effective and appropriate approach for a community group to
address environmentally-oriented company-community conflicts.
Most of the members in our GNA network are happy with their arrangements, and for
good reason. If the SBESC case study is disaggregated into 3 cases, this study features
13 GNAs of which 10 are likely to meet most definitions of success. Even those that are
problematic—i.e., the SBESC arrangements with BOC Gases and PVS Chemicals, and
the SEA arrangement with Unocal (now Conoco/Phillips)—have been partially
successful (although the future of BOC Gases is in question). It is important to note,
however, that this success has come at a significant price in terms of personnel and
budget; as discussed below (particularly in findings # 3 and 5), achieving success through
the GNA approach normally requires a significant amount of effort and resources.

(3) THE NORTHERN PLAINS GNA IS ATYPICAL. The arrangement between Northern
Plains and its partners with the Stillwater Mine is unusually sophisticated in
terms of the scope and complexity of the agreement, and the community group
resources committed to the GNA’s successful implementation.
There is much that other groups could learn from the NPRC GNA with the Stillwater
Mine, but perhaps most important is that the complexity of the GNA should not exceed
the capacity of the community group to ensure monitoring and implementation. While
this GNA is clearly successful, it is not an appropriate model for groups without a
comparable level of resources and longevity. One source of implementation resources is
funding from the mine for NPRC’s GNA monitoring and oversight expenses—a
concession that most members of our GNA network found remarkable and desirable in
future GNAs.13 As the apparent “Cadillac” of GNAs, this GNA undoubtedly offers some
useful insights about what future GNAs should look like, but at the same time, it likely
presents a model that is unrealistic for groups with lesser resources.
It is important to note, however, that while we conclude that the vast organizational
resources of NPRC are essential to the implementation of its GNA, and that
organizational resources (i.e., budget and staffing) in general are an extremely valuable
asset to groups considering GNAs, such resources are not always essential. COCOA,
BREATHE and SBESC, for example, have all produced notable successes using GNAs,
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The argument has been made that accepting implementation money from the company can potentially
lead to cooptation. While this may be a concern in some cases, a more serious concern is community
groups without sufficient resources to monitor and ensure implementation.
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while operating on a collective annual budget of under $20,000 annually.14 Organizations
lacking extensive resources are clearly at a disadvantage when using the GNA tool (and
all other problem-solving tools for that matter), but it is a disadvantage that can often be
overcome by a sound strategy and committed leadership (as described in finding # 5).

(4) FORMAL—I.E., WRITTEN AND LEGALLY BINDING—GNAS ARE HIGHLY DESIRABLE,
BUT MAY NOT BE ESSENTIAL TO ACHIEVING IMPLEMENTATION SUCCESS.
Although there is not a direct correlation between the formality of the agreements
and their degree of implementation success, having a written and binding
agreement offers additional opportunities to ensure compliance should the
signatory company become uncooperative.
This finding is largely influenced by the approach used by Ohio Citizen Action (OCA)
which relies on canvassing and letter writing to pressure companies to agree to address
problems, but does not require signed contracts or agreements. This approach has been
used with great success in the OCA case with Rohm and Haas (described herein), and in
other contexts as well—including the ongoing campaign with AK Steel.15 This compares
favorably with the most “legally bulletproof” of the agreements—the now-expired
arrangement between C/LRTC and Sun Oil (Philadelphia) enacted in a federal consent
decree—where the company’s implementation record was considered good but not
exceptional (estimated by the community representative as 80 percent compliance), and
was achieved only under constant community pressure. It is likely that most community
groups will conclude, wisely, that formal agreements provide a valuable source of
ongoing leverage useful in ensuring GNA implementation.16 But the case studies
reviewed in this study suggest that formal agreements are not always essential, and
conversely, that signed and apparently legally-binding agreements do not ensure
successful implementation.

14

Budget information for WCTC is not available, but is likely quite modest as well. In contrast, NPRC has
an annual budget of approximately $800,000.
15
Already, the AK Steel campaign has turned over 30,000 letters from citizens into company commitments
to spend $65 million on air pollution controls.
16
Designing an agreement that companies cannot easily “dodge” or “escape from” is a common goal of
groups pursing GNAs, and is a challenge where legal expertise can be extremely beneficial. In negotiating
with a company, it is good idea for the community group to have an understanding of contract law. A brief
primer on contract law is provided as Appendix H. Enforcement of agreements is always an overriding
concern. One of the most promising approaches to ensure enforcement is to have a GNA enacted as part of
a federal consent decree, which empowers the community group to return to the judge for enforcement (if
necessary) during the life of the decree. Another strategy is to have the terms of a GNA enacted as part of a
permit. No approach, however, is truly “bulletproof,” as changes in ownership and company bankruptcy,
and other factors, can test even the most carefully constructed agreements. Whether or not a GNA survives
a change in ownership can vary from state to state as the rules differ. If your state does not offer adequate
protections, a group may be able to address the issue through the use of covenants, or by making
acceptance of the GNA a condition of a permit (if the agency will agree). Strategies to make a GNA
survive a company bankruptcy are also multi-faceted, but can include the use of escrow accounts,
performance bonds, or even obtaining a security interest in the property. Regardless of the challenge faced,
good (and creative) legal advice during agreement negotiation can be highly beneficial.
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(5) GNAS ARE BEST VIEWED AS A (LONG AND DIFFICULT) PROCESS. Successfully
utilizing the “GNA approach” requires navigating three very different stages
typically spanning several years: (Stage # 1) getting the company to the
negotiation table, (Stage # 2) GNA negotiation/design, and (Stage # 3)
implementation.
Successfully addressing the problems of concern in a GNA requires completion of all
three stages; the process can fail at any of these stages. The key to negotiating this
process is best defined in terms of leverage and resources. Both of these variables can
be—and typically need to be—augmented and maintained by the community group
throughout the GNA process. This requires planning and strategic thinking. Leverage
can come from many sources, from exploiting legal requirements (both substantive and
procedural), to gaining access to company information (and technical knowledge), to
applying traditional, grass-roots activism. Also critical is the importance of a “focal
point,” such as a permit application or an emergency discharge. Large, well-established
community groups—i.e., those with extensive staffing and funding resources—are best
positioned to take advantage of these ingredients, but as suggested earlier, several
strategies exist that smaller community groups can potentially use to augment leverage
and/or resources, or to reduce the administrative burdens typically associated with
applying the GNA approach. Strategies include: self-executing agreements (e.g., upfront
payments or one-time actions; transferring enforcement to an agency, such as in a
permit), or requiring the company to finance some of the community group’s
implementation activities. Smaller groups may also find it advantageous to form
partnerships or coalitions with other entities17, thereby broadening the base of
organizational resources.18 Finally, we acknowledge that a single motivated activist can
be remarkably effective. As usual, there appears to be no substitute for leadership and
personal commitment.
Our findings regarding the salience of leverage and resources are summarized below in
Tables 3 through 5. These topics are also discussed extensively in the GNA Handbook
prepared by the NPRC as part of this study.
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It is worth noting that members of the GNA network report that mainstream national environmental
groups are rarely helpful to groups pursuing GNAs. In fact, community organizations seeking GNAs are
frequently criticized by environmentalists and environmental justice advocates for “selling-out.”
18
COCOA, for example, is now a member of the Idaho Rural Council.
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Table 3. Prerequisites to Using the GNA Approach Successfully:
Stage 1: Forcing the Company to Negotiate
• Company needs a permit or similar public approval
Sources of Leverage
• Company is vulnerable to a lawsuit (particularly related to
environmental law compliance)
• Company requires/desires good public relations (or must
avoid bad publicity) in order to maintain or expand
profitability
• A change in company personnel/ownership creates an
opportunity for a new relationship
• Litigation and/or permit challenge
Resources /
• Publicity, media relations, and activist strategies (e.g.,
Strategies
letter writing, editorials, demonstrations)
• Leadership; willingness of leaders (on both sides) to “try
something new”
• Knowledge of the company’s needs/desires
• Environmental data (e.g., monitoring results)
•
Other Advice /
Observations

•
•
•
•

Have a very clear idea of what you want before entering a
negotiation; have a “bottom line” established
Articulate the possibility of a win-win solution
Pick your fights carefully, and be prepared to deliver on
threats
Begin research on the company and its manufacturing
processes; consult outside experts if needed
Beware being coopted or diverted through a companycontrolled Citizens Advisory Council
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Table 4. Prerequisites to Using the GNA Approach Successfully:
Stage 2: GNA Negotiation and Design
• Must have something valuable to offer (e.g., drop a permit
Sources of Leverage
challenge or lawsuit; end bad publicity; assist in permit
approval and generating good publicity)
• Must have demands/requests that the company can
theoretically meet

Resources /
Strategies

•
•
•

Other Advice /
Observations

Negotiation skills/training; coherent negotiating strategy
Adequate understanding of technical issues (e.g., science,
law); must have appropriate data (e.g., monitoring data,
company profile)
Must have a strategy for structuring an agreement that
facilitates implementation and real problem-solving (e.g.,
the agreement must provide leverage/resources for
implementation)

During GNA Negotiation:
• Select negotiators carefully
• Transcribe negotiations
• Establish and enforce negotiation deadlines; understand
that many companies’ strategies are designed to wear
down communities (e.g., delays during negotiation,
providing too much information, agreeing to things they
plan to later fight during implementation, etc.)
• Maintain community organization and activism
throughout the process; maintain a unified front; guard
against cooptation
• Cultivate and maintain an image of reasonableness,
credibility and professionalism
In the GNA Document:
• Anticipate the implementation demands of all
concessions: to the extent possible front-load the
agreement by getting provisions that don’t require
ongoing monitoring or enforcement; schedule company
concessions to come before community group concessions
• Strive to make agreements legally binding; consider
having agreements embedded in federal court consent
decrees or in permit conditions
• Establish a process to deal with future, unanticipated
issues (e.g., the sale or bankruptcy of the company);
assume that the company will eventually try to walk away
from the agreement
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Table 5. Prerequisites to Using the GNA Approach Successfully:
Stage 3: Implementation of the Agreement
• Best leverage is a strategically designed agreement (e.g.,
Sources of Leverage
self-executing; timing of concessions is equal or frontloaded in the community group’s favor; legally binding,
readily enforceable and transferable)
• Demonstrate a commitment to monitoring, oversight, and
follow-through; maintain contact with company and the
public regarding GNA compliance; be vigilant
• Publicize and celebrate achievements
•
Resources /
Strategies
•
•
Other Advice /
Observations

•
•

Budget sufficient funding, staff, and expertise to allow
ongoing monitoring and oversight; maintain public and
community group commitment/interest past GNA
negotiation (when initial enthusiasm fades)
If necessary, consider relying upon an outside agency to
oversee or assist in implementation (e.g., a state agency
that adopted the GNA in a permit)
Have the company finance some of the community
group’s implementation costs
Be prepared to endure a long, labor intensive process
Constantly groom new leaders

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The overall conclusion and recommendation emerging from this study is that GNAs are a
process worth pursuing in the right circumstances. Those circumstances are varied, but at
a minimum, require a company with the potential to address community concerns while
maintaining economic viability, and a community group with sufficient leverage,
resources and skill to move through the often long process. While most of the GNAs we
identified were still working to fully achieve the GNA goals, the successes achieved to
date have clearly identified that GNAs, as a tool, can be very effective. Of course in each
case, the GNA tool needs to be compared to other options available. It is worth
remembering that many communities throughout the United States have found ways to
co-exist with industry without resorting to GNAs. National regulations regarding air and
water pollution, for example, are often sufficient to protect environmental resources and
public health. Additionally, many agencies can be relied upon to fight for community
protections. GNAs are not needed everywhere. But where this governmental safety net
is inadequate, GNAs can be a valuable addition to the toolbox of community activists.
Like all tools, the trick is simply to use it in the right circumstances and in the right
manner.
19

Two more specific recommendations are, first, to maintain in some form the GNA
network established in this project. The Northern Plains Resource Council (NPRC) has
established a web site and listserv dedicated to this purpose, building on and
supplementing the networking role so admirably carried for many years by Communities
for a Better Environment (California) and by dedicated individuals such as Sanford Lewis
and Denny Larson. Additionally, Northern Plains has produced a GNA handbook to
educate fellow community groups considering GNAs. These are wise and commendable
efforts that should be maintained. Secondly, we encourage the funding community to
consider grant-making to community groups with a defensible strategy and argument for
pursuing a GNA. Just as grants designed to support activism and litigation are ultimately
judged by funders on a return-on-investment calculus, so too should funding decisions
regarding GNAs—we do not advocate any special status or subsidy for GNAs.
Maximizing this return-on-investment suggests only funding GNAs where the
prerequisites for success can be met, and where both the funder and community group are
committed to the long-term GNA process.
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Additional literature and materials specific to the case studies are referenced at the end of
the case studies summaries in Appendix D.
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APPENDIX B: GNA SURVEY
Community Group Participant Survey
Instructions: The questions below include both “check box” and “short answer” types. Please write
your answers in the space provided. If more space is needed, please attach additional sheets of paper
and indicate which question(s) you are responding to.
Note that the term “Company” in this questionnaire refers to the company with which the good neighbor
agreement (GNA) was negotiated.
Additional Documents. In addition to the survey, we are requesting copies of several documents, if
available. Providing these documents—especially the GNA itself—will significantly reduce the time and
effort required to complete the questionnaire. Please consult the cover letter to see which documents we
already have. The desired documents are:
o The signed GNA and any relevant supporting documentation (attachments, appendices, and/or
agreements drafted pursuant to a provision in the GNA).
o Published articles about your GNA or which prominently feature your GNA (e.g., newspaper,
newsletter, scientific journal, law review, editorials, etc.)
o Documentation of the GNA negotiation process itself (timeline, meeting minutes, progress
reports, correspondence between community groups and company, etc.)
o Implementation documents or reports (e.g., results of GNA-mandated environmental audits).
o Internal or external GNA evaluation studies or reports.
o Breakdown of costs (for your group and the company, if known) relating to any aspect of
negotiating and implementing the GNA.
o Environmental compliance data collected or received pursuant to the GNA.
o Material(s) describing your community group (size, goals, history, accomplishments, etc.).
We realize this is a lot of material to request, but this information is generally not available elsewhere.
We will pay for photocopying and postage charges in addition to the $50 payment to cover your time.

Your Contact Information
1. Your name:
_______
2. Your title/affiliation with community group: _______________________________
3. This is a ____ paid staff position ____ volunteer position.
4. Your mailing address: _________________________________________________
_________________________________________________
5. Your phone number: (
) _______ - _________
6. Your fax number: (
) _______ - _________
7. Your email address: _______________________________
Note: At the end of the survey, you will have the option of requesting anonymity.
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General Information about your Community Group
8. Name of group:
____________
9. Mailing address (only if different than question # 4): ______________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
10. Web site:
__________________________________________________________________
11. Year founded:
__________
12. Number of paid staff:
________
13. Annual operating budget (general estimate): $ ______________
14. Major source(s) of funding (check all that apply):
___ individual & member contributions ..(approximate percentage of total budget: _____%)
___ government grants ………………… (approximate percentage of total budget: _____%)
___ foundation grants …………………. (approximate percentage of total budget: _____%)
___ the “Company” …………………….. (approximate percentage of total budget: _____%)
___ other ………………………………. (approximate percentage of total budget: _____%)

General Characteristics of the Company and the Community-Company Relationship
15. Approximately what year did “the Company” begin operations in your community? __________
16. Approximately how many local residents does “the Company” employ? ______________
17. On a scale of 1 to 10, how important is “the Company” to the local economy? (1 = not important; 5
= moderately important; 10 = extremely important). ____________
18. On the same scale of 1 of 10, how important is the sector represented by “the Company” (e.g.,
mining, petrochemicals) to the local economy? __________________
19. At the time of GNA negotiation, “the Company” was: (check all that apply)
___ profitable (i.e., in “good” financial health)
___ expanding ___stable in size ___shrinking
___ seeking financing
___ privately owned ___ publicly traded ___don’t know
___ concerned about public opinion
___ perceived publicly as committed to environmental concerns
20. Is “the Company” currently a subsidiary of another company? ___ yes (name:________________ )
___no ___don’t know
21. Who is the appropriate contact person(s) at “the Company” regarding the GNA? (Please provide
one or more names, with complete contact information.) __________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
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Incidents/Events Which Led to the Negotiation of the GNA
22. Which of the following types of issues prompted community concern about “the Company”?
(Check all that apply. If more than one category is selected, please number them in order of
significance; 1 = most significant, 2 = second most significant, etc.)
___ nuisance and quality of life issues (e.g., noise, traffic, odors)
___ local economic or fiscal issues (e.g., jobs, overburdened community services)
___ impacts on the environment (e.g., habitat loss, pollution)
___ public health concerns (e.g., toxic releases/spills, illnesses)
___ other (include as part of the description below)
Please describe the specific issue(s) of greatest concern: __________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
23. What types of actions did your group take prior to negotiating the GNA? (Check all that apply.)
Working with Relevant Agencies and Governments:
___ participation in public hearings; commenting on public documents (e.g., EIS)
___ appeal of local, state or federal permit decision or other government action
___ urge regulatory agencies to better enforce existing laws/rules
___ urge agencies and/or other governmental bodies to adopt new rules or legislation
___ other related action (specify): ____________________________________________
Lawsuits:
___ lawsuit initiated by the community group
___ lawsuit initiated by another party, but joined/supported by the community group
___ campaign/lobby for federal/state/local agency to bring suit against Company
___ other (specify): _______________________________________________________
Consultation with the Company:
___ written correspondence to Company expressing concerns
___ meeting(s) with Company representatives
___ other related action (specify): ____________________________________________
Publicity and Grassroots Activism:
___ negative publicity campaigns (media coverage, petitions, demonstrations, protests)
___ boycotts (of the “Company”)
___ support/oppose political candidates
___ other related action (specify): ____________________________________________
Any other types of actions (specify): ________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
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24. What final event, or sequence of events, resulted in the decision to negotiate a GNA?
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
25. Who first raised the idea of negotiating a GNA? (If possible, please list the person by name, and
indicate their affiliation and title.) ___________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

Participants in GNA Negotiation Process
26. In addition to “the Company,” who else was involved in the GNA negotiation?
___ your group
___ other citizen group(s) (Please list: ____________________________________________ )
___ union representatives
___ local government representatives
___ regulatory agency representatives (which agency: _________________________________ )
___ independent consultants or technical experts
___ members of the general public (not directly affiliated with the above parties)
___ others (please list): __________________________________________________________
27. Please list the names, titles, and affiliations of the primary negotiators (for all participating interests):
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
28. In the GNA negotiations, did your group (and/or your partners, if any) have adequate access to:
o Lawyers & legal expertise ___ yes ___ no ___ don’t know
o Technical consultants
___ yes ___ no ___ don’t know
o Trained negotiators
___ yes ___ no ___ don’t know
o Technical/economic data ___ yes ___ no ___ don’t know
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Interests of Parties in the GNA Negotiations
29. What were the specific commitments that the community group wanted from “the Company”?
(Check all that apply. Note that these are the items “wanted,” not necessarily those achieved.)
o Specific Remediation and Mitigation Measures.
___ specific pollution prevention/reduction/remediation goals
___ traffic mitigation provisions
___ worker transportation/housing provisions
___ investments in local community
___ local hiring
___ job training
___ infrastructure improvements
___ contributions to local charities
___ other specific remediation and mitigation measures (describe): __________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
o Information, Audits, Inspections and Monitoring.
___ commitment to perform regular environmental audits and/or monitoring
___ community access to relevant environmental data held by the Company
___ access to company accident prevention and response plan
___ whistleblower protections (for Company employees divulging information)
___ advance notice to the community of any proposed changes in operations
o Ongoing Role of Community Group in Company Practices
___ active community involvement in audits, monitoring, and/or inspections
___ community group representation on Company planning, advisory and/or decisionmaking bodies
___ financial support of the community group named in the GNA
o Other Desired Commitments (describe): __________________________________________
30. What specific commitments did “the Company” want from the community group? (Check all that
apply.)
___ dismissal of pending lawsuit
___ assurances that a lawsuit would not be filed
___ end protests or negative publicity
___ generate positive publicity for the Company
___ confidentiality agreement
___ other (specify): _____________________________________________________________
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31. If a regulatory agency of any kind took part in the negotiations, what was its interest and how did
that affect the final agreement? _______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
32. In your opinion, what was the primary reason that “the Company” agreed to negotiate a GNA? ____
______________________________________________________________________________
33. Please list any issues discussed during the GNA negotiation process which were not incorporated
into the final agreement: ____________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

Negotiation Costs
34. How long did the GNA negotiation process take, from the first meeting or correspondence
suggesting a GNA to obtaining all required signatures of the final agreement? _________________
35. If possible, please estimate the total costs of negotiating the GNA:
$________ was spent by community group ( ___% or $_____ for consultants/outside experts)
$________ was spent by company
Please attach any data that further summarizes the costs and time demands of the negotiation process.

The Final Agreement
36. Do you believe the GNA is legally binding? ___ yes ___ no ___ unsure
37. Is the GNA integrated with a state/federal regulatory action? ___ yes ___ no ___ don’t know
If yes, please explain: _____________________________________________________________
38. If “the Company” is sold, will the GNA remain in effect? ___ yes ___ no ___ unsure
If “the Company” has already changed ownership since the GNA was negotiated, please describe
the change of ownership, listing past and current owners and any relevant dates: ____________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
39. Does “the Company” provide funding to your community group to ensure its continued participation
in GNA-related activities? ___ yes ___ no. If yes, how much per year: $ _____________
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Implementation of the GNA
40. Overall on a scale of 1 to 10, to what extent have the commitments listed in the GNA been honored,
or are on schedule to be honored? (1 = not at all; 10 = everything implemented as planned). _____
41. Please describe any problems encountered in the implementation process: _____________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
42. Have any subsequent modifications been made to the original GNA? ___ yes ___ no
If so, please describe (include any provisions which have been deleted or abandoned): _________
_______________________________________________________________________________
43. Does the GNA include specific procedures for dispute resolution? ___ yes ___ no
How have implementation disputes been resolved? ______________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
44. If possible, please estimate the total costs (thus far) of implementing the GNA?
$________ spent by community group ( ___% or $_____ for consultants/outside experts)
$________ spent by “the Company”
45. If possible, please estimate expected future costs of implementing the GNA?
$________ to be spent by community group ( ___% or $_____ for consultants/outside experts)
$________ to be spent by “the company”

Lessons Learned and General Impressions:
46. If similar disputes with this or a different company were to arise in the future, would negotiating
another GNA be your preferred course of action? ___ yes ___ no ___ unsure
If no, what would you do instead? ___________________________________________________
47. If you had the chance to negotiate the GNA over again, what would you do differently regarding ….
o

… the negotiation process? _____________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________
o … the structure of the agreement? _______________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
o … the specific content of the agreement? _________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
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48. Were there any unexpected benefits to your group and/or community resulting from this whole
experience? _____________________________________________________________________
49. Please rate the overall “success” of your GNA on a scale of 1 to 10: _____
(1 = total disappointment; 10 = a complete success)
50. What, if any, concerns do you have about the viability of your community group to monitor the
GNA and/or ensure its commitments under the GNA over the term of the agreement? ___________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
51. Any final advice to other community groups considering use of a GNA? ______________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
52. Is there anything important about your GNA that we failed to ask about? If yes, please tell us now:
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________

Thank you very much for your time!

Confidentiality. It is our preference to list your name as an interview subject, and to give you credit for
the answers provided. Before publication, you will be given the opportunity to review and correct any
case study write-ups about your GNA effort. Nonetheless, you can remain confidential if desired.
Can we use your name in project publications? ___yes ___no
Payment. We are happy to provide you with $50 in thanks for your efforts. Unless you provide an
alternate address below or indicate another recipient, we will address and send the check to the person
and address listed in questions 1-6.
Please provide a rough estimate of your copying and mailing expenses (if any): $ _______
Alternative address and/or recipient (only if applicable): __________________________
________________________________________________________________________
Thanks again for your assistance. You will, of course, be provided with the results when available.
RETURN TO. Use the envelope provided, or mail to: Doug Kenney, Natural Resources Law Center,
University of Colorado School of Law, UCB 401, Boulder, CO, 80309-0401.
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Finding a Path to Accord:
A Case Study of a Good Neighbor Agreement
Northern Plains Resource Council
Cottonwood Resource Council, Stillwater Protective Association
and

Stillwater Mining Company
You cannot shake hands with a closed fist.
Indira Gandhi
Case Study Overview
This case study documents the Stillwater Good Neighbor Agreement (GNA), an unprecedented
contract between the Northern Plains Resource Council (Northern Plains), Cottonwood Resource
Council (CRC), Stillwater Protective Association (SPA), and the Stillwater Mining Company
(SMC), to protect the environment and at the same time, avoid costly, time-consuming litigation.
A number of people involved in the GNA process were interviewed, and written records
reviewed in an effort to produce a report of the Stillwater GNA and how it came to be. Although
there is much to be learned and applied from this particular GNA, it should be emphasized that
each situation is different, and there is no ‘boilerplate’ solution for all. However, it is always
important to build trust and work toward a common goal, especially when addressing crucial
environmental and social impacts.
Introduction
Montana is a land of riches. Its environment encompasses mountains, rivers, open ranges,
endless sky, and veins beneath the earth that still hold untapped treasures of rare ores. It is also a
land of complex political forces that have a history of colliding in struggles for control of
Montana’s abundant heritage of natural resources.
Imagine for a moment what Montana might look like if cooperation and mutual trust were to
replace the too-often adversarial approach between corporations and community action groups.
A new approach might instead resemble an agreement among good neighbors to treat the land
and its many resources with respect, with an eye toward actions that would benefit the earth and
its inhabitants in a sustainable future.
In fact, that is exactly what has been happening in two Montana counties over the past few years.
Northern Plains and two affiliated citizen groups, CRC and SPA, forged a contract with the SMC
to protect and conserve fragile watersheds in danger of degradation due to mining practices, and
to preserve the character of local communities threatened by increased development and the
influx of workers associated with such a project. The Stillwater GNA also helps protect the rural
nature of the region, and builds relationships damaged by years of conflict over opposing visions
of what is right and necessary for Montana’s long-term environmental, economic and community
health.
Overview
The comprehensive and complex Stillwater GNA, signed in May 2000, is the result of long and
often difficult negotiations, a journey undertaken jointly by Northern Plains, SPA, CRC, and
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SMC. Thus, this case study, which highlights essential components of a landmark GNA, from
inception to implementation, can be used as a tool to examine, analyze and, as appropriate, apply
lessons learned. What follows is the story of bringing the GNA to life, a collaborative,
sometimes arduous, and ultimately worthwhile path to accord.
The largest mining operation in Montana, SMC is one of only three worldwide producers of
platinum and palladium. An important resource throughout the world, palladium is a primary
component of catalytic converters that reduce vehicle emissions. Thus, SMC plays a pivotal role
in both global resource production and local environmental protection.
Northern Plains is an established and respected grassroots action group, with a broad base of
local support, combined with staff and consultant expertise, and a record of community
organizing spanning 30 years. Northern Plains focuses on issues of land stewardship,
preservation of family farms, ranches and small businesses, and providing information and tools
for citizen action. Recognizing the need to balance the quest for economic gain with social and
environmental responsibility, Northern Plains strives to protect Montana’s water, land, air, and
quality of life.
Affiliated with Northern Plains, both CRC and SPA organize and represent local communities
affected by similar environmental, social and economic impacts of mining and development, in
this case resulting from two separate SMC mines drawing from one vein of ore. Since the mid70s, SPA has dealt with socio-economic and environmental consequences related to the
Stillwater mine, now in its 14th year of production. The organization has galvanized citizen and
community protection efforts, and has been a formidable force in keeping mining interests in
check. CRC, founded as a voice for citizen concerns in 1988, has as its current focus the East
Boulder mine, which is projected to begin production in the fall of 2002. CRC works to ensure
sound practices and norms relating to waste and water quality, and to address environmental and
social impacts of the mine’s future operations. Both organizations are deeply committed to
citizen involvement and environmental action.
A history of inadequate enforcement and erosion of state environmental laws made the GNA
seem like a worthwhile gamble to Northern Plains, CRC and SPA, as all three organizations had
long focused on helping citizens have an effective voice in social, economic, and environmental
decisions that affect their lives. A GNA had the potential to protect the health and ecological
integrity of the Stillwater and East Boulder Rivers and surrounding areas, where concern had
been escalating about the harmful effects of the Stillwater mine on the local community and
environment. The three citizen groups sought to raise the bar within the mining industry on
environmental and community protection, and compel SMC to use the best available
technologies to minimize the impact of mining in both watersheds.
The GNA is a legally binding contract, which guarantees land, water and community protections
in Sweet Grass and Stillwater counties, gives unprecedented access to information on SMC’s
mining practices, and leverages citizen clout to block harmful consequences of mining
operations. The GNA provides for citizen oversight and involvement in determining practices
used to extract and process ore from SMC mines. Well crafted and unambiguous, the GNA
serves as a road map to indicate intent and direction in addressing complex environmental and
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social issues affecting the communities represented by CRC and SPA. The objectives of the
GNA are to:
 Minimize adverse impacts of mining operations on the local community and environment
 Facilitate open communication among all GNA parties
 Provide opportunities for citizen participation in decision making
 Legally bind current and future mine owners to the GNA, for the life of the mine
 Avoid or reduce the need for lawsuits to resolve disputes
The Stillwater GNA is a powerful tool that supplements and exceeds federal and state legal
requirements. Highlights of the contract include the following:
 Water quality protection, such as expanded monitoring to ensure that water quality is not
degraded and fishing operations are not disturbed due to mining activities
 Investigation of improved mining technologies
 Incorporation, of conflict resolution methods, such as arbitration, to minimize or avoid
future legal challenges, whenever possible
 Traffic reduction measures, such as restricting the use of private vehicles, improving carpooling programs, and providing buses between the mine and population centers
 Conservation easements on company-owned land, including ranches used for landapplication of wastewater
 Consultation with local citizen groups before property acquisition for future tailings and
waste rock disposal, or for developing employee housing sites
 Independent environmental performance audits at least every 5 years, funded by SMC
 Citizen access to information regarding environmental compliance and performance,
including the right to inspect environmental audit results and mine operations
 SMC funding for technical and scientific consultants necessary for local citizens to
understand mining operations and effectively participate in the SMC decision-making
process
Three committees, comprising members of SPA, CRC , Northern Plains, and representatives of
SMC, are the formal entities that oversee the GNA:
 Two Oversight Committees focus on issues specific to the mine in each of their
geographic areas. The two committees monitor all aspects of GNA implementation,
resolve any new issues that may arise, and keep lines of communication open among all
parties.
 The Responsible Mining Practices and Technology Committee identifies, investigates
and recommends innovative methods to reduce waste and increase environmental
protections in the areas affected by the mines. Currently, the Committee is working on
waste and water issues surrounding the Hertzler and Boe sites.
History and Process
The path to accord was built on a foundation of citizen action addressing local water quality and
mining issues. The efforts of the three citizen groups to organize residents and encourage active
participation in local decision making have long focused on social and environmental protection.
As a result, a well-seasoned pool of citizen leaders with roots in the community was available to
participate in the GNA negotiation process. Without such active citizen membership, achieving
the GNA would not have been possible.
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The forces leading to a GNA were in motion long before the negotiating process began. SMC
had been a Montana presence since assuming ownership of the Stillwater mine in 1994.
Economic and regulatory forces of the time were favorable, as the global demand for palladium
increased. SMC wanted to capitalize on this higher demand for palladium by bringing the East
Boulder project on-line. The company also sought removal of production caps and permission to
build an additional tailings impoundment at the Stillwater mine. The Hertzler Impoundment, as it
was called, was to include construction of a 700+ acre waste management facility, a tailing
pipeline corridor, and a nearly 200 acre water management facility. Local fears were that the
plan would destroy open space, increase noise pollution, and have adverse affects on wildlife and
on property values. The specter of such harmful consequences galvanized citizen groups to voice
their concerns.
The history of activism among the three citizen-based organizations runs long and deep. For
years, Northern Plains, SPA and CRC have participated in numerous public permitting
processes, including at least four Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) challenges to the Nye
Mine and another to the East Boulder project. In fact, the lack of success with the EIS process
and the use of citizen lawsuits to resolve complaints helped provide impetus to pursue a GNA.
In the mid-1990s, CRC challenged SMC’s application for a waiver from Montana’s nondegradation policy. After three years of conflict, SMC and CRC agreed to drop the issue and
take it up again at a later date. In early 1998, CRC challenged yet another SMC application, this
time for a discharge permit for the new East Boulder mine and for proposed construction of a
dormitory, or man camp, to house mine employees away from the population center.
On the other side of the mountain, SPA was fighting the lifting of production caps at the
Stillwater mine. At that time, SMC was seeking specific changes to its environmental permit,
including the elimination of a 2000 ton-per-day production cap, permission to construct the
Hertzler tailings impoundment, and expansion of the mine’s footprint. The final EIS supported
all the changes SMC sought. In early 1999, SPA sued the Montana Department of Environmental
Quality (MDEQ) over this Record of Decision that essentially resulted in no change for the way
SMC conducted operations. SPA’s pending lawsuit was put on hold as SPA explored the GNA’s
prospect of success as an alternative to legal action.
Jerry Iverson, CRC member, emphasizes the value of citizen group leverage and power in
challenging mine operations: “One of the most important elements of CRC’s success is that we
have for years actively lobbied at the legislature, testified at public hearings, provided comments
on numerous Environmental Impact Statements (EIS), sponsored candidate forums, educated the
public on the Hard Rock Impact Plan, and written letters to the editors of local papers. We’ve
done everything, and people know us. And when the state and the mining company acted in a
way we believed was improper, we sued. That’s how you build leverage.”
Citizen group leverage would continue to be a powerful force for change. In August 1998, a
guest editorial in the NY Times by CRC member Tom McGuane gave needed exposure to
SMC’s plan to open a second mine in East Boulder, and establish a man camp to house workers,
which would certainly have negative impacts on the local area, such as added traffic, and

34

potential problems with mine workers who were not integrated into the community. Bill Nettles,
then SMC CEO, responded with his perspective on the issues, as did the Times. Press coverage
served to put SMC on notice that they were being watched. Citizen groups vowed that SMC
would have to deliver on their promises to be both community-friendly and environmentally
responsible.
New SMC company leadership, not wed to traditional mining industry approaches, was willing
to consider new ways of doing business. Local activists praised the CEO as a man of his word
who would honor commitments. SMC provided employment for a significant number of local
residents, and to the company’s credit, had a record of complying with state and federal
regulations. SMC believed a GNA could help avoid production delays resulting from legal
challenges to expansion plans, provide SMC a positive profile as a “good neighbor” in Montana,
and possibly increase its profitability.
In the summer of 1998, informal yet strategic meetings with local activists, residents, and mine
representatives helped identify issues and harness the forces that would lead to negotiating the
GNA. A handshake agreement committed SMC to build a man camp near the populated area of
Big Timber and try to resolve other differences with the community.
Establishment of a formal GNA held interest for both sides because it met the needs of dissimilar
players who otherwise might not have found reasons to collaborate. A shared benefit of the GNA
is that it reduces and even eliminates expensive, time-consuming, adversary-creating legal suits,
which none of the parties wanted. In addition, the GNA provided a golden opportunity for
Northern Plains, CRC, SPA, and SMC to share in a win-win situation for organizations that on
the surface did not appear to have compatible interests.
However, common interests did exist among the parties, even if motivated by differing needs. It
was at this intersection of interests and needs that useful movement occurred, and a valuable
strategy emerged: public influence on environmental protection can exert a positive impact on
the world of profit making and stockholders, especially when citizens have the necessary
information. Michael Reisner, Northern Plains strategic support coordinator who participated
throughout the GNA process, says, “A big issue was opening up public access to information on
the mining company’s internal decision making, so we can try to resolve problems.”
The GNA process also helped to facilitate cooperation among the parties. Chris Allen, SMC Vice
President, concurs, “The heart of the GNA rests upon the principles of mutual trust and respect.
We are not always going to agree with each other, and some issues may be sufficiently important
to drive us to arbitration. But, if our playing field is both level and clearly defined, and the
principles upon which this Agreement was founded remain our touchstone, then I believe the
GNA will prosper.”
From the perspective of SMC, the uncertainty of the legal arena was key. Delays in production
often were a costly and time-consuming consequence of lawsuits. SMC was ready to move
forward with their expansion plans, and saw valuable potential benefits as a result of negotiating
a GNA.
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The variety and depth of forces and issues surrounding the evolution of the GNA were
formidable. Each party began with an agenda based on constituencies and interests, which were
sometimes compatible, but often at odds. Questions of water quality, waste disposal, pollution,
traffic, wildlife habitat, employee housing, culture and esthetics, combined with potential legal
hassles, and definitions of what is the “right” way to protect the environment, all swirled in a
maelstrom of often opposing beliefs and behaviors.
This was where the hard work of bringing people together to benefit the local environment and
community began. Tammi Tragakiss, CRC Chair and negotiating team member, says,
“Volunteer members spent years building leverage, and many months contributing countless
hours and hard work to developing and negotiating the GNA.” It was a daunting task that
required research, preparation and numerous meetings to bring the issues to the table and find
agreement. Frustrating delays and disappointments interspersed with milestones of success
marked the path to accord, which ultimately culminated in the signing of the GNA nearly two
years later.
Negotiations
Arriving at a negotiated agreement is never easy. Intuition and common sense are helpful, but do
not take the place of finely honed negotiating skills. The art of knowing how to establish goals,
bargain instead of debate, articulate a bottom line, speak in one voice, and know when to stay
and when to walk are critical skills to ensure citizen clout. Margaret Vermillion, CRC
negotiating team member, gets right to the point, “It’s important to have courage, be personable
and isolate personal dislikes, be objective, stick to your guns, be honest and forthright, don’t be
beaten by insulting comments, and have a good team.”
An intensive negotiation skills training was the catalyst that produced competent and confident
citizen teams. Jim Thomas, an expert negotiator, educated staff and citizen group members in the
art of striking a deal. He says his task was “to detach them from reliance on logic, rhetoric and
debate, and focus instead on using leverage in deal-making; to focus on the goal, rather than
proving who was right or wrong. The likelihood of persuading the other side with a combative
stance approaches zero, and tends to alienate people from what they want and can obtain.” Jack
Heyneman, a SPA negotiating team member, expressed a sense shared by many: “The
negotiation training was pivotal. We would never have known how to go about being toughminded without it.”
A great help in the process of negotiating the GNA was Northern Plains’ staff member Michael
Reisner, an attorney who served as legal language interpreter and more. In addition, Jim Kuipers,
technical consultant and a former hard-rock miner with intimate knowledge of the mining
industry, was, and continues to be, a bridge to understanding technical data. Daryl Jensen, SPA
Oversight Committee member, acknowledges Northern Plains as a source of valuable expertise
and leadership. He says, “Citizen groups are great, but without the staff work of Northern Plains,
we couldn’t have won it.”
Among the vital factors contributing to open and productive negotiations were the continuing
opportunities to build trust and cooperation among Northern Plains-affiliated committee
members and SMC representatives. Jim Thomas characterizes SMC as a worthy adversary and a
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good player. Richard Parks, Technology Committee member says, “Without Bill Nettles’
leadership, the negotiations would have come unglued. He told his people it had to happen.”
A commitment to the same goal kept the collective “eye on the prize” during difficult
negotiations. Negotiating team member, Paul Hawks, says, “We had every right to be an equal
playing partner, because we represented our local community. Something happens when you
know you have permission to do what you believe in. No one gave us permission; we just picked
up the mantle.”
Given the spectrum of perspectives and uncertainties, some essential elements characterized the
successful training and subsequent GNA negotiations:
 Commitment to resolve areas of conflict to attain the goal
 Willingness to do “homework” and prepare for meetings
 Agreed-upon tactical ground rules, and process for consensus decisions
 Delegation of primary responsibility for each issue among team members
 Commitment to call for a caucus as often as necessary
 Creation of negotiating “envelopes” for top, target, and bottom lines
 Expression of positions in a unified voice
 Focus on bargaining, not debating, as an effective negotiation tool
 Well-run and recorded meetings, limited to involved parties
 Walk-away points for key issues
Citizen groups were frustrated by the outcome of prior adversarial approaches, such as lawsuits,
and saw the GNA as a viable alternative to expensive, time- and resource-consuming legal
actions that didn’t always result in long-term victories. Jerry Iverson, CRC Oversight Committee
member, says, “There’s a risk in a lawsuit; you don’t know where it will go. It can go beyond
what you originally intended.”
Accord
Although the GNA is an alternative to legal wrangling, participating citizen groups emphatically
did not give up their right to sue in the future. The GNA remains in effect unless citizen groups
decide to proceed with litigation. Should that occur, conservation easements to protect over
4,000 acres of open space will continue, SMC will keep employee housing near existing towns,
and will maintain their commitment to bus mine employees to and from work.
In addition, there was approval of a plan to mitigate impacts to the Hertzler Ranch in Stillwater
Valley as a result of SMC tailings impoundment. The Hertzler Mitigation Plan will give SPA the
power to ensure the collection of baseline data and site monitoring to curtail or control any
negative impacts.
In the final agreement, citizen group negotiators prevailed in securing the right to monitor water
quality and to inspect the mines and waste-treatment facilities. CRC members Paul Hawks and
Jerry Iverson remark, “This is the first GNA in the hard rock mining industry. It is a profound
shift from the usual legal battles and threats that have dominated the discussion of natural
resource issues. We believe we can work together to solve problems. Both sides can take credit
for seeking a better way; only time will tell if we can succeed.”
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Challenges and Lessons Learned
Drafting the GNA required commitment by all involved parties, and a willingness to dedicate
time and resources, even amidst doubt about the GNA’s potential for success. Chris Allen, SMC
Vice President, comments, “SMC entered the GNA with decidedly mixed emotions. This
ambivalence was born of many things, but it all boiled down to one word – uncertainty. A year
ago, the path forward looked murky. Today, the landscape is better illuminated, and it seems to
us that the prospect of failure recedes the longer we work together.”
The GNA has faced and withstood initial challenges, such as delays in establishing trigger levels,
lifting the production cap on the Nye mine, and comprehending and incorporating complex
technical and scientific information. A particularly difficult point of contention shows signs of
progress as SMC improves its record of notifying citizens of meetings and other important
information in a timely manner. SMC and the Councils have not always completed agreements
by established due dates, but the groups demonstrate flexibility as long as they see movement
toward compliance.
According to Paul Hawks, “A major challenge has been changing the work habits and
perspective of the corporation, bringing citizens on board for decision making, and keeping the
community apprised about the timeline, and what’s happening to keep them in the decision
making process. We were pushing that process all the time, and still are. We’re finally seeing a
change. At last, they recognize that we’re not going to put roadblocks in their way. Our interest
is to do what is best for the community, which might be good for SMC, too.”
Another central challenge to the GNA has been sustaining active involvement of community
members and mine representatives. As is often the case, when the “front line” burns out or
moves on, it is essential to have others step forward. The vitality of the GNA depends on
continued infusion of motivated committee members who derive satisfaction from contributing
and making a difference over the long-term. Arleen Boyd, SPA negotiation team member
remarks, “Over the years, people have given enormous time and talent to solve problems in our
area. In my best moments, I believe this will continue to happen.”
The Stillwater GNA, although a signed contract, is still a work in progress. Its long-term viability
will be measured by the extent to which it protects local communities and watersheds, and keeps
both from development and further degradation. An indicator of GNA usefulness will be its
ability to define this collaborative approach as an option for resolving other natural resource
conflicts that impact the character and integrity of local communities. This is especially true if
SMC is bought by an entity less willing to negotiate or honor the spirit of the accord.
Can the GNA be a driving force to develop cleaner mining technologies, and more
environmentally sustainable ways to extract needed metals? Will it work to protect communities
from the negative social impacts of unbridled development? Concerned citizen groups hope
SMC will show “good faith” in both the technical and human aspects of mining operations. SPA
Oversight Committee member, Dot Gallagher concludes, “We hope the Stillwater GNA will set
a trend for other places and other times. It’s bigger than this Valley.”
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The most important lessons from the GNA process focus on collaboration, negotiation, and the
need to search for common ground, especially among players motivated by disparate agendas.
However, many involved in the GNA process emphasized that each situation will be different
and there will be no boilerplate solution for every situation. Although there are many
perspectives, a common theme emerged from the key players on both sides of the GNA: Do your
best to build trust based on sincere desires for a common goal, then commit to working together
to forge a lasting agreement to be good neighbors.
Current Realities
Implementation and future compliance with the GNA is guided by local, regional, and global
economic conditions. Since the signing of the GNA, many changes have marked the landscape,
including a decline in the world price for palladium group metals. Global economic factors have
exerted great influence on the way companies conduct business and attempt to satisfy
shareholders. In recent times, SMC faced financial woes when expansions at the Stillwater and
East Boulder operations coincided with plummeting global prices for platinum and palladium.
Press coverage (Big Timber Pioneer, February 15-21, 2002; Northern Miner, February 1, 2002)
reports that SMC has paused in its plan to expand mining operations, and has completed a $60
million financing by issuing about 10% of its outstanding shares, in an effort to improve its
financial structure.
However, since the signing of the GNA, SMC’s operations have expanded in an effort to
maintain a production rate that will keep the company solvent. At the East Boulder mine, surface
infrastructure is complete and Stillwater crews are completing the underground facilities and
mine development. SMC officials say they need to address the reality of a “lower cash-flow
environment” while keeping their options open should prices improve and demand increases.
A few years ago, SMC took steps to abandon a program to provide bus transportation to mine
employees. After feeling intense pressure from the Councils and the community, SMC continued
the bus transportation program. Over the years, SMC has realized bussing is an essential part of
its operations and maintaining safety on the narrow winding county roads.
In looking at the potential for a sustainable GNA, there is uncertainty about SMC’s future
stability and profits, the influence of such change on the Montana landscape, and the willingness
of SMC to honor its key commitments to the environment and local communities.
Changes in SMC management have provided a challenge. Those who were instrumental in
making the Agreement happen are gone, including Bill Nettles, Chris Allen, and Bob Taylor.
In addition, SMC also has a new owner and a new board. In June 2003, Stillwater’s shareholders
voted in favor of selling SMC to the Russian company Norilsk Nickel. On June 23, Norilsk
bought 51 percent of Stillwater Mining Co. The price was $100 million in cash and about
877,000 ounces of palladium. On Aug. 27, Norilsk boosted its ownership to 56 percent by paying
$7.50 per share for another 5 percent of Stillwater stock.
Fortunately, the Good Neighbor Agreement is tied to the ore body and transfers with ownership.
Therefore, it remains as a legally binding contract that Norilsk must uphold. Members of SMC’s
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board reaffirmed to the Councils in August 2004 that SMC is proud of the Agreement and firmly
committed to its ongoing implementation.
SMC continues to use and explore some of the best available environmental control technologies
to manage its waste and water disposal. Through the Agreement’s Responsible Mining Practices
and Technology Committee, SMC, the Councils, and third party contractors have embarked on
the paste pilot project to explore applying paste - a slurry of dewatered mine tailings – on the
surface land. SMC already applies paste with small amounts of concrete back below ground.
Through implementing paste technology, SMC can reduce the size of its environmental foot
print, extend the life of its current impoundment facilities, and reduce the need for additional
large impoundment storage for tailings waste.
To improve SMC’s water operations, the Council’s technical consultants – Kuipers and
Associates – are drafting a Water Optimization or “mass balance” plan that outlines additional
steps SMC can take to become a “zero discharge facility,” meaning no water would be
discharged to groundwater or surface water. The plan outlines further actions SMC can take to
nearly eliminate nitrogen in the water – a by-product of the explosives SMC uses underground.
High amounts of nitrogen in water can be unsafe to drink and can alter the biological integrity of
the river.
One area of contention has been how frequently annual biological monitoring should be
conducted on the East Boulder River. Biomonitoring consists of sampling aquatic inspects and
algae at several sites along the river to determine if SMC is impacting the health of the East
Boulder River and riparian areas downstream from the mine. The Councils would like to see
annual biological monitoring happen, whereas SMC prefers conducting biological monitoring
every three years. After SMC refused to conduct biological monitoring in August 2003,
members of Cottonwood Resource Council did the sampling with the assistance of Kuipers and
Associates. SMC has agreed to do biomonitoring in 2004 and the dispute over the frequency of
monitoring will be revisited in 2005. Neither SMC nor the Councils used the Agreement’s
provisions for arbitration, allowing the parties to maintain a positive dialogue.
Despite a few points of contention, the Councils applaud Stillwater Mining Company for its
environmental excellence, and recommended SMC as a recipient for The Bureau of Land
Management’s 2003 Hard Rock Mining Award, which SMC received. The award recognizes
environmentally sound mineral development operations on public and private lands and
acknowledges successful partnering efforts to ensure a safe and productive hardrock mining
industry.
The Agreement’s ongoing maintenance can be intense, but its benefits have been abundant and
ongoing. The Councils and the community are thankful for the busing program, conservation
easements, integration of employees into local communities, ability for local citizens to have
access to critical information, opportunity to participate in the mine’s decision making process,
and environmental and water quality safeguards above and beyond regulatory standards. The
parties to the Agreement are proud of these accomplishments and the Councils hope that the
Agreement’s success will continue to bear fruit both now, and in the years to follow. Time will
tell.
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Good Neighbor Agreement Players
NEGOTIATING TEAMS
Cottonwood Resource Council
Connie Anderson, Paul Hawks, Jerry Iverson,
Tammi Tragakiss, Margaret Vermillion

Stillwater Protective Association
Arleen Boyd, Jack Heyneman, Daryl Jensen, Noel Keogh

Stillwater Mining Company
Chris Allen, John Andrews (until departure), Bill Nettles

COMMITTEES
East Boulder Oversight Committee
Paul Hawks, Jerry Iverson, Tammi Tragakiss

Stillwater Oversight Committee
Arleen Boyd, Dot Gallagher, Jack Heyneman, Daryl Jensen,

Technology Committee
Henry Connor, Charlie French, Richard Parks, Dale Robinson, Chan Welin,

TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND CONSULTANTS
Loren Bahls, Jim Kuipers, Michael Reisner, Jim Thomas
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A Profile of Citizen Group Facts and Issues
at time of GNA Negotiations
CITIZEN
GROUP
MINE PROFILE

CONCERNS

Stillwater Protective Association (SPA)
STILLWATER MINE
• Near Nye
• 600 employees
• Operating since 1986
• Stillwater River watershed

EAST BOULDER MINE
• Near Big Timber
• 300 contract employees (during
GNA negotiations)
• In development phase
• East Boulder River watershed

•

•

Worker housing, especially ‘man
camps’

•

Water treatment and tailings
ponds (Boe Ranch)

•

Maintenance of production cap at
2000 tons per day

•

Road safety and traffic reduction

•

•

TECHNOLOGY
COMMITTEE
FOCUS

OVERSIGHT
COMMITTEE
FOCUS

Cottonwood Resource Council (CRC)

Impoundment (Hertzler site)
a. Amount of waste
b. Dissatisfaction with EISproposed options
c. Expanding SMC
‘footprint’
d. Risk to river
Production cap removal (from
2,000 tons/day)
a. Potential 2-to-3-fold
increase in number of
workers
b. New ‘man camps’ that
separate workers from
community
c. More traffic, employee
cars, accidents, noise, dust,
pollution
Culture and esthetics
a. River degradation
b. Quality of life

Responsible for identifying best practices and methods to decrease or eliminate adverse
environmental impacts. Current issues: Water monitoring and tailings disposal methods,
such as paste technology, zero discharge, and post-closure water management plan
•
•

As ultimate decision-making body, charged with maintaining open lines of
communication, and addressing significant issues that may develop
Decision-making by voting, majority prevails. Tie vote leads to informal
attempts to gain agreement, and if unsuccessful, to binding arbitration
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Stillwater GNA Timeline
Winter 1997: SMC requests a permit amendment to remove production cap and build a 30year impoundment at the Hertzler Ranch site
March 1998: SPA participates in EIS process, objects to removing cap at Nye site and
adding a 30-year impoundment 7 miles from the mine site
July 1998: CRC voices concern about planned employee housing (man camps) at yet-toopen East Boulder mine, wanting instead, to promote ‘smart growth’ of workers and families
becoming integrated in local towns
August 1998: Guest editorials appear in NY Times
August 1998: CRC, SPA, Northern Plains meet and decide to cooperate to ask SMC to
discuss a GNA
January 1999: US Forest Service and Montana Department of Environmental Quality
(MDEQ) issue joint EIS record of decision on Stillwater Mine, lifting the 2000 tons per day
production cap
February 1999: SPA notifies MDEQ of intent to sue, and formulation of a GNA as an
alternative to legal action. After a 3-month delay, SPA withdraws the suit, but retains the
intent to challenge mining practices in court
March 1999: SPA and CRC communicate with SMC CEO, Bill Nettles, asking to begin
negotiating a GNA
April 1999: Northern Plains sends a letter to SMC to learn potential points for negotiation
May 1999: Northern Plains, CRC, and SPA staff and members receive negotiation skills
training
June 1999: Preliminary meetings are followed by formal GNA negotiations with Northern
Plains, CRC, SPA and SMC
February 2000: Negotiations stall, then resume after discussions leading to SMC
modifications of the contract
May 2000: GNA signed
June 2003: SMC Sold to Norilsk Nickel
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APPENDIX D: GNA CASE STUDY SUMMARIES

Boulder Residents for the Elimination of Air Toxics and Hazardous Emissions
(BREATHE) & City of Boulder
and
Syntex Chemicals
Introduction
In 1995, Syntex Chemicals signed a Good Neighbor Agreement (“GNA”) with the Boulder
Residents for the Elimination of Air Toxics and Hazardous Emissions (“BREATHE”) and the
City of Boulder (“City”). The purpose of the GNA was to mitigate the health hazards associated
with the release of hazardous air emissions from existing operations and future expansions at the
Boulder Syntex facility.

The Parties
BREATHE was formed in 1989 by a group of local residents. The group’s purpose was to fight
for reduced air emissions at local manufacturing facilities. The group had an annual operating
budget of about $2,000 derived from member contributions and foundation grants. There were
no paid staff. This community group is no longer active.
The Syntex facility began operating in Boulder in the 1950’s as Arapahoe Chemicals. At the
time of the GNA, Syntex Chemicals, an international pharmaceutical manufacturer, owned the
facility and employed 250-300 local residents. The company was profitable, expanding, publicly
traded, and “aware of” (as opposed to “concerned about”) public opinion. The chemical
manufacturing sector does not represent an important part of the local economy (1 on a scale of
10).19
The City of Boulder was also a party to the GNA. The City became involved in the negotiations
as a result of Syntex’s attempts to get a city building permit for facility modifications needed to
increase production.

Nature of the Dispute
In 1991, Boulder residents learned from Toxic Release Inventory (“TRI”) reports that a local zip
code had the highest air emissions in the state, and that the Syntex plant was at the top of the TRI
19

Ratings and other opinions are taken primarily from BREATHE’s responses to the GNA survey.
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list. In 1992, Syntex sought state and local approvals for a major expansion at the Boulder plant.
To mitigate the effects of increased air emissions, Syntex proposed building a thermal oxidizer to
capture and burn emissions, thereby reducing current plant emissions by about 85 percent, even
with the increase in production. Following a bitter year-long debate precipitated by the City’s
insistence on a “use review” process, Syntex decided to withdraw its proposal and moved the
expansion operations overseas.
In the fall of 1994, after being acquired by Roche Pharmaceuticals, Syntex again applied for a
construction permit to modify its existing facility in order to produce an AIDS drug (ganciclovir)
which was growing in demand. By this time, BREATHE had received a grant that enabled them
to hire an attorney who was knowledgeable about air toxics. The community group demanded
and received a place at the table during the state and city discussions about Syntex’s proposed
modifications.
The issues of primary concern to BREATHE were public health concerns, impacts on the
environment, and nuisance and quality of life issues. Prior to negotiating the GNA, BREATHE
had undertaken numerous actions, including participating in public hearings and commenting on
public documents; appealing local and state permit decisions; urging regulatory agencies to
better enforce existing laws; writing to and meeting with company officials; and negative
publicity campaigns.

Negotiation of the GNA
The GNA was actually proposed by Syntex, and the community group did not have confidence
in the GNA process, according to Jane Shellenberger, former president of BREATHE. She
states that it was not a priority for them as it seemed like a public relations tactic on their part.
Nevertheless, representatives from BREATHE, the City, and Syntex all sat at the table together
to negotiate the specifics of the GNA. The leverage for these discussions came from the City’s
refusal to issue a building permit until the issue of toxic emissions was resolved.
BREATHE sought a number of commitments from the company, many of which were not
included in the GNA. In particular, BREATHE representatives wanted specific reductions in
dioxins emitted and reductions in the use and discharge of other chlorinated compounds. They
felt there was too much emphasis on “end-of-pipe” treatment and not enough on front-end
prevention. The company proposed the GNA as a way to obtain their building permit as well as
to end negative publicity and generate positive publicity for the company. The final agreement
included the following provisions:
• Syntex agreed to:
o install a thermal oxidizer,
o testing and monitoring requirements including documentation of burn efficiency by a
third party,
o a fugitive emission reduction plan, and
o an independent facility review by an outside consultant selected by all three parties.
• The City and BREATHE agreed to:
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o

not require Syntex to go through the use review process for the proposed modification or
for the building of the TDD itself, and
o drop their insistence on limiting emissions due to future expansions in the GNA.

Negotiations extended over a six-month period. The survey respondents felt that they had
adequate access to lawyers and legal expertise, technical consultants, and technical/economic
data, but not to trained negotiators. The GNA is a legally binding document. It is not part of a
state or federal regulatory action. If the company is sold, the GNA will remain in effect.

Costs
BREATHE estimates it spent $8-10,000 on the negotiation process, 80 percent of which went to
outside consultants. The group did not spend anything on implementation other than the time of
the group members (unpaid volunteers). It is not known how much the company spent on
negotiating or implementing the GNA. The company did not provide any funding to BREATHE
to assure its continued participation in the implementation process. City of Boulder employees
who participated in the process were paid by the City to oversee implementation as part of their
normal job responsibilities.

Implementation
BREATHE estimates that 70-80% of the commitments in the GNA have been honored. The
problem with implementation has been BREATHE’s lack of technical expertise to determine
whether the company actually complied with the audit and testing requirements. No subsequent
modifications have been made to the original GNA. The agreement does contain an enforcement
provision that states that any party to the GNA is authorized to bring a civil action in state district
court seeking specific performance of the terms of the agreement, or any other legal or equitable
remedies. This provision has never been invoked. It must be noted that the group has essentially
dissolved as of the time of this study because most of the provisions had been honored.

Lessons Learned
The two survey respondents gave their GNA an overall success rating of 8 and 9 out of 10. They
would possibly be willing to negotiate another GNA if similar circumstances were to arise in the
future, but both are wary of the use of a GNA as a public relations tool by the company instead
of as a way to reduce pollution. If they had it to do over again they would keep the negotiation
process in the public eye; focus more on the concurrent building of the community group to
prevent burnout and dissolution; anticipate the possible break-up of the group and build in
contingencies; and obtain formal commitments pertaining to reduction in chemical use.
Unexpected benefits of the GNA process include an increase in anonymous involvement from
company staff (and former staff); much more community awareness and scrutiny of the
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company; and, on a personal level, empowerment through public speaking and the general
effectiveness of a small group.
Advice from BREATHE to other groups considering a GNA includes: reserve the right to be
critical of the company’s actions; reserve the right to negotiate additional agreements as future
issues arise; allow for ample on-going review and monitoring of the agreement; be careful of
public relations ploys; don’t confine yourself to the terms of pre-existing templates for an
agreement; be bold and innovative; and ask for more than you want. Advice contained in the
article referenced below (written by the Director of the Office of Environmental Affairs of the
City of Boulder) is that you have to get people talking; be sensitive to timing; work on a
deadline; keep the process open; try to involve all interested parties; and make flexible use of
what each party has to offer while recognizing the situation’s dynamics.

References
1. GNA
2. GNA Survey response and workshop briefing by Jane Shellenberger and Ed von Bleichert,
BREATHE, Boulder, CO [On file with the Natural Resources Law Center (2002)].
3. Alison Peters, “Cooperative Pollution Prevention: The Syntex Chemicals Agreement,”
Pollution Prevention Review 23 (Spring 1996).
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Citizens of Owyhee County Organized Association (COCOA)
and
Idaho Dairies (not the true business names)
Introduction
In October 1998, a Good Neighbor Agreement (“GNA”) was signed by the Citizens of Owyhee
County Organized Association (“COCOA”) and a dairy located in Owyhee County. At the time
the GNA was signed, the owner was operating one dairy. Since that time, he opened a second
dairy and agreed that this second dairy would also follow the GNA. Because of the small size of
the local community, COCOA has asked that we not refer to the dairies abiding by the GNA by
their incorporated title. Hence, the companies will be referred to as “the Dairies” throughout this
document. The purpose of the GNA was to address community concerns regarding the impact of
dairies on the local community. The greatest concerns were in relation to the impacts on both
water quality and air quality from liquid manure being applied to agricultural fields through
pivots/end guns. COCOA was concerned with the change in levels of ammonia and nitrates
found in local wells. The area in question has sandy soils and shallow ground water, creating
concerns within the community that ground water is also susceptible to contamination. The
conditions of the GNA have been included in the water right transfer permit issued by the Idaho
Department of Water Resources (“IDWR”).

The Parties
COCOA is a non-profit grassroots citizens group comprised of farmers and rural citizens, many
of whom have resided in the community for a number of generations. The group is made up of
volunteers and has an annual operating budget of approximately $14,000 generated primarily by
foundation grants, with a small portion of the budget coming in via individual and member
contributions. A portion of the foundation grants received by COCOA is due to the fact that the
organization is a chapter of the Idaho Rural Council.
Since 1996, three commercial sized dairies moved into the Marsing and Homedale areas of
Owyhee County. Two of these dairies abide by the GNA created, while the third has chosen not
to participate in any of the GNA negotiations or conditions. The Dairies at issue are regarded as
moderately important to the local economy. In general, the sector represented by the Dairies is
not perceived to be of great importance to the local economy (1 on a scale of 10).20 This rating
was given in light of the fact that Idaho is the sixth largest dairy state in the nation, and as such,
these Dairies represent only a small fraction of the dairy sector as a whole. At the time the GNA
was negotiated, the Dairies were profitable, expanding, and privately owned.

20

Ratings and other opinions are taken primarily from COCOA’s responses to the GNA survey.
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Nature of the Dispute
The commercial size Dairies moved into Owyhee County between Marsing and Homedale in
1998. The Dairies moved cattle to the area prior to obtaining a water permit. COCOA
recognized this as an opportunity to try to stop the Dairies from being established by protesting
their water permit. Local citizens were concerned with how the Dairies were impacting the air
and water quality of Owyhee County. The most significant issues were public health concerns,
the impacts on the environments, and nuisance and quality of life issues. In addition to the
protesting of the water permit, the group began to test the water of their own individual wells and
hired a professional hydrologist at their own expense.
The Dairies are located within a half-mile radius of one another, and are within two miles of the
Snake River. There are also waste-holding ponds full of manure. Citizens have noticed a
dramatic change in water quality since the building of the two Dairies. The water is described as
“murky” with a noticeable amount of sand in the water. COCOA believes that the volume of
water used by the Dairies, combined with the location of the Dairies, have a direct relation to the
water quality problems. It is noted that the Dairies convert irrigation water from a typical use
into a “commercial” use. This commercial use consumes high volumes of water twelve months
out of the year, rather than just using water from April through October (the time period of the
“typical” use). During the winter months, when the aquifer may not be recharging quickly,
pumping in the sandy soils may cause draw-down effects on surrounding domestic wells.
Citizens have also noticed an increase in the presence of sulfur and ammonia in domestic wells
after the Dairies began pumping water twelve months a year. It was the protesting of one the
Dairies’ water permit by COCOA that resulted in the decision to negotiate a GNA.
Prior to negotiating the GNA, COCOA participated in public hearings, urged regulatory agencies
to better enforce existing laws/rules, urged agencies and/or other governmental bodies to adopt
new rules, and protested the water permit used by the Dairies. COCOA, in working directly with
the Dairies, sent written correspondence to the Dairies expressing their concerns, met with Dairy
representatives, and hired their own hydro-geologist to assist in the monitoring of water quality.
The monitoring of personal wells occurred on a monthly basis. The Idaho Division of
Environmental Quality and the Idaho State Department of Agriculture were contacted to study
the water. The two departments agreed to conduct a five-year water project to monitor wells
around the Dairies.
Both of the Dairies are owned by the same person, and have agreed to follow the GNA. There is
a third dairy in the region, but the management of this dairy has chosen not to be a party to the
GNA at all. The two dairies that are owned by the same person have separate water permits.
Under the GNA, the dairy that signed off on the agreement has allowed COCOA to test water
from wells located on the dairy. The second dairy also allows the testing of water, even though
they are not named parties to the GNA.

Negotiation of the GNA
The Dairies’ willingness to negotiate a GNA was prompted by COCOA’s challenge of a water
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permit. At the time, the Dairies had been using water beyond what had been allocated to them,
and had then applied for a water transfer permit. Every large dairy (more than approximately
300 total head) must obtain written approval for the dairy use of water from the IDWR. This is
accomplished by filing an application for a new water right permit or an application to transfer
an existing water right to the dairy. After hearing COCOA’s complaints, the IDWR made the
negotiated GNA terms part of the water transfer, an approach supported by the Dairies and
IDWR.
During the negotiations, COCOA felt that they did not have adequate access to lawyers and legal
expertise, technical consultants, trained negotiators, or technical/economic data.
COCOA began the process wanting the following commitments from the Dairies:
• Specific remediation and mitigation measures in relation to specific pollution prevention
• Traffic mitigation provisions
• Commitment from the Dairies to perform regular environmental monitoring
• Community access to relevant environmental data held by the Dairies
• Advance notice to the community of any proposed changes in operations
• Active community involvement in audits, monitoring, and/or inspections
The bottom line issue for the Dairies was for COCOA to end all protests and negative publicity
targeted toward the Dairies.
The resulting GNA contained the following major provisions:
• Dairies agreed to allow the testing of water from wells located on the dairy. The conditions
were included in their water transfer permit issued by the IDWR.
o Dairies are required to submit a detailed plan for the monitoring program to the
department for review and approval prior to diversion and use of water. The plan shall
provide for testing of water from at least one well hydrologically up-gradient from the
Dairy and at least one well hydrologically down-gradient from the Dairy.
o If the Dairies do not comply with the conditions of approval for this permit, the IDWR
may revoke the permit.
• The operation of the Dairies will not cause contamination of ground water and/or drinking
water.
• There will be no discharge of pollutants into water except as permitted by state and federal
agencies.
• Agreed to a maximum density of animals per acre.
• Agreed that the facility would not be a nuisance as defined by Idaho regulations.
• Lights on the Dairies shall be shielded to keep the light source pointing down and inside the
property lines of the Dairy.
• The lagoon is to be lined with a grade of vinyl appropriate for manure management.
• The settling ponds are also to be lined with vinyl or concrete.
• The best available odor controlling practices are to be used in manure storage structures.
• The Dairy agreed to requirements relating to the total capacity of manure storage structures.
These structures must also have adequate diversions to contain any spillage or rupture.
• There must be an EPA approved clean-up plan in place for the manure storage facilities.
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•
•
•
•

Requirements were established as to what may be deposited in the manure storage structures.
The Dairies agreed that the water consultant will select the monitoring wells and will
determine if a test well is needed.
If the Dairies close, they agree to submit to an EPA closure plan for the facility
COCOA agreed to:
o End protests and negative publicity targeted toward the Dairies.

The negotiation process lasted approximately one month. The GNA is a legally binding contract.
The GNA has been integrated with a state regulatory action, where the IDWR adopted the
conditions of the GNA into the dairies’ water permit. If the Dairy is sold, the GNA will remain
in effect. The Dairy does not provide funding to COCOA to ensure its continued participation in
GNA-related activities. The Dairy does, however, pay for its share of the cost for a hydrologist
to conduct water monitoring. This money is not paid to COCOA directly.

Costs
COCOA estimates that they have spent a total of $4,500 on the negotiation of the GNA. The
total cost thus far of implementing the GNA is estimated to be $13,000. The largest expenditure
was the hiring of a hydro-geologist to set up the water quality monitoring system. COCOA
expects to spend $10,000 to maintain the conditions of the GNA. The Dairies do not provide
funding to COCOA to ensure its continued participation in GNA-related activities; however,
Dairy management does pay for his own water testing.

Implementation
COCOA rates the GNA as a general success in terms of the extent to which commitments have
been honored. One lingering problem has been the inadequate resolution of the pest and odor
issues. The Dairies were not using effective pest control measures, and continued to sprinkle
liquid manure onto fields using irrigation pivots and end guns. This practice attracts flies and
creates extremely foul odors. Also, by using more water than was allowed by the water permits,
the Dairies were not abiding by the conditions of the water permits In response, COCOA
brought the problem to the attention of the Dairies and to the Idaho Department of Water
Resources. Additionally, COCOA has been constantly patrolling the area to verify that
conditions are being followed by the Dairies. There have been no subsequent modifications
made to the original GNA. The Dairies has recently applied for a new permit, raising the
potential for additional negotiations. The GNA does not include specific procedures for dispute
resolution.
Additional details regarding the status of implementation activities are provided in the table
below:
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The GNA Provision:
Water Quality

What Actually Happened:











Property Issues




Site Requirements
o Manure storage structure
capacity is sufficient for 180
days at maximum capacity
(animal units)
o All manure storage facilities
have adequate diversions, dike
walls, or curbs and direct any
spillage or runoff to
appropriately-sized areas
o All manure storage facilities
have EPA approved clean-up
plan
o CAFO has given public notice
within 24 hours of any spillage
or rupture of storage facilities









Water testing has been
conducted monthly and data
has been submitted to
COCOA
Testing of wells
Monitors have locks on them;
able to determine if monitors
have been tampered with
Operation of the Confined
Animal Feeding Operation
(CAFO) has not caused
contamination of ground
water or drinking water
Negotiating for three test
wells (2 paid for by Dairy, 1
paid for by COCOA)
No pollutants have been
discharged to surface or
ground water except as
allowed by permit
Dairy paid two years in
advance for monthly water
testing. Thereafter, the dairy
has paid a hydrologist
selected by COCOA to
conduct monthly testing
The maximum density of
animals has not exceeded five
Animal Units per acre
The CAFO has not been a
nuisance as defined by Idaho
Code §52-101
Lights for the CAFO have
been placed and shielded to
direct the light source down
and inside the CAFO
property lines
The lagoon has been lined
with vinyl
Settling ponds have been
lined with vinyl or concrete
All manure storage structures
employ the best available
odor controlling practices
(much improved)
Consultant selected
monitoring wells and determined if test well required
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What Didn’t Happen:



Although settling ponds
have been lined with
vinyl, the liners are being
ripped apart when settling
ponds are cleaned out by
front loaders



General Requirements
 Adequate housekeeping
practices have been maintained
to prevent creation of a nuisance
 Dead animals have not been
picked up more than three times
every 48 hours. The pick-up
storage area is not within 500
feet of a public road. A panel
has been constructed to block
public view of the storage area
 The ratio for liquid manure
application is five parts water to
one part lagoon mixture
Facility Closure
 If dairy ceased operation, a
closure plan is to be submitted
to the EPA (with duplicates
submitted to the Idaho DEQ,
Owyhee County Public Health
Dept., Idaho Soil conservation
District, and COCOA), and
removal and disposal of
livestock waste is to be
completed within ninety days of
the final day of facility
operation
 EPA regulations are to be
followed for the closure and
clean up of CAFO facilities
 In the event that the dairy is sold
or leased to another individual
or entity, this agreement
remains in effect as a condition
of the sale



Animal parts and afterbirth
have not been deposited in
manure storage structures
Facilities have been designed
and located with full
consideration of: proximity
to adjacent uses, effect on
surrounding properties, and
reduction of nuisance factors





Level of implementation
not known because the
dairy has not ceased
operations

Lessons Learned
COCOA gives their GNA an overall success rating of 7 out of 10. If similar disputes were to
arise in the future, negotiating another GNA would be their preferred course of action. If they
had to do it over again, they would have added shallow test wells, and testing for hydrogen
sulfide and odors, to their negotiating process. They also would have added a provision to the
GNA asking for funds to hire an attorney. One unexpected benefit of the GNA experience was
that some of the neighbors seemed to bond together, and it was also viewed as an outlet to keep
people involved in their community. COCOA is concerned about the potential financial burdens
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of the GNA over the length of time that the Dairies are in operation. Their advice to others
considering negotiating a GNA is to involve a professional to assist in the production of a
binding contract.
References
1. GNA
2. GNA Survey response (as later revised) by Ilene Dobbin, COCOA, Marsing, ID (on file with
Natural Resources Law Center).
3. Briefing on GNA implementation by Ilene Dobbin and Joan Chadez (July 2003).
4. Briefing on GNA implementation by Ilene Dobbin (June 2004).
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Community/Labor Refinery Tracking Committee
and
Sun Oil
Introduction
In December 1997, a Good Neighbor Agreement (“GNA”) was signed by the Community/Labor
Refinery Tracking Committee (“C/LRTC”), the City of Philadelphia (“City”), and Sun Oil
Company (“Sun”). The GNA was in the form of a Consent Decree negotiated as a settlement to
a lawsuit brought by C/LRTC against Sun for violations of the Clean Air Act. As Sun has
complied with all of the provisions of the Decree, the GNA is no longer in effect.

The Parties
Formed in 1993 with the help of the local chapter of Clean Water Action (“CWA”), the C/LRTC
is a coalition of organizations, workers, and individuals from South and Southwest Philadelphia
who are working to improve the quality of life for the communities that are impacted by Sun Oil
Refinery’s pollution. There are no paid staff, and the group operates on an annual budget of
$5,000-6,000 derived mostly from foundation grants (90%) and individual contributions (10%).
The mission of the C/LRTC is to bring together residents and workers to create a powerful voice
to protect the communities’ health, economic security and quality of life.
Sun bought the Philadelphia refinery in 1990. Sun and the refinery sector in general are
moderately important to the local economy (4 on a scale of 10). At the time the GNA was
negotiated, Sun was profitable, stable in size, publicly traded, concerned about public opinion,
and perceived publicly as committed to environmental concerns.

Nature of the Dispute
A number of issues prompted community concern about Sun’s operations, including public
health concerns, nuisance and quality of life issues, and impacts on the environment. Prior to
negotiating the GNA, C/LRTC had urged state regulatory agencies to better enforce existing
laws, written letters to Sun expressing their concerns, met with company representatives, and
conducted negative publicity campaigns. In 1995, after learning of multiple incidents in which
the refinery emitted illegally high levels of sulfur dioxide, the C/LRTC sent a 60-day notice of
intent to sue the company under the citizens suit provisions of the Clean Air Act.

Negotiation of the GNA
Following the filing of C/LRTC’s lawsuit, it took approximately two and a half years to
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negotiate a settlement (“Consent Decree”). During the negotiations, C/LRTC had adequate
access to lawyers and legal expertise and technical consultants, but did not utilize trained
negotiators. They also felt that there was not adequate access to technical and/or economic data.
C/LRTC was looking for specific commitments with respect to pollution prevention, reduction,
and remediation as well as an active involvement in audits, monitoring, and plant inspections. In
agreeing to negotiate, Sun was seeking a dismissal of the pending lawsuit, an end to protests, and
positive publicity. The City intervened in the lawsuit to collect a share of the fines paid by the
company as part of the settlement.
The major provisions of the Consent Decree are as follows:
• Sun agreed to invest more than $5 million to improve its air pollution controls to decrease the
release of sulfur dioxide, smoke and odors, including installation of color TV cameras and
video recorders for observing flares.
• Sun agreed to pay $500,000 in pollution penalties, with $150,000 going directly to the City,
$200,000 going to projects that would benefit the environment and health of the communities
around the facility, and $150,000 going toward establishing a community emergency
notification system.
• Sun agreed to provide more information to residents on activities at the refinery, including:
o Quarterly reports concerning various operations,
o Incident investigation reports on significant airborne releases of contaminants,
o Notification of planned maintenance or repairs along with environmental impact studies
seven days in advance, and
o Notification of emergency repairs.
• Both the City and C/LRTC had the right to conduct site visits to observe operations and
inspect monitoring records.
• The parties agreed to establish a three member Operating Committee to carry out certain
provisions of the Consent Decree.
• Sun agreed to pay stipulated penalties if it failed to comply.
C/LRTC also sought a better fenceline monitoring system but this issue was not addressed in the
final agreement.
As a lawsuit settlement, the Consent Decree was a legally binding document but was not part of
a state or federal regulatory permit. If the company had been sold, the GNA would have
remained in effect. The agreement contained specific dispute resolution procedures for any
disputes that might have arisen under the Consent Decree. The result of the proposed
implementation provisions are discussed later in this case summary.

Costs
C/LRTC spent $0 on the negotiation process. Organizing support was provided on a pro bono
basis by Clean Water Action. Legal representation was provided on a contingency basis by the
Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia (“PILCOP”). As part of the agreement, Sun paid
PILCOP $75,000 plus $4,500 per quarter until Sun’s obligations were met. The company spent
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an estimated $5,500,000 on implementing the agreement. Sun did not provide funding to
C/LRTC to ensure its continued participation in GNA-related activities.

Implementation
This GNA (i.e., the Consent Decree) was negotiated to reduce the high levels of sulfur dioxide
emissions being produced by Sunoco. The community group threatened to sue Sunoco unless
they worked to improve the situation. To date, the timeline of this GNA is over, hence, the
agreement is no longer in existence. The primary issues negotiated included public health,
nuisance, noise, traffic, environmental impact, and air issues. A fair number of the
implementation strategies have been achieved, but only through a great deal of work on the part
of the community groups. C/LRTC estimates that Sun honored 80% of its commitments.21
Some of the process improvements listed in the GNA were not made due to technical reasons.
Today, a number of the community members that worked on the GNA have left, leaving only a
few active members remaining. To address remaining issues, the groups are currently seeking to
meet with the tracking committee to discuss areas for improvement. No subsequent
modifications were made to the GNA.
Additional details regarding the status of implementation provisions are presented in the
following table:
The GNA Provision:
Sulfur Recovery Unit


What Actually Happened:


Provide incident investigation 
reports pertaining to events
resulting in a significant
release of contaminants to the
air to C/LRTC for review

Sulfur recovery unit was
installed
Reports were received

What Didn’t Happen:




Evaluate potential methods to
reduce emission of fine particles in
the Point Breeze FCCU.
 Submit report with

Although the reports
were received, it was
only after the community
group requested them;
they did not come
automatically
Air is not particularly
cleaner

recommendations to C/LRTC
within 120 days of GNA
going into effect.
Quarterly Reports to C/LRTC



Reports were received



Although the reports
were received, it was
only after the community
group requested them;
they did not come
automatically

*In light of the current status and small size of the group, the committee was unable to assess the
implementation status of several provisions.
21

Ratings and other opinions are taken primarily from C/LRTC’s responses to the GNA survey.
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Lessons Learned
C/LRTC gives their GNA an overall success rating of 8 out of 10. Bob Wendelgass, State
Director of Clean Water Action and participant in the process, is unsure if he would seek to
negotiate another GNA under similar circumstances in the future. If he had it to do over again,
he would have liked the GNA to last longer than the Consent Decree did. He reports that a
significant amount of work went into getting the siren system and other projects implemented
which stretched the resources of the community group.
References
1. GNA (Consent Decree)
2. GNA Survey response and workshop briefing by Bob Wendelgass, CWA, Philadelphia, PA
[On file with the Natural Resources Law Center (2002)].
3. “Sun Oil Reaches Good Neighbor Agreement with Neighbors/Workers 12/30/97 (Cover Note
from Bob Wendelgass, Clean Water Action-Philadelphia to Denny Larson, Coordinator of the
National Oil Refinery Action Network (NORAN) (CBE),” at http://www.igc.org/cbesf/flash.html
4. “More Control Over Sun,” South Philadelphia Review, Jan. 8, 1998.
5. Briefing on GNA implementation by Anne Fitzgerald (July 2003).
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Concerned Citizens of Norco (CCN)
and
Shell Oil
Introduction
In 2002, Shell Oil Company negotiated a Good Neighbor Agreement (“GNA”) with the
Concerned Citizens of Norco (“CCN”). The primary purpose of the agreement was the
relocation of the residents from the Diamond community immediately adjacent to the refinery in
Norco, LA. The GNA is a legally binding commitment that was negotiated in response to longstanding community health concerns and pressure by supporting non-governmental organizations
(“NGO”).

The Parties
CCN is comprised of the affected neighbors in the Diamond community. In the GNA process,
CCN was advised and supported by the Louisiana Bucket Brigade (“LABB”). Founded in 2000,
LABB is a non-profit organization that works with community groups. There are three full-time
and three part-time employees. The LABB has an annual operating budget of $225,000 which is
generated by individual and member contributions (12%), government grants (8%), and
foundation grants (80%). The LABB provided hands on support to the CCN to force Shell to
agree to the relocation demand.
A number of other NGOs also participated in the GNA negotiations and support activities,
including Earthjustice, Xavier Deep South Center for Environmental Justice, Commonweal,
Refinery Reform Campaign, and the Environmental Health Fund.
Shell Oil began operations in Norco in 1915. The company employs only one resident of the
neighboring community. The oil industry and Shell Oil are both very important to the local
economy. At the time the GNA was negotiated, Shell was profitable, expanding, publicly traded,
and concerned about public opinion.

Nature of the Dispute
The Diamond community is 100 percent African-American and sandwiched between the Shell
Chemical facility and Shell/Motiva refinery. Community members are rarely employed at these
facilities. A number of residents have developed strange cancers and many people have had
respiratory problems. Additionally, two members of the community were killed in an explosion
in the 1970s, and there was a massive explosion in 1988. Due to these chronic public health
issues, the community had been fighting for relocation for twenty years.
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Prior to negotiating the GNA, the community took a number of actions, including participating in
public hearings and commenting on public documents; urging regulatory agencies to better
enforce existing laws; initiating personal injury lawsuits (note that the community lost a law suit
demanding relocation in 1997); writing to and meeting with company representatives, and
conducting negative publicity campaigns. One other action that the community took was to
monitor the refinery’s stack discharges as well as the resulting air quality. Samples were
collected exposing violations of state air standards, photographs were taken and a web cam used
to expose flaring abuses, and Shell’s public records were researched to expose other examples of
“bad behavior.”

Negotiation of the GNA
During 1999 and 2000, due to community activism, Shell offered to relocate two of the four
streets in the Diamond community. These two streets were nearest the fenceline with the
chemical facility. Some of the community members accepted the offer, while others did not,
creating division within the ranks of community members that had long argued for relocation of
all four blocks. In June 2001, the Coming Clean Initiative, a national consortium of
environmental groups, visited the Diamond Community, meeting with community and Shell
plant and corporate officials. This effort created further pressure on Shell to relocate all four
streets.
In June 2002, Shell made an offer to purchase and relocate property owners or provide $25,000
home improvement loans (20 percent forgiven each year) to all Diamond community members.
Community members had two months to sign up for the program, an option exercised by all but
two property owners.
According to Anne Rolfes, the unquestionable catalyst for Shell making the final offer (i.e., the
GNA) was the aggressive organizing and media campaign.22 One prominent example involved
the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg in August of 2002. Shell
knew that the activists and the community would be there on a world stage bringing up the issue
of the Norco refinery. This presented a significant threat to Shell since they wanted to present
their global program of Sustainable Development, but they knew that they would have to explain
the apparent community “abuse” that was occurring in Norco. Shell knew that its opponents
were well organized and had the resources to carry out their negative publicity campaign. Shell
was also “vulnerable” at this point due to some other negative international publicity around the
same timeframe. At the point Shell agreed to a relocation plan, Anne Rolfes believes that Shell
was just tired of the relentless pressure on a world stage and wanted to put the situation behind
them so they would not be further embarrassed. Iris Carter of CCN expressed a similar
sentiment, explaining that it was the “drama”—i.e., the constant repeating of heart-wrenching
stories of citizen health issues—that pushed the company to settle the dispute.
Shell proposed the relocation plan as a way to do what the community wanted without losing
face. They combined relocation with a number of other programs which were proposed by Shell
itself and not really a result of the negotiation process. Note that the community’s main focus
22

Ratings and other opinions are taken primarily from LABB’s responses to the GNA survey.
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was relocation; at that point they simply did not care about other issues such as pollution
prevention or effects on the local economy because they would no longer be living in the shadow
of the refinery if they were relocated.
Negotiation of the GNA focused on determining a fair price to be paid to the landowners. In
addition, the company sought an end to protests and negative publicity as well as positive
publicity for the company. (The activist groups involved in the GNA campaign made it clear to
the company that the campaign would not stop during negotiations.) It took approximately three
months to finalize the agreement. Participants included the Concerned Citizens of Norco, the
Louisiana Bucket Brigade, Refinery Reform, Environmental Health fund, Subra Company,
Earthjustice, Commonweal, along with company representatives. Anne Rolfes felt that during
the negotiations the community group and its supporters had adequate access to lawyers, legal
expertise and technical consultants, but not to trained negotiators and company technical and
economic data. However, she would have liked to have obtained a better deal for landowners
than they ultimately achieved.
The GNA is considered by CCN to be a legally binding document that is not integrated with a
state or federal regulatory action. As the buyout is happening over a period of six months to a
year, a future transfer of ownership of the company should have no effect on the agreement. The
current status of implementation is presented later.

Costs
The costs of negotiating the GNA included $8,000 for a facilitator (split between Shell and the
community) and $1,000 for conference calls to link out of town participants to the negotiating
sessions and to conduct strategy sessions. In addition, members of the seven participants
representing NGOs contributed an average of 15 hours per person per week. The company did
not provide any funding to the community group or the NGOs to ensure their continued
participation in monitoring the implementation of the GNA.
The costs of the implementation process so far include $5,000 spent by the Louisiana Bucket
Brigade and $3 million spent by Shell.

Implementation
This GNA was negotiated by residents of Norco, Louisiana and Shell Oil, Co. Shell’s answer to
community concerns was to relocate the residents to another area. However, once they offered
to move the residents, the company began to improve their air monitoring system. Shell drafted
legal documents indicating to the residents that they were being paid fair market value for their
homes. Yet, this fair market value did not take into account the loss of culture and historical ties
to the community. Families have been split because some individuals simply do not want to
leave the community even though they know that it is not a safe environment. Approximately
85% of the neighborhood is being relocated. Generally, it is reported that Shell had more input
in the decision making than the community groups. In this instance, the community groups
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found themselves faced with Shell’s version of a GNA, termed a “Good Neighbor Initiative.” It
is important to recognize that this “Initiative” is different from a GNA (initiated by community
groups to address concerns about an area company).
If this situation should be encountered again in the future, the community groups recommend the
residents have more of a voice as to what is going to be the end result. They also encourage the
residents to take a “hard stand” with these companies. Additionally, the residents should band
together with other groups to try to get significant legislation passed, and to help politicians
recognize that change is needed. The community groups here express frustration with the
number of inconsistencies. Provisions allocating health care and associated costs to Shell have
not been solidified. There are concerns that the health study may not be done properly. No
subsequent modifications have been made to the agreement. Some of the paperwork is taking
longer than expected, and some of the contractors who are working with the community on
behalf of Shell have been rude, impacting company-community relations.
Additional details about the status of implementation provisions are provided in the following
table:
The GNA Provision:
All eligible owners and renters who
wished to do so were to sign up for
the Diamond Options Program by
August 31, 2002
Shell to pay a temporary relocation
allowance to families who chose to
have extensive renovations done to
their homes
Shell paid the following expenses to
owners or renters who were moving
out:
 miscellaneous expenses
 moving allowance
 rent disruption allowance
 professional service allowance
 clear site bonus
 equity advance

What Actually Happened:


What Didn’t Happen:

Provision implemented (a few
families choose to stay)








Moving allowance provision
implemented
Rent disruption allowance
provision implemented
Professional service
allowance provision
implemented
Clear site bonus provision
given
Equity advance provision
implemented.





All home improvements and
property sales to be completed by
Dec. 31, 2002
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No knowledge of any
temporary relocation
allowance being paid to
any families
Misc. expenses were not
distributed according to
the original GNA.
Originally, Shell agreed
to provide $15,000 per
household for misc.
expenses. Instead, Shell
distributed $15,000 per
family (for example, the
$15,000 to be allocated to
one household was
divided into thirds and
distributed to three
biologically related
family members serving
as the heads of their own
households).
Incomplete; only one
home in Norco has had
all improvements
completed, as of July
2004.

Lessons Learned
Anne Rolfes rates the overall success of the GNA a 7 on a scale of 10. She was happy that the
company agreed to the relocation, but she wishes the residents had received higher prices for
their homes. An unexpected benefit to her organization was achieving credibility with Shell and
being able to use this credibility in other battles. If she had a chance to do it over again she
would have had more training for the negotiation team prior to meeting with the company. Her
advice to other groups considering a GNA is to try to get what you want in a closed time frame
so you don’t have the headache of having to monitor the company into the future. The group is
still in negotiations with Shell regarding a health clinic that has yet to be determined. There are
also concerns that very few residents, other than those attending the meetings, were made aware
of the GNA provisions.
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Northern Plains Resource Council, Stillwater Protective Association,
Cottonwood Resource Council
and
Stillwater Mining
Introduction
In May 2000, a Good Neighbor Agreement (“Agreement”) was signed by the Northern Plains
Resource Council (“Northern Plains”), the Stillwater Protective Association (“SPA”), the
Cottonwood Resource Council (“CRC”), and the Stillwater Mining Company (“SMC”). The
purpose of the Agreement was to ensure that SMC would protect local watersheds from
environmental degradation due to mining activities and mitigate the impact of the influx of mine
workers on the local communities.

The Parties
Northern Plains was founded in 1971. With a staff of 15 and an annual operating budget of
$800,000, Northern Plains is committed to land stewardship, to the preservation of family farms
and ranches and small businesses, and to providing the information and tools necessary to give
citizens an effective voice in decisions that affect their lives. Recognizing the need to balance
the quest for economic gain with social and environmental responsibility, Northern Plains strives
to protect Montana’s water, land, air, and unique quality of life in order to pass them on,
unimpaired, to future generations.
Both SPA and CRC are citizens groups that are affiliated with the Northern Plains. These groups
were founded in 1978 and 1988, respectively, to respond to the potential environmental and
social impacts that local mining operations and other commercial developments posed to the
local community.
Stillwater Mining Company owns both the Nye and East Boulder mines which are the subjects of
the Agreement. The Nye mine began operations in 1986 and the East Boulder mine began
operations in 1998. Both mines produce platinum and palladium, drawing from the same vein of
ore which is 28 miles long and 10 feet wide. Between them the mines employ 1460 workers.
The company and the mining industry in general are moderately important to the local economy.
At the time the Agreement was negotiated, SMC was profitable, expanding, seeking funding,
concerned about public opinion, and perceived by the public to be committed to environmental
concerns.

64

Nature of the Dispute
The price of palladium began to increase dramatically in 1997. Anticipating a shortfall in
palladium, SMC management sought to expand their operations. Their plans included opening
the East Boulder mine, increasing production at Nye above the current production cap, and
opening a new tailings impoundment on company owned property eight miles downstream from
the mine. All of these projects required state approval. In addition, in 1998, SMC sought a
Montana Pollution Discharge Elimination System (“MPDES”) permit for discharging
wastewater into the East Boulder River from the East Boulder mine as well as approval for
construction of a new “man camp” to house mine employees.
Both the SPA and CRC were concerned with SMC’s expansion plans and participated in the
permitting and approval processes to the extent possible. Unfortunately, the citizens groups
ultimately felt that their concerns were not being adequately addressed by the government
agencies involved. SPA subsequently filed an intent to sue the Montana Department of
Environmental Quality (“MDEQ”) based on what they felt was approval of an inadequate
Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”). CRC also considered filing suit over the MPDES
permit. One CRC member wrote an editorial for the NY Times exposing the potential negative
impacts of the East Boulder mine on the local area. Because SMC is a publicly traded company,
and because at the time, several “green” funds had a stake in the company, SMC was especially
sensitive to accusations that it does not live up to expectations regarding environmental
protection. The pending and threatened lawsuits in addition to the local and national publicity of
the dispute, coupled with SMC’s determination to proceed with the expansion, resulted in a very
contentious situation in Sweet Grass County as both sides braced for a protracted battle.
About this time, Tom McGuane, a CRC member, arranged a meeting between members of the
local community and SMC management. The results of this meeting were encouraging. Paul
Hawks, the then-chairman of CRC, followed up with a letter requesting a second meeting. At
the same time SPA requested a meeting with SMC. Fortunately, SMC was open to pursuing a
dialogue with the citizens groups, and the parties, including support staff from Northern Plains,
took the first tentative steps toward negotiating a Good Neighbor Agreement.

Negotiation of the GNA
Both sides took negotiation of the Agreement seriously. The citizens groups identified key
negotiators who underwent two days of training with a professional negotiator in preparation for
the process. At the initial meeting in June 1999, 28 issues were put on the table. Over the course
of the next 11 months, the parties had numerous meetings, sometimes productive, often
contentious, with the ultimate success occurring in May of 2000: a signed Agreement that was
truly a joint effort of all of the parties. During the negotiations, the citizens groups demanded
and received adequate access to legal advice, technical consultants, and company data to
facilitate their understanding of the issues and to equalize the expertise of the parties.
The citizens groups originally sought a number of specific commitments in the areas of pollution
prevention and remediation, traffic mitigation, worker transportation and housing, investments in
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the local infrastructure, regular environmental audits and monitoring, community access to
company environmental data, community participation in environmental audits and monitoring,
advance notice of any changes in operations, and financial support of the community groups to
ensure their continued participation in Agreement-related activities.23 The company likewise
sought specific commitments, including dismissal of all pending lawsuits, assurances that no
further lawsuits challenging their operations in court would be filed, ending negative publicity,
generating positive publicity, and a confidentiality agreement to ensure that confidential
company information shared with the community groups would go no further. Concessions were
made on both sides, with the overall result representing acceptable compromises on all of the
major issues, although many issues discussed along the way did not appear in the final
agreement.
The SMC Good Neighbor Agreement is a legally binding document. The agreement will
continue in effect until mining operations have ceased, the mine sites have been closed and
reclaimed, all SMC performance bonds are released, and the water quality of all discharges from
the mines has returned to “baseline” quality. In addition, provision was made in the agreement
for the Agreement to be binding on any and all future purchasers of the mines.
The GNA contains the following major provisions:
• Mitigation of environmental impacts at the new tailings impoundment,
• Mitigation of socioeconomic impacts due to the influx of new workers,
• Environmental audit performed every five years,
• Citizen participation in all state inspections and the ability to conduct an independent
citizen inspection,
• Establishment of conservation easements on over 2,000 acres of company-owned farm
and ranch land,
• Access to almost all environmental performance data,
• A commitment to investigate improved mining technologies,
• Extensive water quality monitoring, agronomic application of wastewater, and a longterm goal of zero discharge,
• Traffic mitigation and control at each site including a busing plan for workers,
• Oversight and technology committees featuring equal participation from the citizens
groups and SMC,
• Confidentiality agreement,
• Mechanism for dispute resolution, and
• Funding provisions that state the specific amounts that SMC will provide for
implementation purposes as well as providing funding to the citizens groups for their
continued participation in Agreement-related activities.
The most current status of implementation provisions are discussed later in this case study
summary.

23

Ratings and other opinions are taken primarily from NPRC’s responses to the GNA survey.
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Costs
Detailed cost records are not available. However, Northern Plains estimates that they spent at
least 3,000 hours of staff time and $63,000 on consultants and outside experts during the
negotiation process. The Agreement has cost SMC a minimum of $4 million per year to
implement. In addition, SMC provides Northern Plains with money each year to offset the cost
of participating in the implementation and monitoring of the GNA. The amount of money is
negotiated each year, but cannot exceed $135,000 and has averaged approximately $120,000 in
the first four years of the Agreement. The company’s costs are expected to decrease only
slightly in future years as specific implementation plans are completed.

Implementation
The NPRC indicates that a majority of the commitments listed in the GNA have been honored.
Problems have been encountered where the company did not keep the citizens groups informed
of changes in operations as well as with the worker busing provisions. A year-long dispute
exists about the level at which long-term water quality monitoring should be maintained. The
busing dispute was resolved under tremendous public and worker pressure put on the company to
continue this popular program. The purpose of negotiating this Agreement was to ensure
environmental excellence in two counties, to include community oversight and awareness, and to
implement new technologies to deal with waste from the mine. The community groups
recognized the need to develop some type of dispute resolution tool to be used when working
with the mining company. The community groups stated that the Agreement process involved
more work then they had anticipated. The groups are pleased with the resulting Agreement and
believe they have developed a very sound process. This is supported through quarterly meetings
with the company as well as meetings with a committee focused on responsible mining practices
and new technologies to reduce mine waste. Most meetings are transcribed to preserve a record
for the future. It was important to Northern Plains to be able to hire experts, but there was the
concern that SMC would view these experts as a hindrance. However, SMC has frequently
benefited from hiring these experts. For both Northern Plains and SMC, community support has
grown substantially. Northern Plains states that having an expert who was also a miner was a
huge advantage because he truly cared about the process and could relate to the mine owners. It
must be noted that Northern Plains had more legal leverage at the time the Agreement was
negotiated than what is currently available. During negotiations, SMC had applied for a permit
and Northern Plains was able to use the permit process as leverage. At the time, SMC could
afford to commit to the provisions suggested by Northern Plains. However, a majority interest in
SMC is now controlled by a Russian mining giant with a very poor environmental record. The
Russians have pledged to honor the Agreement with Northern Plains and its affiliates, but the
company is now more insulated against American market pressures and perceptions.
Additional details about the status of implementation activities are provided in the table below:
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The GNA Provision:

What Actually Happened:

Disclosure of Information



Funding for Program Maintenance



Council Participation



Establishment of New Technologies
Team



Access to Premises



Creation and Donation of
Conservation Easements to
Montana Land Reliance



All information as required
by the GNA, including
confidential information, was
disclosed by SMC
A majority of programs have
been funded

The Councils have been
allowed to participate in all
aspects of the audits, reports,
studies, projects, plans, and
sampling completed by Third
Parties
The Councils and their
consultants have taken over
this function due to lack of
SMC initiation. The
Company is receptive to this
new dynamic.
Councils have been allowed
to enter mine premises and
inspect mine facilities,
conduct Citizen Sampling,
take photographs, and meet
with relevant SMC
employees
Donated conservation
easements to Montana Land
Reliance

What Didn’t Happen:







Mine-Sponsored Housing



Busing and Traffic Plans



Commercial Traffic Reduction Plan



The company dropped plans
for mine-sponsored housing
SMC developed,
implemented and funded
comprehensive busing and
traffic reduction plans for the
East Boulder and Stillwater
Mines
SMC developed,
implemented and funded a
comprehensive commercial
traffic reduction plan
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The timing of the
disclosure is not always
optimal, but it is
eventually disclosed
A dispute exists about the
level of future funding for
water quality monitoring;
the company has indicated
funding beyond the first
five years of the
Agreement may be up for
grabs.

The implementation of
this provision took longer
than expected
Only four of six
easements signed

Environmental Audit Program



Reclamation Plan



Tailings and Waste Rock Project




Notification of Permit
Modifications or Amendments

Water Program
 SMC designed, implemented
and maintained electronic
database of all water data
 SMC funded a third party
review and water quality reports
 SMC developed, implemented,
maintained, and funded the
supplemental monitoring
programs
 SMC participated in and funded
supplemental ground water
studies
 SMC designed, implemented,
maintained, and funded the
Tiered Trigger Level
Framework
 SMC designed, implemented,
maintained, and funded any
programs necessary to
implement the response and
remedial actions
Boulder River Watershed Group













SMC established,
implemented, maintained and
funded an environmental
audit program
Consultants working with
NPRC in response to SMC’s
current permit and
reclamation action



SMC participated in and
funded tailings and waste
rock project
Independent waste rock
characterization is underway



SMC disclosed and provided
Councils with an opportunity
to review and comment on all
Amendments and Revisions
to the mine operating permits
and MPDES permits no later
than 3 months prior to the
commencement of the
permitting process
SMC designed, implemented,
maintained, and funded the
“Water Program”
SMC has provided Councils
with the opportunity to
participate in the design,
implementation, and
oversight of the Water
Program
SMC has given Councils at
least 72 hours notice of all
meetings, inspections,
sampling, and monitoring
events
Councils receive the required
notice approximately 95% of
the time
SMC designed, implemented
and maintained an expanded
reporting program
SMC funded Baseline
Fisheries Study and Plan
SMC contributed to Boulder
River Watershed Group
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State agency delay in
moving the reclamation
and bond process forward
has delayed
implementation
SMC is about a year
behind in implementing
the waste pilot project.
More time may be needed
to test new tailings
technology prior to
negotiating
implementation.
Implementation of
provision is acceptable,
but SMC is sometimes
late in their notifications
Difficulty because both
parties have different
definitions of what
constitutes an
“amendment”
Councils sometimes do
not receive the required
notice
Councils have not
followed up on the
expanded reporting
program; the reporting
tends to be very technical
The optimization plan has
been difficult and will be
negotiated next year

Main Boulder Road



Big Timber City Council



Mitigation Plan



Purchasing Property



SMC initiated the process
necessary to rebuild the
remaining sections of the
Main Boulder Road –
completed summer of 2003
SMC initiated additional
negotiations with the Big
Timber City Council and
made significant additional
funding contributions toward
the expansion of city services
SMC developed,
implemented, and funded
Mitigation Plan

Consulted Councils before
purchasing property for
future tailings/waste disposal,
and has not constructed
tailings impoundments



Implementation of this
provision has been
difficult, but it appears to
be moving in the right
direction



Some complaints from
local residents about the
new tailings impoundment; being investigated
by the Councils.
SMC has not moved to
purchase any additional
property since the
Agreement was signed.



Lessons Learned
Speaking for the citizens groups, Northern Plains rates the Agreement as a success. If similar
disputes were to arise in the future they would be willing to negotiate another Agreement if it
were determined that that was the best alternative under the circumstances. Northern Plains feels
that the GNA process was beneficial for the whole community, as it brought more respect for the
citizens groups who stood their ground, while at the same time demonstrated their willingness to
put in the hard work necessary to forge the agreement. As for the future, Northern Plains does
have some concerns whether they will be able to maintain the current level of commitment to the
GNA from new members, especially with respect to filling committee positions. Overall, their
advice to other groups considering this tool is to make sure they are ready for a lot of hard work
and a long term commitment.
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Ohio Citizen Action, Environmental Community Organization
and
Rohm and Haas
Introduction
In May 2001, Rohm and Haas Co. (“R&H”) made a commitment to Ohio Citizen Action
(“OCA”) and Environmental Community Organization (“ECO”) to improve air quality and
reduce noise near its Reading plant near Cincinnati, Ohio. Neighbors of the plant had been
complaining about the plant’s air, water, and noise pollution for over a decade before their
concerns were finally addressed. Between May and December 2001, the company met monthly
with a local Community Working Group (“CWG”) to work out the details of the agreement. The
resulting Good Neighbor Agreement (“GNA”) is not a formal written contract, nor is it legally
binding.

The Parties
OCA, founded in 1975, is an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization with 150,000 dues
paying members and an annual budget of $2.1 million. With a program staff of 20 plus 150 paid
canvassers statewide, OCA campaigns on issues from public health and the environment to
utility and insurance rates.
ECO is a nonprofit citizen-based industrial air pollution group founded in 1995. This group
joined forces with OCA in the Campaign for Safer Neighborhoods to force R&H to address
issues of concern to the local community.
R&H bought the Reading plant from Morton Chemicals in 1999. This plant produces specialty
chemicals for the PVC plastics industry and employs approximately 200 local residents. R&H is
fairly important to the local economy (7 on a scale of 10), and the chemical sector as a whole is
very important to the local economy (9 on a scale of 10).24 At the time the GNA was negotiated,
the company was profitable, expanding, publicly traded, and concerned about public opinion.

Nature of the Dispute
Neighbors of the R&H plant had complained about “rotten egg” and “dead fish” odors emanating
from the plant for over a decade. More recent complaints included toxic releases of methyl
chloride, after-hours diesel truck parking, and emergency response issues. In February 2000,
OCA and ECO embarked on a campaign to force plant management to address these issues. As
part of the Campaign for Safer Neighborhoods, OCA took numerous actions prior to negotiating
24

Ratings and other opinions are taken primarily from OCA’s response to the GNA survey.
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the GNA, including door-to-door canvassing; initiating a letter writing campaign which
generated nearly 10,000 letters addressed to the plant manager and over 200 letters to R&H’s
CEO in Philadelphia; and reviewing company documents to compile a “Citizen Audit” detailing
the company’s air pollution record, which was released in November 2000.
Immediately following the release of this audit, top management agreed to meet with the
citizens’ groups. The company established a Community Advisory Council (“CAC”) in January
2001. However, many members of the community were upset because they were not invited to
attend the meetings. The company finally agreed to meet on a monthly basis with the CWG,
composed of community leaders and OCA staff, between May and December of 2001. The
purpose of these meetings was to work out the details of their stated commitments to improve air
quality and reduce noise pollution. The company agreed to this arrangement with the
understanding that as of January 2002, the CWG would be “folded into” the CAC.

Negotiation of the GNA
The specific commitments that the CWG sought were to:
• Eliminate truck parking/idling outside the plant before 7 a.m.,
• Eliminate odors,
• Reduce/eliminate toxic releases of chloromethane, and
• Establish an emergency response and notification plan for neighbors.
In exchange for agreeing to address these issues, R&H sought an end to the canvassing and letter
writing and cooperation of the community group with the CAC process.
An independent facilitator was hired by R&H to oversee the monthly CWG meetings. The
primary representative from the plant was an environmental engineer who was familiar with the
processes where changes were demanded. Neither state nor federal regulatory agencies
participated in the meetings.
Unlike most GNAs, the resulting agreement was not a formal written contract. Rather, R&H
simply agreed to continue working with the CAC to resolve the issues. The GNA is not legally
binding, nor does it embody formal dispute resolution procedures. It is not known if it would
remain in effect if the company were sold. The status of each GNA implementation provision
will be discussed later in this case study.

Costs
OCA estimates that it spent roughly $3,000 on the negotiation process and another $6,000 on
implementation. R&H spent an estimated $10,000 for the meeting facilitator and will spend over
$2 million on implementation costs after all process modifications are completed. R&H does not
provide funding to any community group to offset the costs of monitoring the GNA.

72

Implementation
Ohio Citizen Action group typically runs door-to-door and phone canvassing operations to
encourage community participation. In addition to the GNA with Rohm & Haas, OCA has an
ongoing campaign with Sunoco and a negotiated GNA with Columbus Steel Drum. Thus, the
organization has some experience working with GNAs.
Rohm & Haas is a chemical company based out of Philadelphia. OCA meets monthly with the
company. During the negotiation and implementation of this GNA, OCA encountered some
problems recruiting community members. One notable glitch was a two-month delay in
obtaining equipment for one particular process modification. As of the summer of 2004, it was
estimated that 95% of the GNA has been implemented. No subsequent modifications have been
made to the original GNA.
Additional details about the status of implementation activities are presented in the table below:
The GNA Provision:
Reduce Chloromethane (to as near
zero as possible)

What Actually Happened:






Eliminate foul odors that plague
neighbors of the plant





Prohibit after hours truck parking
and idling outside the plant gate

Establish an emergency response
and notification plan with
community input






Implemented to a certain
extent (about 95% so far)
98% recovery efficiency of
chloromethane
Company has now applied
for minimal permit levels
(less than 10 tons per year
limit)
Company has had to change
out compressors from the
1980s, so this provisions is
still being implemented
Currently being
implemented
Pressure from neighborhood
assists with day-to-day
follow-up
Installed work station
technology to improve
ventilate and eliminate
odors
Implemented
Continues to work with
contractors and supplies
Upgraded their gate security
Some community oversight,
especially with toxics and
odors issues

What Didn’t Happen:



Still working on better
notification for all workers

*There is no formal document for this GNA; these commitments were taken from OCA’s press
release dated 5/1/01.
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Lessons Learned
OCA gives their GNA an overall success rating of 9.5 out of 10.25 Rachael Belz, Southwest
Ohio Director of OCA, would seek to negotiate another GNA under similar circumstances in the
future. If she had it to do over again, she would consider trying to get a signed agreement,
although that has not been necessary to this point. One unexpected benefit of the GNA process
was that the plant manager became more involved with his employees even outside of this
process. Another benefit was the great working relationships that developed among the
participants. OCA has no concerns about the future of the GNA at this time as the company
meets monthly with neighbors and community groups to address any concerns. If the company
were to renege on its commitments, the OCA could canvass again at any time to bring them back
to the table. Belz’ advice to others considering a GNA is that canvassing is a very effective tool.

References
1. GNA Survey response and workshop briefing by Rachael Belz, Ohio Citizen Action. [On file
with the Natural Resources Law Center (2002)].
2. May 1, 2001 press release, “Campaign for Safer Neighborhoods, Rohm and Haas Reach
Agreement.”
3. March 26, 2000, phone conversation with Rachael Belz.
4. OCA’s website – ohiocitizen.org.
5. “Neighbors, plant go over fine print of air, noise pact,” The Cincinnati Enquirer, May 3, 2001.
6. Briefing on GNA implementation by Rachael Belz, OCA (July 2003).

25

This figure (of 9.5) was provided orally in July of 2004, updating the original estimate of 9.0 from the written
survey in 2002.

74

Seneca Babcock Environmental Subcommittee (SBESC),
Buffalo Common Council (BCC)
and
Seneca-Babcock Industries
Introduction
In 1993, the Seneca-Babcock Environmental Subcommittee (SBESC) and the Buffalo Common
Council Good Neighbor Committee (GNC) embarked on a campaign to negotiate Good
Neighbor Agreements (GNAs) with polluting industries in the Seneca-Babcock neighborhood of
Buffalo, New York. To date, GNAs have been signed with three companies: PVS Chemicals,
BOC Gases, and Natural Environmental, Inc. The GNAs are written documents but are not
legally binding.

The Parties
The SBESC was formed in 1991 by residents of the Seneca-Babcock neighborhood in response
to concerns about the harmful effects of the pollution emitted by local industries. There are no
paid staff and the group operates on an annual budget of $500 made up solely of individual
contributions.
The GNC of Buffalo is a community, labor, environmental, and academic committee established
in 1993 by the Buffalo Common Council (BCC) to negotiate with industries in the SenecaBabcock neighborhood and along the Buffalo River for reductions in pollution. There is one
“very part time” paid staff member. The annual operating budget is approximately $400. The
mission of the GNC is to reduce the use, release, and storage of toxic chemicals to protect the
health of workers, the community, and the environment.
The three companies that have entered into GNAs with the SBESC are privately owned and
concerned about public opinion. These companies are fairly important to the local economy (6-7
on a scale of 10).26

Nature of the Dispute
For years, the residents of the Seneca-Babcock neighborhoods have been exposed to pollution
from the chemical companies in their midst. The problems ranged from foul odors to accidental
releases of toxic chemicals. Finally, a sulfur dioxide release in 1991 galvanized the local
residents to join together and take action, forming the SBESC. The primary concerns included
impacts on the environment, public health concerns, and nuisance and quality of life issues. The
26

Ratings and other opinions are taken primarily from responses to the GNA survey.
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SBESC met with representatives of several companies in the area in an attempt to open a
dialogue about environmental, health, and safety concerns. They also undertook a number of
different actions in their efforts to be heard, including participating in public hearings, urging
regulatory agencies to better enforce existing laws and/or to adopt new laws, writing to and
meeting with company representatives, and conducting negative publicity campaigns. They took
their concerns to the Buffalo Common Council (“BCC”), the Dept. of Health (DOH), and the
Dept. of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”) which agreed to aid them in their efforts to clean
up the community. In response, the BCC formed the GNC.
In 1993, following a 2,000 gallon diesel fuel spill into the Buffalo River by one of the targeted
Seneca-Babcock companies, the GNC adopted a resolution that called on polluting companies to
negotiate GNAs with local citizen’s groups. The GNC also enlisted the help and support of
regulatory agencies and the state attorney general’s office. After no substantial progress was
made more than a year after the resolution, the AG’s office sent a letter to four companies
pressuring them to honor the commitments of the Chemical Manufacturers Association
Responsible Care Program in which they participated by meeting with local residents and
signing GNAs. The pressure from the BCC and government agencies as well as the bad
publicity the polluting companies were receiving finally prompted some of them to sit down and
negotiate with the SBESC.

Negotiation of the GNAs
The GNC proposed a Good Neighbor Process as follows:
• Meet quarterly with the company to discuss the company’s efforts to achieve three
Community Goals which are supported in the Responsible Care Pollution Prevention
Code – pollution prevention, protecting community health, and notification and
emergency response planning;
• Before starting these meetings, hold a joint press conference to announce the good
neighbor process and express hopes for a fruitful dialogue;
• Prior to each meeting, exchange specific information in preparation for the meeting; and
• After three meetings, evaluate the progress made to date and decide on future forms of
communication and methods of resolving any remaining differences.
During negotiations with the various companies, the SBESC/GNC generally had adequate access
to legal expertise, technical consultants, and technical/economic data, but did not have enough
access to trained negotiators.
The SBESC generally sought commitments in the areas of pollution prevention/reduction, traffic
mitigation, investments in the local community, emergency response planning, regular
environmental audits and community access to environmental information, and an active
involvement in audits, monitoring and inspections. The companies sought an end to protests or
negative publicity, positive publicity for the company, confidentiality agreements, access to the
community to satisfy government public participation requirements under the Responsible Care
initiative, and relief from the pressure to negotiate.
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The final agreements were tailored to each individual company. Specific provisions include the
following:
•

•

•

Natural Environmental, Inc. (waste processing facility) – GNA signed 5/6/95 prior to the
company commencing operations as settlement of permit challenges by the SBESC.
o Traffic mitigation provisions specifying truck routes and prohibiting incoming truck
backups or engine idling.
o Noise limitations on machinery and prohibitions of certain types of operations (stone or
concrete crushing).
o Limitations on hours of operation.
o Property upkeep requirements.
o Prohibition on accepting certain types of waste materials.
o Installation of plastic dust curtains if necessary.
o Requirement of advertising all job openings at local community center.
PVS Chemicals, Inc. (sulfuric acid plant) – GNA signed 5/8/97
o Environmental assessment to be performed by member of GNC.
o Report of pollution prevention progress, including plans and initiatives, provided to
SBESC annually.
o Public portions of Process Safety Management Plan, Risk Management Plan, Process
Hazard Analysis, and Facility Response Plan provided to SBESC at no charge at same
time they are filed with appropriate regulatory agencies.
o Maintenance of a Continuous Emissions Monitoring System.
o Continued participation in operation and maintenance of Community Alert Network
(CAN) emergency notification system.
o Participate in neighborhood emergency response drill.
o Notification provided to SBESC of unusual plant activities such as shut down or start up
as well as spills or releases to air, soil, or water.
o Annual meeting upon request of SBESC.
BOC Gases (industrial gas producer) – GNA signed in 1997.
o Annual meeting upon request of community members.
o Establish and update a repository of documents at the local community center, including
TRI data and an emergency response plan.
o BOC will develop a system for sharing emergency information with potentially affected
neighbors.
o Specific incident follow-up procedures concerning notification and reporting.
o Maintain public access along the Buffalo River’s edge and continue to participate in the
City’s Greenway efforts.

The GNAs are not legally binding and do not contain specific dispute negotiation procedures. It
is not known whether they would remain in effect if the companies were sold.
In addition to the individual GNAs, the GNC also negotiated an agreement with three
companies—Buffalo Color, PVS and Allied Signal—to install an automated emergency
notification system that dials the numbers of local residents in minutes, giving them warnings
and instructions on how to respond in the event of any release. The actual implementation
results to date will be discussed later.
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Costs
The GNA negotiation and implementation costs for the SBESC have been less than $1,000. The
BCC spent about $3,300. The individual company costs are not known. None of the companies
provided funding to the SBESC to ensure its continued participation in GNA-related activities.

Implementation
The implementation record for these three GNAs is highly variable and generally disappointing.
SBESC considers the agreement with National Environmental to be a success because little
pressure was needed to get the company to comply with the provisions. The GNA with BOC
Gases, however, is described as a “flop,” particularly in the area of safety issues. The
community groups fought unsuccessfully to prevent BOC Gases from “going remote” (i.e.,
automated), an operational modification perceived by the community to elevate the risk of
accidents. Finally, it is estimated that about half of the commitments made by PVC Chemicals
have been met. Generally, the environmental issues have been addressed, with some
improvement resulting from the agreement. The CAN system, a computerized telephone system,
was installed so that everyone in the community will be called if there is a spill or release.
In terms of implementation, SBESC states that little was gained from the agreements. However,
because of the large amount of energy required in fighting for each item, they will “take what
they can get.” There is a great deal of frustration with the companies, especially in light of the
imbalance of power. SBESC advises others considering such negotiations not to back down
from larger, resourceful companies. Generally, there has been some improvement found in the
Seneca-Babcock community, but the improvements are far from complete. The nature of the
companies may also present some difficulties. For example, one of the companies the
community group was working with is now in the process of shutting down, staffed by only a
skeleton crew. This is disheartening for the community because the purpose of negotiating
agreements with companies is not to force them to shut down, only to improve their
environmental practices. One other possible tactic being explored by SBESC is the use of Urban
Renewal Plan, whereby redevelopment of the area may be encouraged and environmental
hazards may be regulated or removed. In the future, the organization asserts that they need
funding to hire a staff that is able to concentrate on future agreements or proposals. In this case,
the local government has provided a great deal of assistance, but the SBESC would like to see
more assistance from the state Department of Health. SBESC estimates that 50-60% of the GNA
commitments have been honored, while BCC estimates that 70% have been honored. No
subsequent modifications to the agreements have been made. Problems have arisen when the
companies have used stalling tactics to avoid complying with the provisions of the GNAs. Also,
the GNC has stopped meeting.
Additional details about the status of implementation activities are provided in the table below:
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Natural Environmental, Inc. Commitments (5/6/95)
The GNA Provision:
What Actually Happened:
Traffic





Noise




Hours





Property



Toxics



Plastic Air Curtains



Jobs



Good Neighbor Process



All company truck traffic
approaches the facility from
I-190 on Keating St.
NE personnel are on site by
6 a.m. each work day and
trucks are not allowed to
line up on Kellogg St.
No idling trucks parked
outside facility
The wood chipping machine
is operated at an average of
no higher than 80 dB and is
not audible from inside the
houses on Kellogg St., is
operated only when facility
doors are closed, and is not
operated after 8 p.m.
No stone or concrete
crushing
Facility only accepts
materials from 7 a.m. to 5
p.m. Monday-Friday and 8
a.m. to noon on Saturdays
Processing ends by 11 p.m.
Monday-Friday and by 8
p.m. on Saturday
The property is kept up at
all times and any spills are
immediately cleaned up
Neither painted/treated
wood nor materials
containing asbestos are
processed
If complaints were received
about dust, NE installed
plastic curtains on the
doorway of the offending
truck bay
NE advertised all job
openings at the Seneca
Babcock Community Center
NE has contacted the
Lovejoy Councilmember
and the Seneca-Babcock
Community Center when it
anticipated changes to any
of these conditions

79

What Didn’t Happen:

BOC Gases Commitments (early 1997?)
The GNA Provision:
What Actually Happened:
Community Meetings



Public Information



Emergency Notification



In the event of any release, fire,
accident, or explosion






Process Modifications and Public
Access




Future Review

PVS Chemicals, Inc. Commitments (5/8/97)
The GNA Provision:
What Actually Happened:
Plant Access

l Reports and Meetings






Access to Management and
Response Plans



What Didn’t Happen:

On request, BOC holds an
annual meeting with
community members
BOC established and updates
a repository of public
information at the Old First
Ward Community Center
Where needed, BOC
developed a system for
sharing information with
potentially affected neighbors
BOC supplied the Old First
Ward Community Center and
the GNC with a one page
memo within 24 hours
BOC held a public meeting
within 10 days if requested or
warranted
Utilized the Cornell Chemical
Information Program to
facilitate process
modifications
Maintained public access
along the Buffalo River
After five years, reviewed the
need for the GNA and agreed
to terminate and/or revise as
deemed mutually appropriate

Allowed member to tour
plant and recommend process
improvements for pollution
prevention
Provides GNC with annual
report on pollution prevention
progress
Conducts an annual meeting
with GNC (if requested)
Provided GNC with free
copies of the public portions
of: (1) the Process Safety
Management and Risk
Management Plans, (2) the
Process Hazard Analysis, and
(3) the Facility Response Plan
and updates
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What Didn’t Happen:

Emissions Monitoring System



CAN system



Emergency Drills and Plume Maps




Notification of Unusual Activity or
Incidents





Has maintained a Continuous
Emissions Monitoring
System with real time data
available to the DEC via
modem
Continues to participate in the
operation and maintenance of
the CAN system
Has performed an emergency
response drill within the S-B
neighborhood
Has provided GNC with a
copy of plume maps
Notifies the SBESC of
unusual plant activities such
as shut down or start up
During spills or releases with
off-site impacts, notified the
SBESC as soon as practical
Provided GNC with a copy of
any incident report submitted
to the DEC

Lessons Learned
Dawn Caldarelli, Director of SBESC, gives their GNAs an overall success rating of 5 out of 10,
while Bill Nowak of the BCC gives them a 6. They will both continue to seek to negotiate
GNAs with other local companies in the future. If Dawn had it to do over again, she would like
to speed up the process and possibly come out with a more legally binding document. Bill would
also like to see quicker solutions to prevent wearing down community activists. He would also
like to obtain full scale agreements with some legal teeth that would contain specific pollution
reduction goals. Unexpected benefits of the process were increased knowledge, meeting great
people, and implementing the emergency notification system. Dawn and Bill’s advice to other
groups considering a GNA is to stay committed, don’t give up or become intimidated, develop
strong strategies to get the companies involved, and hire someone to monitor the company and
report back to the group if you are able.
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Shoreline Environmental Alliance, CBE, Crocket/Rodeo Coalition
and
Unocal
Introduction
On April 7, 1995, a Good Neighbor Agreement (“GNA”) was signed by Union Oil Company of
California (“Unocal”), Shoreline Environmental Alliance (“SEA”), Crockett/Rodeo Coalition
(“CRC”), and Communities for a Better Environment (“CBE”). The purpose of the GNA was to
address issues of concern to the local community regarding accidental chemical releases from the
refinery. The agreement is legally binding and presumably still in effect today.

The Parties
CBE is an environmental health and justice non-profit organization, promoting clean air, clean
water and the development of toxin-free communities. CBE’s three-part strategy consists of
grassroots activism, environmental research and legal assistance within underserved urban
communities. CBE directly equips residents impacted by industrial pollution with the tools to
inform, monitor, and transform their immediate environment.
A direct result of CBE’s involvement with the Crockett/Rodeo community and the GNA
negotiation process was the formation of the community group SEA in 1994. SEA has a paid
staff of three and an annual operating budget of $50,000 derived from individual and member
contributions (5%), government grants (75%), and foundation grants (20%).
Unocal began operations in the community in 1879. The refinery employs 200-400 local
residents and is moderately important to the local economy. At the time the GNA was
negotiated, Unocal was profitable, expanding, and publicly traded.27

Nature of the Dispute
In September 1994, Unocal had two separate releases of toxic substances, one of which was
potentially deadly hydrogen sulfide gas which hit the local elementary school and sickened many
children and teachers. (The first release lasted sixteen days and was the result of the company
intentionally keeping on-line a unit known to be leaking.) Complaints from the community fell
on deaf ears at Unocal. As community outrage and demands for action grew, there were several
public meetings and strategy sessions attended by community leaders, environmental groups, and
labor unions. The groups decided to challenge Unocal’s expansion permits to try to force them
to sign a legally binding GNA. In spite of initial resistance, Unocal finally agreed to negotiate
27

Ratings and other opinions are taken primarily from SEA’s responses to the GNA survey.
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after county supervisors directed them to do so if they wanted to be approved for their
reformulated fuel construction permits.
The citizens’ primary concerns were public health, nuisance and quality of life, and impacts on
the environment. Prior to negotiating the GNA, the community groups, as well as individual
residents, took numerous actions, including participating in public hearings, appealing permit
decisions, urging regulatory agencies to better enforce the laws, filing individual lawsuits, trying
to get regulatory agencies to file suit, meetings with company representatives, phone calls,
negative publicity campaigns, and community “bucket brigades.”

Negotiation of the GNA
Numerous parties took part in the GNA negotiations, including CBE, SEA, CRC, Bayo Vista
Housing Project, union reps, local government reps, members of the general public, and Crockett
and Rodeo Chamber of Commerce reps. The agreement took eight months to complete, during
which time one to three meetings per week were held which lasted up to five hours each. During
negotiations, SEA had access to lawyers and legal expertise, trained negotiators, and
technical/economic data, but Ms. Kessler felt they did not have access to technical consultants.
Denny Larson states that SEA did, in fact, have access to numerous technical consultants such as
CBE’s scientists, other medical and scientific experts, and Mr. Larson himself, who served as a
media/organizing and negotiation advisor.
SEA and other participants sought numerous commitments from Unocal including specific
pollution prevention, reduction, and remediation measures; traffic mitigation; investments in the
local community; performance of and community involvement in regular environmental audits
and monitoring; access to emergency response plans; financial support for the community
group(s); and a fenceline monitoring system. One measure that the community desired but did
pursue in negotiations was the removal of the only elementary school in the area from the Unocal
fenceline. Unocal instead agreed to conduct an area wide risk assessment of all the schools in
the vicinity of the plant, both public and private.
At the suggestion of the unions involved in the negotiations, Unocal was asked to sign a simple
statement that committed them to negotiating a list of concerns in good faith to resolution
(similar to what unions do at the start of contract talks). In agreeing to negotiate, Unocal was
seeking to end the challenge to their land use permit for the clean fuels expansion project.
However, Unocal subsequently tried to back out of actually signing an agreement to negotiate,
and the community groups went to the press and the county planning department that was
hearing Unocal’s permit case. As a result, the county took the extraordinary step of passing a
permit condition that required the company to sign a GNA.
Mr. Larson stated that one successful negotiation tactic was to bring a court reporter to each
meeting to take exact minutes that were then written up and approved. This was a very
important strategy which prevented Unocal from backing out of signing the agreement to
negotiate in good faith. Other important sources of leverage were the revelation that the 16-day
leak was 100% preventable and the support of Ed Masry and Erin Brockovitch who filed the
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toxic tort cases. Also, leverage was provided by an agreement with the trade unions to not sign a
labor contract unless a GNA was signed and the GNA parties to not sign a GNA unless a labor
contract was signed.
In the final document, Unocal agreed to the following provisions:
• Health Risk & Medical Monitoring
o Continue to fund independent health risk assessment;
o Fund the establishment and operation of a medical clinic for diagnosis and treatment of
people affected by the Unocal Catacarb release incident;
o In the event of a release, work with local health care providers to provide early medical
intervention for affected residents;
o Fund epidemiological study of the health impacts of recent chemical release on the
affected members of the community; and
o Fund an emergency response van.
• Emergency Response and Community Warning
o Create and fund a health effects database;
o Participate in a working group to develop a feasible community-based information and
notification system that will meet the community’s needs; and
o Fund the purchase and installation of a siren as part of the county community warning
system.
• Vegetation and Parks
o Plant vegetation on land between the refinery and Rodeo;
o Fund construction of a bike path through Unocal property; and
o Contribute $5,000 each to Lindsay Museum and to the Carquinez Preservation Trust for
trees.
• School Safety Issues
o Install and maintain a permanent monitoring station at the local elementary school;
o Provide emergency response education and training to teachers and students; and
o Contribute $500,000 to the elementary school for chemical safety issues.
• Vocational Training and Local Hiring
o Fund vocational training at local high school;
o Announce job opportunities locally; and
o Institute and fund a local hiring outreach program.
• Transportation
o Mitigate traffic impacts from construction of the Reformulated Gasoline Project;
o Contribute $4.5 million to county for local roads; and
o Discontinue use (and transportation) of anhydrous ammonia by 12/31/01.
• Environmental Issues
o Install a state-of-the-art fenceline monitoring system;
o Fund an independent audit of the refinery;
o Reduce onsite emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs), and
o Make audit and study results available through the Community Advisory Panel.
• Financial Issues
o Contribute $300,000 annually to local communities and schools;
o Funds not spent can be carried over to the following year; and
o Agreement to negotiate continuation of payments after 15 years.

84

The community groups agreed to drop permit challenges to Unocal’s Land Use Permit and the
associated Environmental Impact Report as well as the Authority to Construct and Permit to
Operate issued by the Bay Area Air Quality Management District.
The GNA assigns the task of developing a process for distribution of the funds within six months
to CRC and SEA. It further assigns oversight of the GNA to CRC. Unocal also agreed to submit
a quarterly summary to the CAP reporting progress on implementation of the GNA.
The GNA does contain dispute resolution procedures – specifically, mediation – with Unocal
agreeing to pay one-half the cost of the mediator. If mediation fails to resolve the dispute, any
party may bring a lawsuit; however, the agreement expressly prohibits payment of attorney’s
fees to the victorious party.
The provision which discusses a change in ownership states that a party may transfer or assign
the GNA to a successor as long as “the affiliates, successors, or surviving corporation shall agree
in writing to assume all of the obligations hereof.” According to Denny Larson, this “clause is as
airtight as it gets.” However, when the plant was sold the new owners tried to get out of the
GNA and only agreed to continue to abide by it when they were “pressed.” The most current
status of implementation of the GNA provisions are presented later in this case summary.

Costs
No specific cost information was available for negotiation of the GNA. An estimated $45,000
was spent by SEA for implementation, and it is not known how much Unocal spent, but the
funding commitments easily exceed several million dollars. The GNA did not specifically
provide for funding for oversight and implementation activities performed by SEA or other
community groups. Kasha Kessler states that a portion of the annual $100,000 contribution to
each community was supposed to go to oversight, but Community Foundation politics prevented
this from happening.

Implementation
This toxic substance accident destroyed any previously existing trust held by the county, cities
and area agencies. The lack of trust set the stage for negotiating the GNA. The community
members decided to focus their attention to finding ways to reduce waste, clean-up materials,
provide health care, and implement a monitoring system. At the same time, the refinery had just
applied for a land use permit, a permit that the community groups could use as leverage during
negotiations. The GNA was negotiated and signed within three months of the accident. Portions
of the GNA were adopted into the final permit award, assisting with the enforcement of certain
provisions.
As of July 2004, representative Janet Callaghan estimates that approximately 60% of the
commitments in the GNA have been honored by Unocal. Some problems have been encountered
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with the implementation process. The company previously known as Unocal has since been sold
twice, and is now Conoco/Phillips. The subsequent owners have disregarded many sections of
the GNA. In fact, no disputes have been resolved following the procedures outlined in the GNA.
Unfortunately, SEA is currently a shadow of its former self. When the GNA was first formed,
SEA had access to $50,000 for monitoring purposes and was present at meetings. Now, there is
no money left and no direct line of communication. Because SEA has not continued its
oversight activities, it is unknown how many other commitments have not been met. There are
five active board members that meet once a year to help monitor the GNA. Enforcement of the
GNA relies solely on the tenacity of the individuals involved. For example, one person receives
real-time fenceline monitoring data over the internet, another receives month Conoco/Phillips
fenceline emission summary reports, while two others continue to interface with the plant as
CAP members. Four SEA members are actively involved in the fenceline monitor upgrade
taking place in 2003-2004. Although the plant is supposed to publish quarterly implementation
progress reports, the last reports were viewed on May 31, 2002 and in the fall of 2003.
Regarding advice for further GNA negotiations, it was noted that it is difficult to maintain a
GNA without the necessary funding and follow through.
Because of the difficulty experienced by the community group in obtaining funding to monitor
their GNA, the current implementation condition of several provisions are unknown. Additional
details about the status of implementation activities are provided in the table below:

The GNA Provision:

What Actually Happened:


Health Risk and Medical
Monitoring
 Pay for medical

assessment and treatment
of victims
 In the event of a
subsequent release, work
with local health care
providers to provide early
medical intervention
 Contribute up to $238,000

to epidemiological study
of the health impacts of
the recent chemical release
 Provide up to $20,000 to
fund an Emergency
Response Van



Emergency Response and
Community Warning



The company paid for
medical assessment and
treatment of victims
It is difficult to assess the
provisions regarding
subsequent releases because
(a) no “major” releases
since the agreement, and (b)
the community group lacks
access to individuals’
medical records
The company was to
establish and operate a
medical clinic to treat
people affected by the
release incident for up to 6
months (at $120,000
month); in actuality, the
company set up the clinic
for 18 months
Funded independent health
risk assessment and released
a final report
Funded the purchase and
installation of siren as part
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What Didn’t Happen:


Although the
independent health risk
assessment was
conducted, SEA felt the
findings were skewed
and followed up with a
report of their own



Create and fund a health
effects database for
refinery chemicals by
March 1, 1995
 Participate in a working
group to develop a
feasible community-based
information and
notification system
 Notification system
designed by July 1, 1995
and installed by December
31, 1995
Vegetation and Parks
 Continue funding Lindsay
Museum at previous level
 Contribute $5,000 to
educational programs
 Make $5,000 donation to
Carquinez Strait Preservation Trust for trees
 Maintain membership in
Carquinez Strait
Preservation Trust
Transportation
 Mitigate traffic impacts
from construction of
Reformulate Gasoline
Project
 Contribute $4.5 million to
county for local roads
Environmental Issues
 Install a state-of-the-art
fenceline monitoring
system
 Fund independent audit of
refinery
 Transmit to SEA all
written and verbal incident
notifications and written
materials provided to
Community Advisory
Panel (CAP)
 Make hydrogen sulfide
facility study results
available through CAP
 Do not seek emission
reduction credits for any
air pollution reductions
listed in GNA

of warning system
(although it is unclear if the
system really works)



The company did a lot
regarding vegetation (and is
committed to spend $30,000
per year for nine years to
vegetate appropriate areas)

Discontinued use and
transportation/storage of
anhydrous ammonia




Infrared air monitoring
system in place
Reduced fugitive emissions
of Volatile Organic
Compounds (VOCs) by
34% through leakless valves
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The company did little to
implement provisions
relating to parks
Company was supposed
to build bike path
through Unocal property,
but decided it was a bad
idea to invite people into
this hazardous area

Lessons Learned
If similar disputes were to arise in the future, group member Janet Callaghan would choose to
negotiate another GNA. In addition, the group could pursue options such as filing suit, “taking
to the streets”, and applying political pressure. If the group had it to do over again, they would
reduce the number of people at the negotiating table; only negotiate issues that dealt directly with
the mitigation of the toxic releases; keep the issues more focused; get more money; and have an
airtight redress process and legal section. Denny Larson points out that the parties did “take it to
the streets” and applied political pressure; that allowed certain provisions in the GNA to be
enacted even before the GNA was signed. He also points out that initially Unocal tried to cut a
deal with a county supervisor, and if the community groups had not demanded that the process
be opened up and more parties allowed a place at the table, there would not have been a GNA.
He feels that most of their strength came from the 100% inclusion demand.
One unexpected benefit of the GNA was follow-through on installation of the state-of-the-art
fenceline monitoring system. After this system was installed in 1997, there have been no further
releases of toxic chemicals into the community.
Kasha’s concerns regarding the ability of SEA to monitor the GNA stem from SEA being
“hamstrung” from the beginning by the Foundation (which was formed to distribute the
mitigation funds). (Mitigation funds are used for a variety of community programs, and are not
necessarily reserved for dealing with GNA implementation or the issues at the heart of the
GNA.) Her advice to other groups is to go in with a united front, a clear idea of your goals, and
make sure your legal section is enforceable and legal action financed. Mr. Larson points out that
the difficulties SEA has had with the Foundation are more a reflection on SEA’s organizing
strength and not that the GNA would not allow for any implementation monitoring funding. Mr.
Larson agrees that the provision that “no payment of attorney’s fees shall be allowed” should not
have been included, at least with respect to citizens’ suits filed to force implementation of the
agreement.
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Texans United Education Fund
and
Rhone-Poulenc
Introduction
In November 1992, a Good Neighbor Agreement (“GNA”) was signed by Texans United
Education Fund (“TUEF”), members of local neighborhood groups in Manchester, Texas, and
Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chemicals Company (“RP”). The purpose of the GNA was to facilitate
community input into environmental and safety auditing and decision-making at the plant. The
agreement is a legally binding document that was incorporated into the company’s incinerator
permit issued by the Texas Water Commission (“TWC”).

The Parties
TUEF, founded in 1988, is a non-profit public interest organization with a paid staff of one and
an annual operating budget of approximately $25,000. Since its inception, TUEF has confronted
powerful corporate polluters and ineffective government agencies on pollution-related issues
affecting local communities with a focus on chemical plants, refineries and toxic waste sites.
TUEF teamed up with local neighborhood associations to work on the GNA. The key to
winning the agreement and seeing it implemented was organizing the community and forming a
Community Advisory Committee (“CAC”) made up of representatives from local neighborhood
groups.
RP began operations in Manchester, Texas, in 1970. The company employs approximately 200
local residents. The company and the chemical sector are moderately important to the local
economy. At the time the GNA was negotiated, RP was profitable and concerned about public
opinion.

Nature of the Dispute
Two types of issues prompted community concern about RP’s operations: nuisance and quality
of life issues (odors, noise, traffic) and public health concerns (toxic releases/spills and illnesses.)
One specific event that galvanized community forces was an accidental release of sulfur dioxide
in June 1992 which sent 27 people to area hospitals. Prior to negotiating the GNA, community
groups had participated in public hearings; appealed state permit decisions; urged regulatory
agencies to better enforce existing laws; wrote to and met with company officials, and conducted
negative publicity campaigns.
Three primary factors ultimately motivated the parties to sit down at the bargaining table:
community opposition to modification of RP’s permit issued by the TWC; the negative publicity
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surrounding the sulfur dioxide release; and the community’s growing awareness of its right to
information. RP was willing to negotiate a GNA when they realized that 1) it would not hurt
them, 2) it would improve community relations, and 3) that they would possibly have their
permit denied if they did not reach a settlement with TUEF/CAC. The participation of TUEF
was a key component of the community’s leverage. This was evidenced by RP’s attempt to
remove TUEF from the final provisions of the agreement.

Negotiation of the GNA
Negotiation of the GNA took a period of approximately six months. TUEF/CAC met directly
with the company and their attorneys. TUEF/CAC had access to attorneys but did not need
them. They brought negotiating experience to the table but had never been formally trained.
TWC was deliberately excluded from the negotiations, but was not completely removed from the
process because it had to approve the settlement as it was made part of the company’s permit;
thus, TWC served as a consultant if any particular regulatory questions arose. Two state senators
and one city council member showed up at one or two meetings to lend their support for the
citizens’ groups. These representatives were also signatories to the final agreement.
The specific commitments sought by TUEF/CAC were pollution prevention/reduction/
remediation goals; traffic mitigation; regular meetings, information, and accountability;
commitment to perform regular environmental audits and/or monitoring; community
involvement with environmental and safety audits, access to results, and participation in RP’s
planning, advisory, and/or decision-making process; access to company accident prevention and
response plan and relevant environmental data collected by RP; split environmental samples to
allow for independent analyses; and radio station alerts whenever an accidental release occurred.
In return, RP wanted TUEF/CAC to drop the permit challenge.
In the final agreement, RP agreed to the following provisions:
• Recognize and work with the CAC.
• Upon request, provide financial assistance to the CAC in an amount agreeable to both the
CAC and RP to cover administrative costs of the CAC.
• Discuss and negotiate improvement of local emergency notification procedures. The CAC is
allowed to have input into the design of this system.
• Notify the CAC of any changes to designated hazardous waste transportation routes and
provide the CAC with information regarding frequency of shipments of hazardous waste or
materials into the plant.
• Make available to the CAC groundwater and surface water monitoring data as well as
providing split samples for independent analysis.
• Provide the CAC with employee health study results and work with the CAC to determine
the feasibility of a citizens’ health survey. If pursued, RP will help develop the survey and
cover the administrative expenses incurred by the CAC in performing the survey (up to
$4,000).
• Allow the CAC to participate in emergency response planning involving potential fires,
explosions or releases of hazardous substances
• Provide the CAC with information regarding OSHA recordable accidents on a monthly basis.
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•

•
•
•

Fund and participate in an annual environmental and safety audit program by an independent
auditor; allow citizen participation in the audit process; allow citizen inspections of plant
operations by appointment at all reasonable times; provide TUEF and the CAC with copies
of the audit findings; negotiate in good faith to implement the audit recommendations.
Maintain an off-site sulfur dioxide monitoring system and keep the CAC advised of major
changes to the system.
Conduct dispersion modeling and prepare hazard assessments or consequence analyses which
identify potential plumes of contamination into the community; negotiate modeling scenarios
with the CAC and make the results public.
Household hazardous wastes will not be received by the facility unless RP is requested to do
so by TWC and can maintain all permit parameters while processing the waste.

It is not known whether the GNA survived the subsequent permit renewal process which occurs
every five years. The actual status of each implementation point will be discussed later in this
case study.

Costs
No information is available regarding the costs of negotiating or implementing the GNA. RP did
not provide funding to TUEF to ensure its continued participation in GNA-related activities.
(TUEF is against this in principle.)

Implementation
Rick Abraham (TUEF Director and survey respondent) estimates that 90-100% of the
commitments in the GNA have been honored. As previously stated, this process was initiated
after there had been an accident next to the plant. The CAC participated in the permitting
process, exercising their right to oppose the permit as “leverage.” As part of the emergency
notification system, an AM radio station and siren were established to alert the community of
any problems. Both the radio station and siren are still in place. The primary concern of the
CAC was centered on air pollution. As such, CAC entered into these negotiations looking for
opportunities to improve the quality of living in the area. In addition to guarantees regarding air,
they also negotiated GNA provisions addressing hazardous waste and water pollution. The
purpose of the CAC was to have the opportunity to exercise these provisions. Some were
exercised, others were not. Under certain provisions (e.g. preparing a citizens’ health survey,
requesting financial assistance from Rhone-Poulenc, etc.) it was up to the CAC to request
implementation. Other than the provisions where CAC opted not to request implementation,
Rhone-Poulenc met their GNA responsibilities. One suggestion presented was to involve groups
beyond just local groups, including state and national groups that may assist the group by
providing resources. The one problem noted is the difficulty in keeping the community group
together and involved. To date, no significant modifications have been made to the original
agreement.
Additional details regarding the status of implementation activities are described in the table
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below:
The GNA Provision:
Recognize and work with
Community Advisory Committee
(CAC)

What Actually Happened:



Provided documents to CAC
and public library unless
confidential
Provided representatives to
answer questions

What Didn’t Happen:



Improvement of local emergency
notification procedures




Improve the transportation of
hazardous wastes







Provide CAC with copies of any
ground and surface water
monitoring analyses on a monthly
basis



Provide CAC with a copy of its
1992 employee health study




CAC provided input into the
system design.
Necessary license and
approvals obtained within
120 days of signing GNA
Advised CAC of changes in
transportation routes
Provided CAC information
about frequency of shipments
Informed community about
the DOT hazardous materials
placard system
CAC provided input about
RP’s efforts to minimize
transportation risks
Transportation routes and
enforcement policies were
provided at first CAC
meeting
CAC reps were allowed to be
present during sampling
procedures to receive split
samples
The study was provided to
CAC
RP worked with CAC to
review feasibility of a
citizens’ health survey







Allow CAC to participate in RP’s
“tabletop” emergency drills
Provide CAC with monthly OSHA
recordable accident information

These drills are still being
conducted
Provision was implemented
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Rhone-Poulenc (RP) did
not provide financial
assistance to CAC,
however, this provision
was only to be
implemented at the request
of CAC.
CAC never requested this
financial assistance.

RP was to split samples
with CAC on request.
CAC never requested the
implementation of this
provision
GNA provisions whereby,
if a citizens’ health survey
was conducted, RP would
cover administrative
expenses and negotiate the
possible need for a local
off-plant health survey
It was determined that a
citizens’ health survey was
not necessary.

Fund and participate in
independent environmental and
safety audit program

Maintain off-site SO2 monitoring

Make groundwater data from
RCRA corrective action
investigation available to
“undersigned citizens”
Conduct “worst case” scenario
models



Initiated first audit procedure
within 90 days of receiving
modified permit
 Allowed citizen participation
in the audit process
 Allowed other citizen
inspections by appointment at
all reasonable times
 Auditor provided findings of
audit to TUEF
 Considered recommendations
from citizens for
implementation
 Kept CAC advised of any
major changed made to
monitoring system
 Allowed inspection of system
by CAC and TUEF within 90
days of receiving modified
permit
 Provided CAC and TUEF
with all information relevant
to system
 On request, provided CAC
with analytical information
 Allowed for follow-up
inspections by CAC
Provision was implemented




Provided analysis and plume
maps to CAC
Negotiated modeling
scenarios with CAC

Do not receive household
hazardous wastes at the facility
unless able to continue to operate
within all permit parameters while
processing the waste, and request
for receiving the waste was from
the TWC.

Lessons Learned
Speaking on behalf of TUEF, Rick Abraham rates the GNA a nearly complete success.28 If
similar disputes were to arise in the future he would be willing to negotiate another GNA. If he
28

Ratings and other opinions are taken primarily from TUEF’s response to the GNA survey.
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had it to do over again he would speed up the process; be more clear on what they want; better
prepare the group for the negotiating process; and make the agreement less legal and more easily
understood.
As for the future, Rick Abraham does have concerns about his group’s ability to address all of
the issues involving communities and companies operating in their midst and the fact that there
are “too many other companies.” Overall, his advice to other groups considering this tool is to
be clear, keep it simple and straightforward, keep government agencies out of the process, and
“be tough.”
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West County Toxics Coalition, CBE, People Do!
and
Chevron Refinery
Introduction
In 1992, a Good Neighbor Agreement (“GNA”) was signed by the Richmond, California,
Chevron Refinery, the West County Toxics Coalition, Citizens for a Better Environment, and
People Do! The agreement incorporated commitments to both reduce/prevent pollution and
invest in the local economy. The GNA is a legally binding agreement that was negotiated in
response to Clean Air Act violations.

The Parties
The Richmond-based West County Toxics Coalition (“WCTC”) was founded with assistance
from the National Toxics Campaign. The San Francisco-based Citizens for a Better
Environment (“CBE”) furnished the group with technical assistance and documentation of the
local environmental problem.
Chevron began operating the Richmond refinery in 1980. The company employs about 60 local
residents. Chevron and the refinery sector are both very important to the local economy. At the
time the GNA was negotiated, Chevron was profitable, expanding, publicly traded and
concerned about public opinion.

Nature of the Dispute
Over its long history, Chevron has had innumerable accidents and has been cited for serious
violations of almost every conceivable environmental law. The issues of greatest concern to the
neighboring community were public health concerns, impacts on the environment, and nuisance
and quality of life issues. The community was also very concerned with the potential for fire and
explosions and the company’s ability to quickly and effectively respond to an emergency.
Prior to negotiating the GNA, the community groups took a number of actions, including
participating in public hearings and commenting on public documents; appealing local, state, or
federal permit decisions, urging regulatory agencies to better enforce existing laws and/or to
adopt new laws; threatening to file a lawsuit; writing to and meeting with company
representatives; pressuring elected officials; shareholder resolutions; and conducting negative
publicity campaigns. The primary events that resulted in the decision to negotiate a GNA were
permit appeals by the community before the Bay Area Air Quality Control District
(“BAAQCD”). These meetings occurred because Chevron was applying for permits to make
“cleaner fuels” which required various construction projects and process changes.
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Negotiation of the GNA
In 1990, the WCTC brought in the Reverend Jesse Jackson to negotiate with Chevron. This
meeting included representatives from the WCTC, the National Rainbow Coalition, and the
Sierra Club. Chevron was presented a six-point plan that included the following:
• Annually set aside 1 percent of the cost of Chevron’s proposed $1 billion modernization
for a clean-up fund. Uses of the fund should include employing Richmond’s unemployed
to help clean up the environment, financing community health care, and purchasing new
pollution-reduction technology;
• Establish a 24-hour medical clinic to provide services to those harmed by Richmond’s
polluting industries;
• Reduce the quantity of toxic waste burned in Chevron’s Ortho Chemical plant
incinerator;
• Bring together representatives of other polluting industries and pressure them to reduce
their companies’ toxic emissions;
• Divest from South Africa; and
• Negotiate a timetable for accomplishing the above goals.
While Chevron did not agree to this specific plan, it did agree to negotiate. In return, Chevron
sought assurance that a lawsuit would not be filed and sought to generate positive publicity for
the company. During the negotiation process, the community groups felt they had adequate
access to lawyers and legal expertise, technical consultants, trained negotiators, and
technical/economic data.
It took approximately one and a half years to negotiate the GNA. The final agreement contained
the following provisions:
• Pollution Elimination
o Install leakless valves
o No pollution credits for the valve emission reductions
o Fenceline air pollution monitoring with community-suggested target chemicals
o Continue toxic emission reductions
• Local Economic Commitments
o $5 million over five years to nearby neighbors through United Way and nonprofit
service organizations
o Skilled job training to 100 fenceline neighbors
o Aggressive pursuit of community-based hiring
• Emergency Response and Health Care Commitments
o Install sirens/computers and train emergency workers
o Establish and fund city emergency services coordinator position for 5 years
o Contribute $2 million to local health center.
The GNA is a legally binding document that was negotiated in compliance with rulings by the
BAAQMD as part of the permitting process. If the company is sold, the agreement will remain
in effect. The agreement contains no dispute resolution process. The success of the community
groups in implementing the GNA provisions is discussed later.
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Costs
Cost information is not available for this GNA. Chevron did not provide funding to any
community group to ensure its continued participation in the implementation process.

Implementation
The negotiation of this GNA helped to establish one of the first environmental groups in the
region. The primary concern in 1986 was how to get Chevron to negotiate with the community
group initially. It was not until 1990 that Chevron appeared at the negotiating table, after WCTC
came to the meeting with Jesse Jackson. City officials convinced Chevron to negotiate the GNA
only after WCTC did a great deal of political organizing. Chevron became concerned with the
level of publicity they were receiving. During negotiations, WCTC asked Chevron to provide
medical assistance to the surrounding community, to get rid of their incinerator, and to use part
of their modernization campaign to clean-up the area, among other things. There was no real
progress during negotiations until WCTC discovered that Chevron had applied for a permit to
build expansions in order to burn oil. WCTC used this permit as a type of leverage, recognizing
that the permit process provided an opportunity for the community group to stall the proposed
expansion. It was clear to Chevron that talking to the group may expedite the process.
At that point in the negotiations, WCTC preferred to focus on the economic side of their
requests. In the past, Chevron had historically donated a great deal of money to organizations
that did not necessarily pertain to the local community. WCTC encouraged Chevron to continue
to donate to these organizations, but asked Chevron to donate to the people and projects in the
area surrounding the company at the same level. Overall, there have been some gains achieved
through the implementation of certain GNA provisions. It is estimated that the company initially
honored nearly 100% of its commitments under the GNA. However, it is reported that there has
been some “backsliding” and conduct not “continuing in the spirit,” causing some neighbors to
be unhappy with Chevron. Follow-through is identified as the primary problem, but WCTC is
reluctant to enforce the GNA provisions because enforcement would require the use of economic
and legal resources. Community groups, such as this one, often focus on one issue at a time.
Many members have moved on to the next battle, and as a result, no one is currently monitoring
this GNA. No subsequent modifications were made to the agreement.
Additional details regarding the implementation of the GNA are provided in the table below:
The GNA Provision:

What Actually Happened:

Elimination of pollution
 No pollution credits taken for
the valve emission reductions



Provide economic assistance to the
local community
 Skilled job training to 100
fenceline neighbors
 Seek community-based hiring



Chevron installed leakless
valves

What Didn’t Happen:



Chevron began donating
more money to non-profit
organizations located in areas
surrounding the refinery
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Fenceline air pollution
monitoring did not happen
Have not continued to
reduce toxic emissions
Chevron has increased
local donations, but it is
unclear if Chevron has met
the $5 million over five
years provision

Provide for emergency response
system and health care assistance
 Install sirens/computers and
train emergency workers
 Establish and fund city
emergency services
coordinator position for 5
years





Initially, Chevron did not
follow through with the $2
million contribution they
committed to donate toward
the building of a local health
center
Chevron finally donated the
money, but has not continued
to fund the health center



Chevron recognized that
the GNA only required that
they build the health
center, but did not require
continued funding

*These commitments were gleaned from various press releases and articles, as we do not have a
copy of the actual GNA.

Lessons Learned
Survey respondents rated the GNA an 8 and a 10 in terms of overall success.29 Both respondents
would choose to negotiate another GNA under similar circumstances. Unexpected benefits from
the process were the feelings of community empowerment and the education received by those
who were new to such an endeavor. The primary concern is the ability of the community group
to monitor the implementation process. Both respondents consider a GNA to be worth pursuing,
but it will not solve all the problems.
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Western Slope Environmental Resource Council
and
Bowie Resources
Introduction
In February 2000, a Good Neighbor Agreement (“GNA”)—termed a memorandum of
understanding—was signed by the Western Slope Environmental Resource Council (“WSERC”)
and Bowie Resources Ltd. (“BRL”). The purpose of the GNA was to mitigate potential impacts
on the local community resulting from a proposed increase in coal production by several local
mines. The GNA is a legally binding document which addresses issues related to truck and rail
traffic, noise, and local water supplies.

The Parties
Western Slope Environmental Resource Council (“WSERC”), founded in 1977, is a non-profit
organization dedicated to protecting and enhancing the natural environment and quality of life in
Delta County, Colorado, and Colorado’s Western Slope. WSERC seeks to build an aware and
active community that can live with harmony and respect for the land and other natural
resources. The group has 250 members and an annual operating budget of approximately
$100,000, which is generated by membership dues, special events, donations and grants.
The Concerned Citizens of Garvin Mesa, a group of about 20 local residents, also participated in
the GNA negotiations. It was this group’s appeal of the permit process which sparked the GNA
negotiations in the first place.
Addington Enterprises opened the Bowie mine in the North Fork Valley in 1994 and began
operations as BRL. BRL is fairly important to the local economy (8 on a scale of 10), while coal
mining in general represents a significant sector of the local economy (6 on a scale of 10).30 At
the time the GNA was negotiated, BRL was expanding, seeking financing, privately owned, and
concerned about public opinion.

Nature of the Dispute
Three coal mines operate in the North Fork Valley: Oxbow, Bowie, and West Elk. In 1998,
local citizens became concerned over the potential impacts of the three mines’ plans to more than
double the valley’s production from 8.3 million tons in 1998 to nearly 20 million tons in 2003.
Of particular concern were the significant increases in rail and truck traffic. Also of concern to
nearby residents was BRL’s plan to mine the Iron Point deposit underlying a reservoir on Garvin
30

Ratings and other opinions are taken primarily from WSERC’s response to the GNA survey.
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Mesa and the increase in noise levels anticipated to accompany the increase in production.
Of the three companies, only BRL needed a new federal coal lease to expand its mining
operations. The leasing process, conducted by the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”),
provided citizens with the opportunity to voice their concerns. WSERC distributed a fact sheet
that detailed potential impacts and raised questions about the proposed expansion. After a
controversial Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) was approved by both the BLM and the
Forest Service, a group called the Concerned Citizens of Garvin Mesa filed an appeal. BLM
responded by abandoning the EIS and undertaking a year-long study to look at the valley-wide
impact of Oxbow’s existing coal lease and the new Iron Point lease requested by BRL. An
issues forum was held which was attended by many members of the community including both
proponents and opponents of the expansion. As a result of this meeting, the North Fork Coal
Working Group (“NFCWG”) was formed. This group was composed of representatives from
WSERC, the Concerned Citizens of Delta County & Mine Neighbors, irrigation and domestic
water companies, Delta and Gunnison Counties, West Elk, Bowie and Oxbow coal mines, the
City of Delta, mine employees, and members of the community at large. It was through the
efforts of this group that the GNA came to fruition.

Negotiation of the GNA
BRL’s willingness to negotiate a GNA was spurred by the realization that until citizens’
concerns were addressed, their proposed expansion could be delayed as long as two years by the
EIS appeals process. Such a delay would have likely put BRL out of business. However, the
majority of the citizens’ groups did not want to put their neighbors out of work and were also
interested in negotiating an agreement that would avoid a protracted appeals process and would
address the specific issues of concern rather than derailing the whole permitting process. Thus,
the NFCWG focused primarily on issues that the EIS would not address—the increase in train
and truck traffic caused by the expansion.
After five months of weekly meetings, BRL proposed a 5-point plan. This plan became the basis
for negotiating a formal Memorandum of Agreement (the GNA) between the mine and WSERC.
During the negotiations, WSERC felt that they had adequate access to lawyers and legal
expertise, but did not have access to or utilize outside consultants, trained negotiators, or
technical/economic data. WSERC identified two issues that were discussed but not incorporated
into the final agreement: conservation easements on BRL’s private land and contributions to the
community not related to rail traffic.
The bottom line issues for WSERC were to:
• get the coal trucks off of Highway 133;
• secure money for railroad safety upgrades;
• ensure significant impact mitigations on Garvin Mesa; and
• not allow an outside appeal to negate the agreement.
BRL’s bottom line was that the citizens’ groups had to drop all opposition to the EIS and support
BRL’s application for a new coal lease.

101

The resulting GNA contained the following major provisions:
• BRL agreed to:
o Substantial reclamation work;
o Build a new mine-to-train conveyor and loadout which would eliminate 978 trucks/day;
o Construct turning and acceleration lanes on Highway 133 as an interim measure;
o An annual production cap;
o Pay a penalty if the annual production cap is exceeded;
o No new mine portals in certain areas;
o Conduct a baseline noise study;
o Not exceed baseline noise levels when production increases;
o Pay a penalty for noise violations;
o Prepare a state-approved water augmentation plan prior to mining within one mile of
Terror Creek Reservoir; and
o Contribute up to $500,000 to the community rail mitigation trust.
• WSERC agreed to:
o Support BRL’s ongoing permit;
o Support BRL’s pending application to mine the Iron Point Lease;
o Intervene on behalf of the mine should an appeal by an outside group threaten the GNA;
and
o Formally oppose any stay of the lease resulting from an outside appeal.
It took approximately one year to complete the GNA. The GNA was designed to be a legally
enforceable contract. The GNA is not part of a state or federal regulatory action. If the company
is sold, the GNA will remain in effect. BRL posted two $1 million performance bonds which
will be forfeited to WSERC should BRL default on any or all parts of the GNA (subject to
certain contingencies, as discussed later).

Costs
WSERC estimates that they have spent at least $15,000 annually on the negotiation and
implementation of the GNA. The primary expenditure is staff time. WSERC expects to spend
an additional $10,000-15,000 in the future for implementation. It is not known how much was
spent by the company for negotiation or implementation beyond the $500,000 for the rail
mitigation trust. BRL does not provide funding to WSERC to ensure its continued participation
in GNA-related activities.

Implementation
As of 2002, WSERC rates the GNA a complete success in terms of the extent to which
commitments have been honored—although many provisions have been modified. For example,
WSERC agreed to change their request for a passing lane on Hwy. 133 to construction of
flashing signs. The difference in costs was then applied to rail traffic mitigation. The production
cap was also modified at the request of BRL and after several weeks of intense and sometimes
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unfriendly debate among the WSERC board. While the GNA does have specific dispute
resolution procedures, they have not been used to resolve any disputes thus far.
Based on the GNA, WSERC now has at its disposal approximately $500,000 in mitigation funds
(soon to be $800,000), and is now faced with the unusual (but pleasant) task of determining a
spending strategy.
Other changes to the GNA were prompted after BRL filed for bankruptcy. Some of these
amendments were made at the urging of the bankruptcy judge (e.g., removing some bonding
requirements), with others occurring after discussions between WSERC and BRL. It is difficult
to determine how a bankruptcy would impact a different GNA in a different industry. The other
issue that WSERC has been dealing with is a change in leadership. This has caused the
organization to focus energies on areas other than the GNA provisions.
Additional details about the status of implementation activities are provided in the table below:
The GNA Provision:

What Actually Happened:

Transfer permit for existing silo
train load-out area from old Bowie
#1 to new Bowie #2 permit.
Repair damaged paved portions of
Stevens Gulch Road by the end of
2001, w/a $100,000 maximum
contribution from mine.




Discontinue using Highway 133
stockpile once new Bowie #2 coal
storage area becomes operational



Road has been repaired
The portal that was served by
the road is no longer being
used – the road is essentially
used only as a forest access
road now
Stockpile was removed

What Didn’t Happen:


Unsure if this actually
happened



The reclamation plan of
this area has been
modified
The mine is in the process
if pursuing alternative
mitigate whereby the area
would be turned into an
orchard
The original reclamation
plan was modified, and
the mine is looking at the
alternative reclamation of
creating a residential area
Alternative reclamation
plan proposed because the
mine filed for bankruptcy



Reclamation work will begin in
2000, with all work completed
within 18 months

Examine and report reclamation
status of Bowie Portal #1 by the
end of 2001

Provision has been implemented
 West portal has been
recontoured and reseeded –
waiting to see if vegetation
will come in
 Portal #1 has had 90% of its
structural facilities
disassembled – current
proposal on table to turn the
area into a residential area
 Some reclamation completed
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Because of bankruptcy,
mine sought assistance
from county to create a
residential area



Cap total production at 5 million
tons/year for the life of the Bowie
#1 and #2 mines






If production cap is exceeded, the
mine is to pay liquidated damages
of $1.00/excess ton



This has been amended
The new agreement states that
this mine can only exceed the
cap if both of the other mines
in the valley are producing less
than 50% of their capacity
Cap is now set at 5.25 million
tons because the train cars
have been lengthened, so now
more can be transported
without introducing any
additional safety hazards
Has not been necessary – mine
has not exceeded production
cap








Meet with CDOT in the first
quarter of 2000 to identify
upgrades to Highway 133
(including turning and acceleration
lanes) as interim measures;
compete within 90 days of
receiving permits from CDOT
Install downward focused lighting
hoods, baffling or housing around
fans, and high grade precision
sealed bearings for the conveyer
rollers
Incorporate noise mitigation into
the design of new facilities and
hold at least one public meeting to
disclose noise/light/dust reduction
methods

Ceased further
reclamation pending
county commissioner’s
review
This has been amended

When the mine filed for
bankruptcy, the
bankruptcy judge required
WSERC to remove the
bonds put into place to
cover the penalty
Now, there is no bond
requirement
The penalty is still
enforceable (but WSERC
would have to go to court)

Provision has been implemented
 Turning and acceleration lanes
constructed
 There is no more truck traffic,
now that the new load-out
facility has been built
Provision has been implemented

Provision has been implemented
 Company did a baseline noise
study and used high quality
materials to keep noise at the
pre-expansion levels
 Company is pleased with the
higher quality of the system
because of the reduced number
of repairs
 Enclosed and insulated loadout facility
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Did an initial reading
regarding noise, but have
not done a second noise
study to follow up

Liquidated damages provision if
noise levels are exceeded
 If permit received to mine
under Terror Creek, BRL will
not use Garvin Mesa or
Garvin Mesa roads to
transport coal
 BRL will not establish portals
on or immediately north of
Garvin Mesa for purposes of
ingress and egress of men,
materials or coal
 If BRL uses existing roads for
other purposes, BRL will
maintain the road during the
first week of operation and at
least once a month thereafter
Restrictions on ventilations fans
for Bowie #1 and Bowie #2

Finalize water augmentation plan,
with no secondary mining or
longwall mining within one mile
of Terror Reservoir until plan is
approved
Maintain open door policy
including meeting with concerned
residents and/or organizations to
discuss any of the above items,
changes in the current situation, or
new problems
Contribute up to $500,000 to the
Delta County Rail Transportation
Mitigation Fund



Noise levels have not been
exceeded
Provision has been implemented
because there are no facilities
above Garvin Mesa at this time

Provision has been implemented
 Concrete barrier was placed
between ventilation fans and
Garvin Mesa




Not sure if this has been
implemented

This has been implemented to
the extent that BRL
approached WSERC to discuss
the possible impact of the
bankruptcy on the GNA

Provision has been implemented
 $500,000 was donated to
improve railcrossing safety
 BRL submitted their last
payment at the beginning of
2004

Lessons Learned
WSERC gives their GNA an overall success rating of 9 out of 10. Negotiating another GNA
would be their preferred course of action if similar disputes were to arise in the future. If they
had it to do over again, they would have asked for funds to pay someone to monitor the
implementation. Additionally, the bankruptcy contingency is something that should be planned
for in the GNA, as is the internal challenge of transferring GNA implementation responsibilities
during staff turnovers. One unexpected benefit of the GNA process was that in some circles
WSERC acquired a new reputation for being “reasonable.” Their advice to others considering a
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GNA is to be very clear about why you are choosing this tool, be sure it will get you further than
other tools (lawsuits, etc.), and have bottom lines and do not give up on them.
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APPENDIX E: SUMMARY OF SURVEY RESPONSES
by Miriam Stohs and Jessica Chavez, Natural Resources Law Center
Overview of the Parties
•

Survey responses received from 11 community groups in 9 states (CA, CO, ID, LA, MT,
NY, OH, PA, TX) representing 13 GNAs with 13 companies.
• Annual budgets of community groups range from $500 to $2.1 million per year
• Number of paid staff ranges from 0 to 170.
• Company types:
o Chemical (3)
o Dairy
o Industrial Gas
o Mining (2)
o Pharmaceuticals
o Refinery/Petrochemicals (4)
o Waste Processing
• Number of local residents employed by the companies: from 0 to 1,460.
• On a scale of 1 to 10, the importance of the sectors that the companies represent to the local
economy ranges from 1 to 10, with an average of 6.
Characteristics of Companies at Time of GNA Negotiations
Characteristic
Concerned about public opinion
Profitable
Publicly traded
Expanding
Privately owned
Seeking financing
Perceived as committed to environmental concerns
Stable in size
Shrinking

Issues Prompting Concern
Type of Issue
# of Companies
Nuisance (noise, traffic, odors)
12
Public health concerns
10
Environmental impacts
10
Local economic impacts
1
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# of Companies
11
9
7
8
5
2
2
1
0

Examples of “specific issues of greatest concern”:
• Public health – strange cancers, breathing problems
• Mining under agricultural water supplies (ditches, reservoirs)
• The potential for fire and explosions
• Releases and spills of hazardous substances to the air and water
• Nuisances (e.g., odors, overnight truck parking)
• Adequacy of the company’s emergency response and evacuation plans
• Danger of contamination of domestic water wells and groundwater from dairy activities

Prior Actions Taken
•

All groups reported that prior to negotiating the GNA they:
o Took their concerns to relevant government agencies
o Consulted with company officials
o Engaged in publicity campaigns and grassroots activism
• Five groups reported filing or threatening to file lawsuits.
• At least eight groups challenged permit applications.
Examples of specific actions taken by different groups:
• Distribution of a “fact sheet”
• Neighborhood canvassing (letter writing campaign)
• Compile “citizen’s audit” based on publicly available documents
• Lobby political candidates
• Write editorial for the NY Times
• Air monitoring by community members
• Media coverage, petitions, demonstrations

Commitments Sought From Company
Commitment

# of GNAs
12
10
10
10
9
9
8
7
5
4
3
3
2

Pollution mitigation
Regular environmental audits
Access to environmental data
Citizen involvement in audits
Traffic mitigation
Advance notice of company changes
Access to emergency response plan
Infrastructure improvements
Local monetary contributions
Citizen participation in company decisions
Local hiring
Whistleblower protection
Job training
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Financial support of community group
Worker transportation/housing
Community relocation

2
1
1

Commitments Sought From Community Groups
Commitment
# of GNAs
End negative publicity
9
Generate positive publicity
8
Drop permit challenge
8*
No lawsuit will be filed
3
Dismissal of pending lawsuit
2
Sign confidentiality agreement
1
*Estimate - not specifically asked in survey.

GNA Negotiation Process
Citizens had adequate access to: # of GNAs
Lawyers and legal expertise
9
Technical consultants
9
Technical/economic data
8
Trained negotiators
3

•

GNA Structure
Feature
# of GNAs
Legally binding
9
Remain in effect after sale
7
Procedure for dispute resolution
6
Integrated with permit
5
Clear termination point
3
Company funding of community group
2
Subsequent modifications
2
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The GNA negotiation process took
2 months to 1.5 years for all GNAs
except one, which took 4 years.

GNA Implementation
# of GNAs
Extent to which commitments were honored:
40%
50 – 60%
70 – 80%
90 – 100%

1
1
5
7

Rating of overall success (1 – 10):
5
6
7
8
9
9.5
10

2
1
1
4
4
1
1

Yes
Most Likely
Unsure
no

8
1
4
1

Would you do it again?

What Would You Do Differently?
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Reduce the number of people at the negotiating table
Keep the issues more focused
Get more money
Have an airtight redress process
Keep negotiation process in the public eye
Obtain formal commitment to reduce chemical use
Focus more on building the community group to prevent burnout and dissolution
Anticipate possible break-up of group and build in contingencies
Increase the term of the GNA
Speed up the process
Create a more legally binding agreement
Better prepare the community negotiating group
Make the GNA less legal and more easily understood
Ask for funds to monitor the implementation
Ask for funds to pay for technical consultants

110

Unexpected Benefits
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Increased respect for community group
Empowerment of community group
Increased credibility of community group
Learning experience
Plant manager became more involved with employees
Developed great working relationships between the parties
Implementation of state of the art monitoring systems
Greater community awareness
Water monitoring in place

Concerns About Viability of Group
•
•
•
•

Lack of funding
Insufficient staff /volunteers to monitor GNA
Staff turnover
Need for new members to take an active role
• Too many issues and battles to be fought

Final Advice
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Go into the process with a united front
Make sure legal section is enforceable and legal action financed
Reserve the right to be critical of company actions
Be careful of a company’s public relations ploys
Ask for more than you want
Make sure you are ready for a lot of hard work and a long-term commitment
If possible, hire someone to monitor the company and report back to the group
Canvassing is a very effective tool
Be clear, keep it simple, keep government agencies out of the process, be tough
Worth pursuing, but won’t solve all problems
Be sure you will get further than using other tools (lawsuits, etc.)
Have bottom lines and stick to them
Try to get what you want in a closed timeframe
Obtain financial commitments prior to entering into negotiation to level the playing field
• Stay committed – don’t give up!
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Survey Respondent:

WSERC

WCTC

TUEF

OCA

SBESC

NPRC

C/LRTC

BREATHE

SEA

LABB

Characteristics of the company at time of GNA negotiation. The company was …
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Profitable
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Expanding
X
Stable in size
X
X
Seeking financing
Private
Public
?
Public
Private
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Private / publicly traded
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Concerned about public opinion
Characteristics of the GNA document, negotiation process, and the survey respondents’ degree of satisfaction.
How long did GNA negotiation
take? (months)
Legally binding?
Procedures for dispute
resolution?
Remain in effect after sale?
Integrated with permit?
Clear termination point?
Company funding of
community group?
Subsequent modifications?
Extent commitments honored (1
to 10)
Rating of overall success (1 to
10)
Would you do it again?

12

12

6

X
X

X

X
X

X

X
X

?
X

10

1 to 12

?

?

COCOA

X
X

Private

12

18

4

8

3

2

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X
X
X

X

?
X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
10

9, 10

9.5

9.5

5-6, 7

X
9

8

7-8, 8

4

10

8

9

8, 10

9.5

9

5, 6

9

8

8, 9

5

7

8

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Unsure

Unsure

Unsure,
No
Unsure
Yes
Most Likely
WSERC = Western Slope Environmental Resource Council; WCTC = West County Toxics Coalition; TUEF = Texans United Education Fund; OCA = Ohio Citizen
Action; SBESC = Seneca-Babcock Environmental Subcommittee; NPRC = Northern Plains Resource Council; C/LRTC = Community/Labor Refinery Tracking
Committee; BREATHE = Boulder Residents for the Elimination of Air Toxics and Hazardous Emissions; SEA = Shoreline Environmental Alliance; LABB =
Louisiana Bucket Brigade; COCOA = Citizens of Owyhee County Organized Association. [Some responses later updated by the original survey respondents.]
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APPENDIX F: ENVIRONMENTAL GNA EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

ENVIRONMENTAL GOOD NEIGHBOR AGREEMENT EVALUATION
METHODOLOGY: AN OVERVIEW
Doug Kenney, Natural Resources Law Center
Revised, September 2002

The following pages describe the general philosophy being used to conduct the
evaluation of environmentally oriented Good Neighbor Agreements. The term “Good
Neighbor Agreement” (GNA) is poorly defined and is used in a variety of contexts to
describe arrangements voluntarily negotiated between companies and local communities
(or local governments) (Lewis and Henkels, 1996). Communities generally see
environmental GNAs as a way of making polluting businesses more accountable for
negative public impacts, while companies seek positive publicity for, and avoided
community opposition to, business operations.
No central or comprehensive listing of GNAs exists, however, it is estimated that
approximately 50 examples exist worldwide.31 In this study, we are interested in
examining GNAs with the following characteristics:
1. Feature a written agreement;
2. Located in the United States;
3. Concerned with environmental issues; and
4. Prominently involve one or more non-profit community groups.

Several techniques have been utilized to find GNAs with these qualities, including key
word searching of academic publication databases (e.g., Lexus/Nexus), web searching,
phone conversations with prominent leaders in this field (e.g., Sanford Lewis) and GNA
oriented organizations (e.g., Communities for a Better Environment), and the review of
related documents. The survey has identified just over a dozen candidate GNAs.

CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN PROGRAM EVALUATION
Everyone conducts evaluations of various types as part of normal daily life. The formal
evaluation of management programs and strategies, however, is a specialized task ideally
informed by theories and methodologies described mainly in the program evaluation
31

This estimate is provided by Sanford Lewis.
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literature. Much of the theoretical literature describes sophisticated, quantitative
evaluation methodologies based largely on experimental methods that are often of little
practical value in real-world applications where data and budgetary constraints
necessitate more qualitative approaches (Patton, 1988). Arguably, the evaluation
literature is currently as rich with descriptions about constraints and impediments to
formal evaluations, than in advice on conducting pragmatic evaluations. The situation is
particularly murky regarding the assessment of efforts concerned with environmental
protection and management.32 Nonetheless, the literature can provide some help in
guiding the design of an evaluation protocol.
The formal evaluation of environmental programs and management strategies is a
relatively new endeavor. Modern goals such as cost-effectiveness, performance based
management, and maximized return-on-investments have recently prompted a variety of
evaluations.33 The purpose of these evaluations can include identifying successes and
failures, improving program effectiveness and/or efficiency, guiding funding decisions
regarding program expansion or discontinuation, or comparing the efficacy of one
program to another. Such evaluations have a long history in many public sectors—
particularly in education, health care, welfare, and criminal justice—but are less common
regarding the issue of environmental protection. This omission partly reflects the
newness of many environmental programs, and the difficulty in linking program activities
to frequently nebulous environmental goals such as ecosystem health and ecological
sustainability.34 Several strains of thinking are beginning to congeal, however, into a
literature of environmental program evaluation.
Techniques seen in environmental program evaluations typically reflect some
combination of three different evaluation foci: (1) process analysis, (2) environmental
outcome (or impact) assessment, and/or (3) efficiency measurement (Knapp and Kim,
1998a).
o Process Analysis. The “process” evaluations typically utilize methodologies
pioneered in the program implementation literature, and are concerned with
describing and assessing activities occurring between program initiation and the
presumed future achievement of results.35 These studies focus on activities (i.e.,
32

As Knapp and Kim (1998b:349) conclude: “Whereas the state of the art in program evaluation is in flux,
the art of environmental program evaluation has no state at all. It has only artists.”
33
Much of the recent evaluation work has focused on Superfund (i.e., CERCLA), the Clean Water Act, the
Endangered Species Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and related efforts (Rich, 1998).
34
As Bryner (1998:321) observes, “Program evaluation is particularly challenging in environmental policy.
The uncertainty over the causes and consequences of ecological problems makes it difficult to assess the
impact of public policies. The long lag time between exposure and evidence of a problem makes it difficult
to identify the factors responsible for environmental problems. Pollutants may be transferred to another
environmental medium instead of actually being reduced in volume, making evaluation of programs
incomplete. The challenges in changing human behavior in ways that are more protective of the
environmental are inextricably intertwined with a host of other concerns, from economic growth to
individual freedom.”
35
Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky are considered the pioneers of this work. This work tends to
focus on outputs, rather than on-the-ground outcomes. Environmental outputs can include “the number of
hazardous waste site inspected, the number of actions taken to protect the habitat, the number of species
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outputs) and decision-making involving challenges such as problem
identification, the formulation of solutions, and the processes used to coordinate
action.
o Outcome (or Impact) Assessments. In contrast to the process oriented evaluations,
the outcome (or impact) evaluations draw from the environmental assessment
literature largely inspired by National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
compliance. These efforts feature a strong emphasis on defining and measuring
environmental indicators and outcomes, often in the context of natural science
theories and models used to explain causality.36 Comparing alternatives is a core
element in many impact assessments.
o Efficiency Evaluations. These efforts are sometimes also labeled as “economic”
evaluations, due to their heavy dependence on economic theory and their reliance
on methodologies such as benefit/cost analysis, cost-effectiveness studies,
compliance cost estimates, and risk assessment. Much like outcome (impact)
assessments—and in contrast to most process evaluations—these efforts often
emphasize the comparison of alternatives.

Sometimes overlying these three classes of evaluations are studies that “assess how
processes work and outcomes are produced within a larger institutional framework”
(Bartlett, 1994). These “institutional studies” typically focus on broad parameters such as
behavioral incentives, agency/organizational cultures, value systems, and decision rules,
and how these larger institutional attributes might be shaped over time by a particular
program to create a new institutional context—presumably one more conducive to
environmental protection (Kraft, 1998). The literature of institutional analysis is useful
for guiding these efforts, even though it is not always considered as a core element of the
program evaluation field.37
As noted above, each focus implicates a different set of tools and methodologies,
described in a different tributary of the evaluation literature. Determining which
combination of concepts and tools is most applicable in a given evaluation exercise is a
complex challenge, especially since many researchers have concluded that several
programs are simply not amenable to any type of evaluation. Those researchers suggest
that an “evaluability assessment” be conducted before any evaluation effort is considered
(e.g., see Wholey, 1983, 1987; Schmidt et al., 1979; Rich, 1998). The primary constraint
on environmental program evaluations is the lack of appropriate data, especially as it
pertains to environmental indicators and outcomes. This is well illustrated by U.S.
General Accounting Office environmental evaluations that tend to reach few conclusions
recovery plans that have been approved, the number of environmental impact statements that have been
submitted, and the amount of pollution in the air or water” (quote by Rich, 1998:32-33 Rich, drawing on
research by Rosenbaum, 1991, and Bartlett, 1994).
36
The selection of appropriate indicators is an active area of research and writing.
37
Kenney and Lord (1999) provide an explanation of how institutional analysis techniques can be used to
assess natural resources and environmental problems and problem-solving strategies.
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about program effectiveness, while identifying in detail the data deficiencies that prevent
a comprehensive evaluation (Solomon, 1998). These deficiencies include the quality of
environmental data, the adequacy of techniques used to gather data, and the integrity of
the analytical techniques used to evaluate that data. GAO recommendations,
consequently, primarily focus on ways to improve the databases needed for future,
methodologically rigorous, evaluations. These recommendations tend to have little
practical use in short-term decision-making.
The availability of information is a major consideration in designing a program
evaluation. For example, the availability of data often shapes whether the approach
selected is quantitative or qualitative. Quantitative approaches often rely on a quasiexperimental or “scientific” approach, and utilize statistical methods to analyze data and
support conclusions. Such approaches can be expensive, time-consuming, and
impractical where data is not readily available, and may encourage researchers to focus
only on those dimensions of a problem that are operational and measurable. Often, more
practical evaluations are those that use qualitative methods, such as interviews,
observations, and the review of written documents, to support conclusions (Rich, 1998).
The status of qualitative approaches has risen in recent decades. As King et al. (1987:15)
explain: “The development of evaluation thinking over the past twenty years has led
away from the notion that the quantitative research study is the only or even the ideal
form for an evaluation.”
The efforts of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) highlight several
difficulties of program evaluation. Historically, the agency based its evaluations on
activity (or output) measures, such as number of permits issued, and was roundly
criticized for not measuring what was really important: environmental outcomes (Mintz,
1995; NAPA, 1997). In this respect, the agency was primarily engaged in so-called
formative evaluations, which are most typical of young programs, are usually reliant on
output measures, and are most often conducted internally with the goal of improving
program performance. Critics, in contrast, were calling for so-called summative
evaluations, which are often more appropriate for mature efforts, use outcome data, and
are often conducted by (and/or for) outside entities responsible for making decisions
about continuing or discontinuing programs.38 The agency responded in recent years by
focusing more on environmental outcomes such as water quality data, thereby balancing
process analyses with outcome assessments.39 This, however, has led to a new
methodological problem: trying to link outcomes to EPA activities.
This experience highlights a great paradox in evaluation: focusing on means (i.e.,
processes and outputs) tells you little about ends (i.e., impacts and outcomes); focusing
38

The distinction is credited to Scriven (1967).
One example of this commitment to better integrate outcome measures into program evaluations is the
National Performance Measures Strategy (NPMS). According to EPA, the strategy not only “includes
traditional measures, such as the number of inspections and enforcement actions conducted each year, it
also establishes new outcome measures for evaluating the behavioral and environmental results of our
activities. These measures include compliance rates for selected regulated populations, pollutant reductions
resulting from enforcement actions, behavioral changes stemming from compliance assistance, and average
time for significant violators to return to compliance” (EPA, 2000:3).

39
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on ends tells you little about means. Without an explicit knowledge of how means and
ends are related, it is impossible to generate advice for making programs more successful
(Knapp and Kim, 1998b; Wholey et al., 1970).40 This suggests two related lessons in
evaluation design. First, truly valuable evaluations are those pursued from multiple foci,
featuring measurements and theories necessary to relate on-the-ground outcomes to
program activities and, at the least, to distinguish between the achievements of the
program versus what would have happened in its absence. An articulation of this
perspective is found in Minnesota law guiding the evaluation of state programs:
[Evaluations should determine] the degree to which the activities and
programs entered into or funded by the state are accomplishing their goals
and objectives, including a critical analysis of goals and objectives,
measurement of program results and effectiveness, alternative means of
achieving the same results, and efficiency in the allocation of resources.41
Second, the goal(s) of the evaluation should largely shape the focus and methodology
employed, as suggested below in Table 1. For the reason stated above, evaluations
designed to improve program functioning are perhaps the most demanding.

TYPES OF EVALUATION EXERCISES
Question to be Answered

Type of Evaluation Required

How is the program being implemented?

Program Review

Is the program in compliance with specified
agreements?
Is the program managed efficiently?

Compliance Evaluation
Economy and Efficiency
Evaluation
Effectiveness Evaluation

Is the program accomplishing its goals and
objectives?
What are alternative ways of reaching the program’s Policy Evaluation
goals?

Adapted from figure 4, Evaluation Categories, in Guide to the Program Evaluation Division, Office of the Legislative
Auditor, State of Minnesota, August 2001, page 7.

40

“Although data on outcomes provide perhaps the ultimate measures of program success, they offer little
of use for making programs successful. Constructive criticism requires not only an assessment of what is
achieved but also an understanding of why achievement suffers. Such an understanding requires
knowledge of the institutional context” (Knapp and Kim, 1998b:350).
41
Minn. Stat. §3.971, subd. 2.
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CRAFTING THE EVALUATION STRATEGY
An initial review of GNAs has identified several factors that influence what types of
approaches and evaluation methodologies are (and are not) possible in this study. While
that work is still ongoing, it is sufficiently complete to have produced several insights
that have relevance to the design of an evaluation, including:
o In most cases, GNAs are very poorly documented;
o GNAs very greatly in terms of structure, function, goals, subject matters, and
other organizational and substantive characteristics;
o Environmentally-focused GNAs are relatively uncommon; and,
o GNAs operate in an environment where success or failure can be greatly
influenced by a wide variety of exogenous factors that cannot be controlled for
through typical experimental methods (especially given the low sample size
available to us).
Additionally, the goals of the evaluation are multi-faceted. One interest of the Northern
Plains Resource Council, for example, is to improving the functioning of the Stillwater
GNA. However, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation—the organization funding
this work—while sharing this interest, is primarily interested in assessing the general
utility of the GNA tool in environmental applications. Both goals necessitate a variety of
information gathering and analysis efforts. Combined, these goals give this evaluation
exercise an extremely broad focus.

EVALUATION DESIGN DECISIONS
As explained earlier, the design of a particular program evaluation should be based on
several considerations, including most prominently the availability of information and the
goals of the exercise. In this case, we have a situation where information is generally
lacking, and where the goals of the evaluation are multifaceted.42 This strongly suggests
two overarching principles for the evaluation effort. First, the effort should be qualitative
and descriptive more so than quantitative (and/or statistical). The universe of GNAs is
much too small to consider any sort of statistically oriented evaluation, especially given
the difficulty associated with establishing appropriate control groups. Basic descriptions
of existing GNAs are a real deficiency in the literature and are an impediment to virtually
all types of analysis.43 These considerations strongly suggest a research strategy
primarily reliant on qualitative analyses. Secondly, the effort must feature several lens
and/or foci. This evaluation is intended to serve several purposes and several audiences.
42

Unfortunately, these conclusions all underscore our belief that the evaluation of environmental GNAs
will be difficult. On the other hand, the lack of data and understanding about GNAs suggests that even
modest insights gained through our evaluation will have real value.
43
As King et al. observe (1987:11), “description, in as much detail as possible, of the materials, activities,
processes, and administrative arrangements that characterize a particular program is an important part of its
evaluation.”
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Users of this study are likely to have a variety of questions regarding GNAs: e.g., How
are GNAs being used? Are GNAs achieving their specified goals? How effectively and
efficiently are GNAs functioning? Do some GNAs work better than others? How can
the use of GNAs be improved? How well do GNAs work in comparison to other
approaches? Several types of evaluation studies are implicated by these questions.
While an effort will be made to offer partial answers to all these questions, the evaluation
strategy proposed below is primarily an “effectiveness evaluation” aimed at determining
the extent to which the set of GNAs studied are achieving their intended goals. This
analysis will primarily be conducted from the perspective of the community
organizations (rather than the companies involved). A secondary goal is to determine
why or why not the GNAs studied are successful. Thus, the proposed analysis is
summative more so than formative, in that the primary goal is to assess whether or not
the selected GNAs are working, rather than emphasizing how they might be improved.
Five perspectives or “metrics” are listed below to guide evaluation judgments. Note that
they offer a blend of objective and subjective analysis, and draw on insights from
participants (i.e., insiders) as well as outside analysts. This diversity of metrics and
information sources is a product of the multiple objectives of this research, and reflects
the challenge of finding adequate information.
The following three metrics will primarily be used to evaluate whether or not the GNAs
are working successfully. They are listed in order of importance.
1. Actual program activities versus promised activities. To the extent that the GNA
requires specific actions (or inactions) at predetermined times (or under specific
circumstances), these standards provide a useful way to evaluate activities, outputs,
and potentially, outcomes. (This is a time series, or longitudinal, approach.)
This type of evaluation is highly objective, and depends only on collecting
data on activities and requirements. This information should be obtainable
through questionnaires and interviews, and the review of the GNA document and
any other available records. (Potentially, this may include technical information
such as emissions data.)

2. Participant satisfaction and self-assessment. Presumably, participants have a good
idea of the suite of problem-solving options available to them, and to the costs and
benefits of pursuing the GNA strategy. Thus, their degree of satisfaction with the
GNA is a useful metric of the strategy.44
This information can be obtained through questionnaires and interviews. Note
that it will be useful to solicit opinions from both community leaders and
company representatives.
44

Note that asking a participant to measure their satisfaction can be an easy an effective way for identifying
variables such as cost and cost-effectiveness which a party may not be willing (or able) to speak to directly.
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3. GNA success versus other problem-solving opportunities. Communities can use a
variety of approaches to modify and/or control the activities of neighboring
companies. Ultimately, the efficacy of the GNA approach must be considered with
respect to what is potentially achievable using other tools—including those of a
regulatory, judicial, economic, and/or political nature.
While this assessment will be informed by discussions with GNA participants,
it is largely an analytical effort that can occur within the Natural Resources Law
Center in consultation with researchers with expertise in other problem-solving
strategies and their associated literatures.45

Determining why or why not a given effort is successful will be approached from two
perspectives. One approach relies on the judgments of participants regarding the
availability of key resources and variables, such as leadership, funding, and other
categories defined by participants. A second approach involves an analysis by the
Natural Resources Law Center using principles of institutional analysis.
4. Self-assessment of keys to success and failure. Success or failure can often hinge on
the availability of a key resource or circumstance that is best understood by
participants active in the negotiation and implementation of the GNA.
This type of information is readily available in written questionnaires and
interviews.

5. Internal logic of the problem-solving strategy used in the GNA. One way to explain
the success or failure of a problem-solving strategy in a given situation is through an
institutional analysis case study that evaluates how the GNA effort has changed rules
influencing relationships, behaviors, and activities of key participants, and whether or
not this happened as intended.
This is the type of analysis ideally suited to institutional analysis concepts,
and can be conducted by researchers at the Natural Resources Law Center without
significant outside input. Before the analysis can be conducted, however, a
working knowledge of each case study must be developed. This can be done
through written questionnaires, oral interviews, and through the review of relevant
documents.

45

This is a metric where a statistical comparison would be highly desirable, but is impractical given the
small sample size of GNAs.
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APPENDIX G: NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF THE GNA WORKSHOP IN 2002
Billings Gazette, August 4, 2002

Knowledge, trust key to agreements
By Dan Burkhart
Of the Gazette Staff

RED LODGE -- Dawn Caldarelli remembers how people in her low-income
neighborhood in Buffalo, N.Y., spent generations watching freshly washed sheets sully
on the line. Old timers talked about orange snow.
“Everyone had just kind of put up with what they saw without thinking about what it
really meant," the single mother of four said.
But Caldarelli, with a degree in psychology and environmental science, knew there were
dangers to the health and welfare of the community from the company recycling waste in
her neighborhood.
"For decades some nasty chemicals had been making people sick, but the company got
away with it because they were doing a good thing - recycling - without anyone looking
to see how that was done," she said.
For Caldarelli, this was where she lived. She wasn't going to see her kids get sick.
"We had a high incidence of cancer, but no studies to see if there was a connection. I
couldn't get the regulatory agencies to even look at the issue. 'That's it,' I decided. I was
going to have to do something myself," she said.
It wasn't easy when she began a campaign to get the media involved. She was threatened.
Plant employees demeaned her.
"I was told I wasn't smart enough to understand," she said. "But I didn't need a degree to
recognize a 30,000-pound spill of sulfur dioxide was dangerous."
It took time, but Caldarelli eventually persuaded the Buffalo Common Council (the
equivalent of a city council) to pressure the chemical company with the eco-friendly
name, Environmental Natural Corp., to sit down to negotiate remedies to neighborhood
concerns. Trucks carrying toxic chemicals were re-routed away from her community.
Pollution prevention measures were beefed up. The company agreed to notify the
community when there was a toxic spill or health threatening event.
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It was Buffalo's version of a Good Neighbor Agreement, something similar to what
citizen groups in Stillwater and Sweet Grass counties did with Stillwater Mining Co.
Basically, Good Neighbor Agreements are a way for companies and communities to
resolve environmental, health and safety issues without going to court. It allows both
sides to sit down face to face to resolve problems. It involves people in corporate
decisions and actions.
In Caldarelli's case, it fixed what governmental regulatory agencies didn't.
"The agencies looked the other way. They weren't interested," she said.
Her story was one of many told this past weekend in Red Lodge at a Good Neighbor
conference sponsored by the Northern Plains Resource Council.
"In the course of trying to move forward with Good Neighbor Agreements, we were
interested in the experience of others," NPRC staff director Teresa Erickson said.
Erickson said the NPRC is interested in trying to use the same kind of agreement with
coalbed methane issues.
"We thought it would be useful to bring together others from across the country to
collectively refine Good Neighbor Agreements as a tool to solve natural resource
conflicts," she said.
The representatives of citizen groups attending told different stories about different
conflicts. For Dr. Henry Clark of Richmond, Calif., it was dealing with a petro-chemical
company. For Tara Thomas, it was coal mining in Colorado. For Denny Larson it was
working in what was called the "cancer crescent," an area saturated with toxic oil and gas
residues and residents with an abnormally high rate of cancer.
But despite the different stories, all had much in common. First, they were motivated by
the failure of government.
"Regulatory agencies don't do their job," Clark said. "It's partly inertia, partly politics."
Publicity is one tool to persuade companies to discuss agreements that often go beyond
the compliance companies have under local, state and federal laws.
"Money talks," Richard Abraham of Texans United said. "Even if a company has good
intentions, they answer to stockholders. There has to be an economic benefit to working
out the problems."
Sometimes not being tied up in court is enough. Sometimes getting good publicity helps.
"Companies don't like bad press, and they hate delays. It costs them money if we appeal
permit decisions," Abraham said.
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Many times it's because the community groups find ways to resolve an issue and save the
company money. Most citizens don't really want to know technical details about mining
or refining, according to Larson. But his group discovered more unhealthy emissions
came from leaking valves than out the stacks of refineries.
"We researched leakless valves. They would reduce bad emissions and save the company
a lot of money. They could recapture product. Of course, we had to demonstrate the
expense of installing them would repay them," he said.
Thomas had a similar experience dealing with Colorado coal companies when it came to
noisy trains. With 100 crossings in communities along the route of the coal trains, it was
a serious issue. Thomas found there were ball bearings that would reduce the noise.
"I'd rather be gardening than learning about ball bearings," she said. "But you have to
know the subject to negotiate."
Patience is required to complete agreements. Clark said his group started addressing
refinery issues in 1984. It was in the early 1990s before negotiations began, spurred
somewhat by the media attention that came when the Rev. Jessie Jackson arrived to help.
And once agreements are in place, the work isn't done. Anne Rolfes of the Louisiana
Bucket Brigade said her organization's name was literal. They provide people with a
relatively inexpensive bucket that can test for six different toxic emissions. It's a way of
checking how accurate a company's reports are, she said.
For NPRC, dealing with Stillwater Mining was a good deal less contentious than some of
the experiences others had. The biggest obstacle was uncertainty, according to Stillwater
Mining vice president Chris Allen in an NPRC report.
"SMC entered the GNA with decidedly mixed emotions. This ambivalence was born of
many things, but it all boiled down to one word - uncertainty. A year ago, the path
forward looked murky. Today, the landscape is better illuminated, and it seems to us that
the prospect of failure recedes the longer we work together," he stated.
NPRC and its affiliates - the Stillwater Protective Association and the Cottonwood
Resource Council - also had uncertainties. Could the company be held legally
accountable? Would there be ongoing cooperation?
In the end the agreement between Stillwater Mining and the citizen groups was a good
model for others. It was binding. It went beyond what the company was required to do. It
included citizen representatives on two key committees - one for oversight, one for
technical developments. It was good publicity for the company.
"The heart of the GNA rests upon the principles of mutual trust and respect. We are not
always going to agree with each other, and some issues may be sufficiently important to
drive us to arbitration. But, if our playing field is both level and clearly defined, and the
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principles upon which this agreement was founded remain our touchstone, then I believe
the GNA will prosper," according to Allen.
Caldarelli was one who benefited from the report on the historic Montana agreement.
"Ours is based on memorandums of understanding rather than a legally binding
agreement," she said. "That's something we can do better thanks to what we learned at
this conference."
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APPENDIX H: CONTRACTS: DEFINITIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS
by Jessica Chavez

Introduction
When considering the negotiation of a Good Neighbor Agreement it may be beneficial to
understand some of the fundamental terms and concepts that make up the law of
contracts. This memo briefly reviews some definitions and considerations regarding
contracts. In reviewing this material, keep in mind that for every rule or requirement in
contract law, there is often an exception. There are multiple aspects of contract law that
are not included in this document—e.g., aspects such as the mirror image rule (how
offers and counteroffers relate to each other), parol evidence (dealing with what can come
in as evidence when terms of a contract are in dispute), the various defenses that a
breaching party may have when not fulfilling the terms of a contract, and remedies or
damages available if a party does breach. These are complex issues that require the skill
of a practicing attorney familiar with contract law.46
Definitions47







Agreement – A manifestation of mutual assent between two or more people.
Bargain Requirement – Generally, when forming a contract, there must be some sort
of a manifestation of mutual assent to the agreed upon exchange.
Consideration - A contract requires the presence of “consideration.” Consideration is
present in a bargained-for exchange, where a person making a promise requires
something from the other person in return for the promise. Consideration may be
thought of as the price of this promise, or something bargained for and given in
exchange for the promise.48
Contract – A contract is a promise where the law provides a remedy for the aggrieved
party if that promise is broken.
Offer & Acceptance – Aspects of the “bargain requirement.” The offer is typically a
proposal presented by one party followed by an acceptance from the other party,
manifesting mutual assent.

46

It must be noted that this document is intended only as an educational tool and is not to be construed as
offering any legal advice. When working with the intricacies involved in drafting a contract, it is advisable
to seek legal guidance from a licensed attorney.
47
Each of the definitions included has been summarized from the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. See
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (3rd ed. 1999) for a comprehensive treatment of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts. The Restatement was a project instituted by several prominent scholars in 1933. In
1979, a second version was adopted by the American Law Institute. The provisions of the Restatements are
generally considered to be authoritative by courts and commentators. However, the Restatements do not
carry the force of law that is found in a statute or court decision. See CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., RULES OF
CONTRACT LAW (1999).
48
See CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., RULES OF CONTRACT LAW 15 (1999).
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Promise – A manifestation of intent to act or not act in a certain way. This promise is
made in a way so as to justify another in understanding that the promise is intended to
create a commitment.
Statute of Frauds – A requirement that certain contracts must be in writing, otherwise
enforcement may be forbidden. The following contracts are those that generally must
be in writing to be enforceable: a contract requiring one to answer for the duty of
another; a contract regarding an interest in land; a contract that cannot be completed
within one year from the date created; a contract for the sale of goods valued at $500
or more.
Term – a provision of a contract negotiated by both parties.

Considerations
General Creation of Contracts
The primary approach in the creation of contracts is called a “bargained-for exchange.”49
A bargained-for exchange means that there is a legally enforceable agreement where each
party gets something. For example, suppose one person has $1000 to spend on a used car
and another person has a car that she is selling for $1000. Transferring title to the car in
exchange for the money is a bargained-for exchange. This is different from simply
giving the car to someone as a gift because gift promises are not enforceable.50 When
there is a bargained-for exchange, “a promise is said to be ‘supported by consideration’
because the promisor gets something in exchange for (or as the price of) her promise.”51
This exchange of bargains is also called “consideration.” One important aspect of
consideration is the concept that “past consideration is not consideration.” If a person is
willing to give Mr. Smith $1000 in June for helping her move into her apartment the
previous January, there is no bargained-for exchange and the gift is not enforceable.
Another example may be if a company wants a concession for something that it did in the
past (“we closed that portion of the company four months ago, so in exchange we
want…”) would not necessarily be consideration. Courts often do not like having to
determine how much is “enough” consideration and will often leave it up to the parties to
determine.52
Once the basics of the bargain have been negotiated, there must be an actual offer and
acceptance before a contract can be formed. Contract law approaches this aspect by
looking for “a particular communication that constitutes an offer and another
communication that constitutes an acceptance.”53 An offer is “an expression by one party
of assent to certain definite terms, provided that the other party involved in the bargaining
transaction will likewise express assent to the same terms.”54 Contract law uses a

49

ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 15 (2004).
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 26.
53
Id. at 40.
54
1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 28 (2d ed. 1993).
50
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“reasonable person” approach in determining if someone’s actions or behavior is an offer
to enter into a contract.
Statute of Frauds
The Statute of Frauds generally requires that certain contracts must be in writing,
otherwise enforcement may be forbidden. The idea behind this requirement is that the
presence of an actual written contract deters people from fraudulently claiming that the
parties have an enforceable oral agreement. According to the Restatement (Second),
“where any promise in a contract cannot be fully performed within a year from the time
the contract is made, all promises in the contract are within the Statute of Frauds [must be
in writing] until one party to the contract completes his performance.”55 Even after the
one party completes his performance, the provisions regarding the other party are still
enforceable.56
Unless there is a law in place requiring otherwise, a contract that must be in writing
because of the Statute of Frauds is enforceable if it is actually in writing, signed by or on
behalf of the parties. The writing must (a) reasonably identify the subject of the contract,
(b) indicates that a contract has been made between the parties, and (c) describes in
reasonably certain language the essential terms of the promises made when creating the
contract.57
Misrepresentation, Duress, Undue Influence & Unconscionability
There are several acts of conduct by one party that can influence whether the contract
being negotiated is enforceable. Three types of conduct discussed here are acts of
misrepresentation, duress, and undue influence. It is often difficult to determine when a
specific act or term crosses the line into the realm of misrepresentation, undue influence,
or overreaching. This seems to be a constant challenge for lawmakers and courts.
If a party to a contract makes a representation to the others, this representation may be
considered to be a fraudulent misrepresentation, depending on the circumstances. A
misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker intends the statement to induce the other
party to agree to the contract and the maker (a) know that the statement is not being made
according to the facts available, or (b) does not have confidence that he is making the
statement truthfully, or (c) knows that he does not have a proper basis for making the
statement.58 This type of misrepresentation is considered “material” if it would likely
induce a reasonable person to agree to the contract, or if the maker knows that this would
be the likely result.59 If the misrepresentation relates to one of the essential terms of a
proposed contract, and it induces the other person to assent to the agreement, the assent is
not effective. The “other” person must have been justified in relying on the
misrepresentation. This misrepresentation aspect of contract law may result in the

55

E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §130 (3rd ed. 1999).
Id.
57
Id. at §131.
58
Id. at §162.
59
Id.
56
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contract being prevented from being formed in the first place, or may result in the
contract being voidable.60
Conduct involving duress often impacts the existence and/or enforceability of a
contract.61 Duress may be present if a party’s assent to a contract is induced by the other
party’s improper threat. If the improper threat leaves the victim with no reasonable
alternative, the victim may decide to take action to void the contract (the contract is
voidable by the victim).62 So, when is a threat improper? It is improper if “what is
threatened is a crime or a tort, or the threat itself would be a crime or a tort if it resulted in
obtaining property.”63 It is also improper if the other party is threatening a criminal
prosecution, the threat of a civil suit made in bad faith, or the threat itself is a breach of
the duty to deal in good faith.64 Additionally, a threat is improper if the threatened act
would cause harm to the recipient and would not significantly create any benefit to the
party making the threat.65
Undue influence is another factor to consider when determining if a contract is
enforceable. Undue influence is “unfair persuasion of a party who is under the
domination of the person exercising the persuasion or who by virtue of the relation
between them is justified in assuming that that person will not act in a manner
inconsistent with his welfare.”66 If a person agrees to a contract as a result of undue
influence, the contract may be voidable by the victim.67 Undue influence typically relates
to the entire contract.
When questioning if a specific term is enforceable, courts also look to see if the contract
or term is “unconscionable,” a term used to refer to a bargain that is so exceedingly onesided and detrimental to a party as to suggest a lack of meaningful choice or bargaining
power.68 If a term is unconscionable at the time the contract is created, a court may
refuse to enforce the entire contract, may remove the unconscionable term and enforce
the rest of the contract, or limit the application of the unconscionable term to avoid any
unconscionable result.69
It should be noted that, in addition to policies against using undue influence and
unconscionability, there is also a general duty of good faith and fair dealing that is
imposed on each party to a contract. This good faith and fair dealing duty applies during
both the performance and enforcement of the contract.70
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Impossibility of Performance & Impracticability of Performance
Even if the contract is created in good faith by both parties, there may be unforeseeable
circumstances that make it difficult for one or both parties to comply with their promises
included in the contract. Community groups have come across this situation when the
company in question is experiencing financial difficulty and claiming that they are not
able to fulfill their end of the bargained-for exchange. Contract law addresses this type of
situation under the category “impossibility” of performance and “impracticability” of
performance.71
“Impossibility” is when one making a promise is literally unable to perform his promise
due to circumstances beyond his control.72 A common example is where a musician rents
a music hall to perform for a fee of $3,000. Prior to the concert, the hall burns down. In
that case, a supervening event (the fire) made performance impossible. As such, contract
law may turn to the concept of “impossibility of performance” to release the music hall
management from liability.73 Not everything that makes performance impossible has this
same result. Generally, a court will first look at if the parties to the contract allocated the
risk of a specific event (such as a flood or fire) to a party. This may be done by directly
expressing the risk through words or through implication as indicated via the parties’
negotiations, trade custom, course of dealing, etc. If the parties did not anticipate this
type of event at all, the courts must determine where the risk lies.74 The courts also look
at other factors in determining if performance is truly impossible, and if so, who bears the
risk. However, a court will not generally excuse a promising party from performing
where the party somehow causes the impossibility to occur.75
What if an event occurs that does not make it impossible to fulfill a promise, but does
make it extremely expensive to fulfill the promise? This situation is termed
“impracticability.” It is difficult to determine when the results of an event reach the level
of impracticability. It is suggested that a “very serious disruption must occur.”76 Courts
will look at factors such as if the event alters the essential nature of the contract or
contract term, if the event causes a severe shortage, etc.77 Foreseeable, moderate changes
that naturally occur within the contract are typically not enough.

Other Matters
In addition to issues regarding contract law, groups considering GNAs may want to seek
professional advice about other related legal issues. For example:
 One community organization investigated the possibility of getting a Federal Consent
Decree. This is when the parties, after filing a federal lawsuit, come to an agreement
and submit the agreement to a federal judge. That judge has discretion as to if the
71
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judge will accept the agreement and approve it. Once it is approved and the judge
“signed off on it,” the court has essentially agreed to maintain jurisdiction to enforce
the agreement.
When negotiating contract terms, some community organizations involved in this
Good Neighbor Agreement study specifically sought out terms that are selfexecuting, that is, terms that do not require a significant amount of oversight. With a
self-executing term in a contract, if the term is not met, it is considered a breach and
general breach of contract remedies are available.
Several community organizations have achieved some success in enforcing contract
provisions by including the terms in a permit, such as a water use permit. Investigate
all requirements relating to this option as they often require the approval or
collaboration of a state agency.
There may also be remedies available through property law (covenants, easements,
etc.). This is a specialized area that may require consulting an attorney working
specifically with property law.

Resources
The following is a list of possible resources. The list includes legal treatises,
practitioner’s guides, and websites that may assist you to further expand your
understanding of contract law. The sponsoring organization makes no representations as
to the quality or comprehensiveness of the resources listed.
GERALD E. BERENDT ET AL., CONTRACT LAW AND PRACTICE (1998). A commonly
used textbook with details on each contract concept and supporting case law.
1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 28 (2d ed. 1993). A widely used
contracts treatise.
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (3rd ed. 1999). A widely used contracts
treatise.
ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 15 (2004). Short, concise
treatise with examples presented in an easy to understand format.
CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., RULES OF CONTRACT LAW (1999). A guide that includes
the Uniform Commercial Code (guides contract law when the contract involves the
sale of goods) and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (guides general contract
law).
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO ON CONTRACTS (5th ed. 2003).
FRED S. STEINGOLD, LEGAL GUIDE FOR STARTING & RUNNING A SMALL BUSINESS
(7th ed. 2003). Although this book is targeted to those starting a small business, it
includes material discussing the core concepts of contract law.
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http://www.findlaw.com. Website that provides links to find a lawyer, search the
website, search legal news, search for related cases, and search for statutes (laws)
relating to contracts, and virtually every other aspect of the law.
http://www.contract-law.com. Website that provides additional definitions and a
series of Frequently Asked Questions regarding contracts.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contract. Provides definitions and concepts.
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